Com. v. Jackson, J. (memorandum)

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J-A12032-21 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOVAR JUWAN JACKSON Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 591 MDA 2020 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 2, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001488-2019 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: AUGUST 19, 2021 Jovar Juwan Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of two counts of robbery, and one count of criminal conspiracy.1 We affirm. In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 1-7. Jackson now raises the following issues for our review: I. Two of the Commonwealth’s witnesses testified that their discussions with the prosecutor affected their testimony. … During [] Jackson’s cross-examination of the second witness, the Commonwealth objected and the trial court limited [defense] counsel’s questioning. … Did the trial court err when: ____________________________________________ 1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(9), 903. J-A12032-21 a. The hearsay rules, on which the prosecutor rested her objection, would have allowed the witness to answer; and b. It prevented the jury from forming a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility and violated the Confrontation Clause? Brief for Appellant at 4. We will address Jackson’s issues together, as they are related. Jackson asserts that the trial court “improperly cut off [Jackson’s] cross-examination.” Id. at 16. First, Jackson claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth’s hearsay objection, and that the restriction of crossexamination contributed to the verdict. Id. at 16, 19. According to Jackson, Todd Coyle (“Coyle”) and William Reiss (“Reiss”), who heard the gunshot and saw people fleeing the scene from across the street, changed their testimony at trial. Id. at 17. Jackson argues that defense counsel asked Reiss2 whether his discussions with the prosecutor influenced his trial testimony regarding his observation of two or three people running from Hilary Gbotoe’s (“Gbotoe”) apartment, despite previously having told police that he had observed four men. Id. at 17-18; see also id. (claiming that “[t]he obvious point of the question was not to prove the number of people that ran from the apartment; it sought details of the witness’s preparation to determine whether the ____________________________________________ In his Argument, Jackson fails to identify the witness to whom the challenged objection was directed. From our review of Jackson’s Statement of the Case and the trial transcripts, it appears that this exchange occurred during crossexamination of Reiss. See N.T., 10/10/19, at 379-87. 2 -2- J-A12032-21 prosecutor corrupted his recollection.”). Jackson contends that this alleged error contributed to the verdict, as “[t]here is no understating the importance of the credibility of the ‘two independent witnesses across the street.’” Id. at 19. Second, Jackson asserts that, by limiting his cross-examination, the trial court also violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 20. Jackson claims that he should have been permitted to cross-examine Commonwealth witnesses on matters affecting credibility. Id. at 21. Specifically, Jackson argues that [] Jackson’s questioning—if the trial court had not intervened— would have left the jury with a significantly different impression of [] Reiss’s credibility. [] Reiss indicated that his discussions with the prosecutor changed his recollection. He admitted that he told the police that he had seen four people flee and another person stay in the apartment after closing the door. [Reiss] admitted that his police statement did not include the “minimum number” verbiage that he used during his direct examination. He further admitted that he used that verbiage as a result of his conversations with the prosecutor before trial. Further exploration into what the prosecutor had told him would have provided the jury with an explanation of why [] Reiss’[s] recollection had changed. Id. at 22-23 (citations to record omitted). Jackson asserts that both Reiss and Coyle changed their respective accounts after meeting with the -3- J-A12032-21 prosecutor. Id. at 24, 27.3 In its Opinion, the trial court set forth this Court’s standard of review and the relevant law, addressed Jackson’s claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 7-12. Specifically, the trial court stated that “the court’s ruling did not prevent counsel from impeaching Reiss, and it did not prevent the jury from assessing his credibility based on the potential discrepancies between his trial testimony and what he initially told police.” Id. at 10. The trial court also stated that it was clear, even without the proffered testimony, that the jury would “understand that counsel was asking whether the prosecutor got the witness to change their statement.” Id. Additionally, as the trial court pointed out, Coyle testified that during his later conversation with the prosecutor, he clarified that there were three people running from the scene, but the fourth man remained inside the house. Id. at 9 n.7; see also N.T., 10/9/19, at 354-59. According to the trial court, even if its evidentiary ruling was erroneous, the resulting prejudice was de minimus. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 10-12. We agree with the trial ____________________________________________ 3 Jackson’s Confrontation Clause challenge is waived. As Jackson acknowledges in his brief, defense counsel did not raise a challenge based on the Confrontation Clause in arguing against the Commonwealth’s objection. Brief for Appellant at 20 n. 1; see also Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding the appellant’s Confrontation Clause challenge to the preclusion of cross-examination waived, because he first raised it in his concise statement); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). -4- J-A12032-21 court’s reasoning, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis. See id. at 7-12. Accordingly, we can grant Jackson no relief on his claims. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 08/19/2021 -5- Circulated 07/29/2021 10:15 AM

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