Becker, H. v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (memorandum)

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J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 HEYWOOD BECKER Appellant IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA v. U.S. BANK, N.A. Appellee No. 998 EDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered April 21, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No: 2018-00849 U.S. BANK, N.A. Appellee IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GEORGE KIRIAKIDI AND HEYWOOD BECKER APPEAL OF HEYWOOD BECKER No. 999 EDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered April 21, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No: 2018-03392 J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 HEYWOOD BECKER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. U.S. BANK, N.A. Appellee No. 1001 EDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered April 21, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No: 2018-03843 HEYWOOD BECKER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. E. KEITH DARROW Appellee No. 1004 EDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered April 21, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No: 2019-08586 -2- J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 HEYWOOD BECKER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. ESTATE OF RICHARD RESTIFO, DECEASED A/K/A RICHARD J. RESTIFO, EMILY MARIE CIPRIANO, ADMIN. A/K/A EMILY M. CIPRIANO, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA APPEAL OF HEYWOOD BECKER, ESTATE OF RICHARD RESTIFO, DECEASED A/K/A RICHARD J. RESTIFO AND EMILY MARIE CIPRIANO ADMIN. A/K/A EMILY M. CIPRIANO Appellee No. 1000 EDA 2021 Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No: 2018-02856 BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 16, 2022 The issue in these consolidated appeals1 is whether Heywood Becker or U.S. Bank, N.A. (“the Bank”) has superior title to residential property originally owned by Richard Restifo located at 5 Brendon Knoll, Solesbury Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania (“the property”). The trial court ____________________________________________ The four appeals at 998, 999, 1001 and 1004 EDA 2021 were consolidated by order dated August 13, 2021. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513, we now consolidate these four appeals with the appeal at 1000 EDA 2021. 1 -3- J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 correctly concluded that the Bank has superior title to the property and that Becker’s claims are devoid of merit. Nevertheless, Becker entered judgment at all docket numbers in favor of himself. We remand for entry of judgment against Becker at all docket numbers, and we order the judgments that Becker entered in favor of himself stricken. The evidence adduced and supported by the record during the bench trial in these cases established the following. Restifo acquired the property in 1990. In 2001, Restifo’s builder, George Kiriakidi, loaned Restifo $30,000.00 and took a lien on the property as security for the loan. Kiriakidi’s mortgage was recorded on June 26, 2001. On October 12, 2001, Transland Financial Services, lnc. loaned Restifo $384,500.00, and as security for this loan, Transland took a first lien on the property until the debt was repaid. Transland’s mortgage was recorded on October 23, 2001. In 2004, after the work and improvements on the property were completed, Restifo refinanced his debt with a $500,000.00 loan from Fremont lnvestment & Loan to be secured by a recorded mortgage lien of first position on the property. Fremont paid the Kiriakidi and Transland mortgages and obtained the first position lien on the property. On March 15, 2012, the Fremont mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank. On May 20, 2016, Restifo died. Subsequently, the Fremont mortgage went unpaid. On December 26, 2016, the Bank commenced a mortgage foreclosure action against the property. -4- The Bank notified all interested J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 parties, including Kiriakidi, that the property was to be sold at sheriff’s sale. On November 9, 2017, the Bank was the successful bidder on the property at sheriff’s sale. The sheriff prepared and filed a sheriff’s deed which was recorded by the Recorder of Deeds. The Bank refurbished the property and hired a realtor, Kathleen Todd, to list it for sale. In December 2017, Keith and Lori Darrow entered into an agreement of sale to purchase the property. As of the date of trial, there had been no closing due to the litigation over the property. At some point following Restifo’s death, Becker, a real estate investor and disbarred attorney, contacted Kiriakidi regarding his mortgage, which Becker had discovered through a property search. remained of record and unsatisfied. Kiriakidi’s mortgage Kiriakidi told Becker about his relationship to Restifo and the reason for the