Com. v. Ferrufino, J. (memorandum)

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J-A30020-19 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE SANTOS FERRUFINO Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 530 MDA 2019 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002349-2017 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE SANTOS FERRUFINO Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 531 MDA 2019 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002350-2017 BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.* MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2020 Appellant Jose Santos Ferrufino appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for first-degree murder, burglary, and related offenses. Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A30020-19 We adopt the trial court’s summary of the facts underlying this matter. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/5/19, at 7-41. Briefly, we note that Appellant was arrested and charged with several offenses based on two separate incidents involving Alexander Hugo and Appellant’s wife, Patricia Sanchez-Rivera, who were allegedly involved in an extramarital affair.1 On December 10, 2018, following a multi-day trial, the jury convicted Appellant of all charges, including first-degree murder. On January 30, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life without parole for first-degree murder and an aggregate consecutive term of fifteen to thirty-five years’ imprisonment for the remaining convictions. On February 8, 2019, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence supporting the murder and burglary convictions. After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion, Appellant timely filed separate notices of appeal at each docket number.2 Appellant ____________________________________________ At CP-36-CR-0002349-2017, Appellant was charged with one count each of burglary, firearms not to be carried without a license, and endangering the welfare of children, two counts of terroristic threats, four counts of simple assault, and four counts of recklessly endangering another person. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(1), 6196(a)(1), 4304(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(3), 2705. At CP-36-CR-0002350-2017, Appellant was charged with criminal homicide, burglary, and two counts of conspiracy. See 18 Pa.C.S. 2501(a), 3502(a)(1), 903. 1 Appellant was charged in two cases that were consolidated for trial. The record confirms that Appellant complied with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), and properly filed separate notices of appeal at each docket number. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 977 (stating that “the proper practice under Rule 341(a) is to file separate appeals from an order that 2 -2- J-A30020-19 subsequently filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement challenging the weight and sufficiency of the evidence supporting his murder and burglary convictions. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Appellant’s claims. On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we have reordered as follows: 1. Whether the evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable inferences derived from the evidentiary record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to establish all elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt? 2. Whether the evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable inferences derived from the evidentiary record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to establish all of the elements of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt? 3. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] posttrial motion for judgment of acquittal by order dated April 1, 2019 where the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence as a matter of law to establish the [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges? 4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal by order dated April 1, 2019[,] since the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence as a matter of law to establish the [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges ____________________________________________ resolves issues arising on more than one docket. The failure to do so requires the appellate court to quash the appeal”). The fact that Appellant listed both docket numbers on each notice of appeal does not affect our conclusion. See Commonwealth v. Johnson 236 A.3d 1141, 1144 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (partially overruling Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Super. 2019), and declining to “invalidate an otherwise timely appeal based on the inclusion of multiple docket numbers”). -3- J-A30020-19 because certain facts were not given greater weight but were ignored or given equal weight with all the facts? Appellant’s Brief at 6. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the wellreasoned conclusions of the trial court, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. Specifically, we agree with the trial court that there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s convictions for first-degree murder and burglary.3 See Trial Ct. Op. at 44-49. Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting Appellant’s weight claims. See id. at 49-52. Accordingly, we affirm. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 11/18/2020 ____________________________________________ We add that, to the extent Appellant claims that the jury should have convicted him of voluntary manslaughter instead of first-degree murder, he raises this claim for the first time on appeal. Appellant did not raise a heatof-passion defense at trial, nor did he request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, this claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302 (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). 3 -4- Circulated 10/28/2020 12:06 PM 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion 2_Opinion

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