mortgage. Becker agreed to pay Kiriakidi $3,000.00 for an assignment of the Kiriakidi mortgage and agreed to pay Kiriakidi an additional sum of money if he, Becker, successfully obtained good title to the property. Thus, the total price for assignment of Kiriakidi’s mortgage was contingent upon whether Becker succeeded in his quiet title claims. On December 1, 2017, Kiriakidi executed an assignment to Becker. Becker recorded the assignment and recalculated the principal and interest due on the $30,000.00 loan as $584,329.60. In early 2018, Todd noticed signs of intrusion into the property, so she placed “no trespass” signs on the property. In a subsequent visit, she found that her keys to the residence no longer worked. -5- She encountered J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 contractors inside the residence and learned that Becker had hired them to perform work at the property. In April 2018, Becker asked Emily Cipriano, a tenant at one of the properties Becker managed, to become administratrix of Restifo’s estate. Becker promised to pay Cipriano for serving as administratrix, but only if he successfully acquired good title to the property. The parties filed a total of five lawsuits asserting title to the property. The first lawsuit at No. 2018-00849 was Becker’s quiet title action against the Bank seeking invalidation of the sheriff’s deed issued to the Bank for the property following its foreclosure action. Becker initially obtained a default judgment due to the Bank’s failure to answer his complaint, but the Bank successfully petitioned to open judgment and then answered the complaint. In the second lawsuit at No. 2018-02856, shortly after Cipriano was appointed administratrix, Becker sued Restifo’s estate in a mortgage foreclosure action that he prepared based on Kiriakidi’s mortgage. Cipriano, acting as personal representative of Restifo’s estate, admitted to all of Becker’s claims against the estate. Becker drafted a quitclaim deed for Cipriano to execute to convey Restifo’s interest in the property to Becker to satisfy his claims against the estate. Cipriano testified that she never actually visited the property, that she relied exclusively on documents that Becker provided to her, and that she reviewed these documents in Becker’s office. Cipriano signed the quitclaim deed, and Becker filed and recorded it in May 2018. -6- J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 The third lawsuit at No. 2018-03392 was the Bank’s action to quiet title against Becker and Kiriakidi. The fourth lawsuit at No. 2018-03843 was Becker’s second quiet title action against the Bank. In the fifth lawsuit at No. 2019-08586, Becker filed a petition for injunction against Keith Darrow, who had signed the agreement of sale to purchase the property in December 2017. Following a three-day hearing, the court postponed its decision on Becker’s injunction motion until after trial on the quiet title actions. The lawsuits proceeded to a bench trial in which the court heard testimony and incorporated the record from the injunction hearing into the trial record. In a decision and order docketed on March 9, 2021, the court quieted title in favor of the Bank against all other claims on the ground that the Bank had paramount title to the property by virtue of its foreclosure and deed issued by the Sheriff. The court ordered that Kiriakidi’s mortgage be marked satisfied because Fremont paid Kiriakidi’s mortgage in 2004, and Kiriakidi received and negotiated the payoff check. The court denied all of Becker’s quiet title claims because they were based on a paid-off and satisfied mortgage. The court determined that Cipriano’s May 16, 2018 quitclaim deed did not convey any valid interest in the property to Becker and ordered the deed to be marked accordingly by the Recorder of Deeds and all parties. Finally, the court denied Becker’s motion for permanent -7- J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 injunction against Darrow because Becker was not the property’s owner and had acquired no interest in said property. Becker and Cipriano filed post-trial motions, which the court denied on April 20, 2021. The court’s order on this date directed the prothonotary to enter judgment, but the prothonotary did not do so satisfactorily.2 On May 14, 2021, Becker and Cipriano3 filed five notices of appeal (one from each of the five cases below). Becker and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On August 10, 2021, this Court ordered Becker to enter judgment in all five cases. The dockets reflect that at various points in August and September of 2021, Becker entered judgment in favor of himself in all five cases. See, e.g., Bucks County No. 2018-03843, docket entries (September 7, 2021 docket entry stating “praecipe to enter judgment on the order entered in favor of Haywood Becker and against U.S. Bank, N.A. for the sum of $0 on the order dated April 20, 2021”). ____________________________________________ In the lead case at No. 2018-00849, the docket entry for April 20, 2021 states, “Order entered by Judge Trauger on April 20, 2021. This order/judgment was docketed and sent on 04/20/2021 pursuant to PA.R.C.P. 236.” The term “order/judgment” appears to be standard language that the prothonotary uses for every order on the docket. We do not think that “order/judgment” adequately carried out the intent of the April 20, 2021 order, which was to enter judgment against Becker and in favor of Becker’s opponent(s) at each docket number. In our disposition below, we direct the prothonotary to enter judgment in these terms in every case. 2 3 Cipriano has not filed briefs in any appeal. -8- J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 We begin by addressing four of the five appeals: 998, 999, 1001 and 1004 EDA 2021. We address the fifth appeal, 1000 EDA 2021, below, because separate briefs were filed at that docket number. In the appeals at 998, 999, 1001 and 1004 EDA 2021, Becker filed two opening briefs, one pro se brief and one brief by his attorney, Ronald Clever, Esquire. Pennsylvania courts have consistently prohibited this practice, known as hybrid representation, in which a party is represented both by counsel and himself. Our reasons for precluding this practice are that permitting the pro se brief may involve a conflict between lawyer and client, and this conflict could undermine appellant’s chance of success; that counsel is obligated to submit to the appellate court only those issues which he believes to possess merit; that under no other circumstances are counsel and client permitted to present opposing arguments to Superior Court, as may well happen if both are permitted to submit briefs; and finally, that reviewing pro se briefs of counseled appellants would lead to procedural confusion and delay in the appellate process because of the need for the court and the Commonwealth to review and evaluate additional pro se briefs. Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1040 (Pa. 2011). Based on our policy against hybrid representation, we only will review the opening brief filed by Appellant’s counsel at 998, 999, 1001 and 1004 EDA 2021. The briefs essentially raise only two issues: 1. With regard to the various findings and inferences which the trial court made, were they supported by evidence? 2. Is the bank’s cause of action barred by the statute of limitations? Counseled Brief For Becker, Nos. 998, 999, 1001 and 1004 EDA 2021, at 5. -9- J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 The first argument is a claim that the court erred by denying his posttrial motion for judgment n.o.v.4 He claims that none of the court’s findings are supported by evidence, and he insists that he has superior title to the property because (1) he foreclosed on Kiriakidi’s mortgage, which he claimed was never satisfied, and (2) Kiriakidi’s mortgage was the first position lien on the property. He requests that we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for entry of judgment in his favor. Our standard of review of an order denying judgment n.o.v. is whether, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner and granting the benefit of every favorable inference, “there is sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict.” Tillery v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 156 A.3d 1233, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2017). Any conflict in the evidence is resolved in the verdict winner's favor. Id. Judgment n.o.v. may be granted “only where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... or [where] the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the ____________________________________________ Technically, Becker’s request for judgment n.o.v. in this Court is at odds with his prior act of entering of judgment in his favor at all caption numbers. A party normally seeks judgment n.o.v. when the judgment is adverse to him, not in cases such as this, when the judgment is (purportedly) in his favor. To resolve this procedural anomaly, we will treat these appeals as if the judgments on the docket are adverse to Becker, the proper foundation for an appellate request for judgment n.o.v. Further, as discussed elsewhere in this memorandum, we will instruct the trial court’s prothonotary to strike the judgments that Becker entered in his own favor. 4 - 10 - J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 movant.” Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 907 A.2d 1061, 1074 (Pa. 2006). We will disturb a trial court’s grant or denial of judgment n.o.v. “only for an abuse of discretion or an error of law.” Id. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, the applicable law, the well-reasoned decision of the Honorable Jeffrey Trauger dated March 5, 2021, and Judge Trauger’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion dated July 7, 2021, 5 we conclude Appellant's issue merits no relief. Becker claimed that he had superior title to the property because Kiriakidi’s mortgage was the first position lien on the property but had never been paid off. Thus, Becker continues, he obtained superior title by foreclosing on Kiriakidi’s mortgage and then obtaining a quitclaim deed from Restifo’s estate for the property. Judge Trauger’s decision explains, with accurate citations to the record, that Kiriakidi’s mortgage was fully paid off in 2004. Id. at 8-17. The decision further demonstrates that Becker’s claim that the mortgage was not satisfied was patently incredible. Id. Indeed, Judge Trauger observed that much of the evidence presented by Becker during trial, particularly the testimony of Kiriakidi, bordered on perjury. Id. Next, Becker’s counseled brief claims that the statute of limitations bars the Bank’s action, the third of the five lawsuits described above. ____________________________________________ We append both Judge Trauger’s decision and his opinion to this memorandum. 5 - 11 - J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 Becker characterizes the Bank’s action as one for promissory estoppel and argues: In the [B]ank’s instant cause of action for promissory estoppel, the bank claims that there had been a promise to mark the loan “satisfied.” Instead of deciding that cause of action, which is time-barred (the alleged promise from 2001 or from 2004, was sued upon in 2018), the [trial court] decided a case which is not before [it]: i.e., a declaratory judgment case, declaring that Mr. Becker's loan was already satisfied, by having been paid in 2004. Becker’s Brief at 15. This argument is devoid of substance. The Bank’s action is not a promissory estoppel claim but an action to quiet title. Becker does not argue that the statute of limitations bars the quiet title action. Moreover, contrary to Becker’s argument, there was not merely “a promise” to pay the loan. The trial court determined—and had ample basis to determine from the record—that Kiriakidi’s loan was paid in full when Restifo refinanced with Fremont in 2004. We next address the appeal at 1000 EDA 2021. In this appeal, Becker filed a pro se brief as Appellant, while his attorney in the other four appeals above, Mr. Clever, purported to file a brief as Appellee on behalf of Restifo’s estate.6 ____________________________________________ We express no opinion whether attorney Clever’s representation of the estate in this appeal poses a conflict of interest with his representation of Becker in the other four appeals. During oral argument attorney Clever answered that he believed there was no conflict because Becker and the estate had consistent interests. 6 - 12 - J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 Since Becker’s pro se brief is the only brief filed on behalf of an appellant at this caption number, we will review its substance. Lengthy review, however, is unnecessary due to its lacking content. Becker does not include a Statement of Questions Presented. His argument section claims that there are “no issues,” because all parties agree that this case should proceed to foreclosure in favor of Becker and against Darrow. This is simply false. No other party agrees that Becker is entitled to foreclosure, and the evidence of record belies this claim. Based on our review of all five appeals, we fully agree with Judge Trauger’s apt analysis, and we have no trouble concluding that the Bank is entitled to prevail, while Becker’s claim of title is entirely without merit. We direct the prothonotary in the lower court to strike (1) the judgment entered in favor of Becker on August 18, 2021 at No. 2018-00849, and (2) the judgments entered in favor of Becker on September 7, 2021 at Nos. 2018-03392, 2018-02856, 2018-03843 and 2019-08586. We further order the Bucks County Recorder of Deeds to strike the deed relating to the property from Emily Marie Cipriano to Becker. We further order that the prothonotary shall enter judgment at each docket number, explicitly worded as follows: (1) No. 2018-00849: Judgment entered in favor of U.S Bank, N.A. and against Heywood Becker; - 13 - J-A11017-22, J-A11018-22 (2) No. 2018-03392: Judgment entered in favor of U.S. Bank, N.A. and against George Kiriakidi and Heywood Becker; (3) No. 2018-02856: Judgment entered against Heywood Becker, and deed from Emily Marie Cipriano to Heywood Becker stricken; (4) No. 2018-03843: Judgment entered in favor of U.S Bank, N.A. and against Heywood Becker; and (5) No. 2019-08586: Judgment entered in favor of E. Keith Darrow and against Heywood Becker. Finally, we affirm the judgments as modified above. Case remanded for proceedings in accordance with this memorandum. Judgments affirmed as modified in accordance with this memorandum. Application of Heywood Becker for leave to file supplemental brief denied. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 6/16/2022 - 14 - Circulated 05/27/2022 01:12 PM Circulated 05/27/2022 01:12 PM

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