Com. v. Brightwell, R. (memorandum)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

J-S56014-19 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ROBERT BRIGHTWELL Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1123 EDA 2019 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 22, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000732-1975 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2019 In 1980, Robert Brightwell was convicted of, among other charges, second-degree murder, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b), and conspiracy, see Pa.C.S.A. § 903. Subsequently, he was sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”). The incident in question involved the shooting and killing of an individual during an armed robbery at a gas station, and although it is unclear from the record who performed the shooting, two others were implicated in this armed robbery and killing. When Brightwell committed the offenses for which he was found guilty, he was seventeen years old. After the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that sentencing juveniles capable of rehabilitation to LWOP is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) J-S56014-19 (indicating that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review), Brightwell received a new sentencing hearing. At this hearing, the trial court sentenced him for his second-degree murder conviction to thirty-five years to life imprisonment. Brightwell appeals from that judgment of sentence, arguing that the maximum term of life imprisonment imposed upon a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Miller and Montgomery. As we are bound by precedent to hold that a mandatory life maximum for a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder is not cruel and unusual punishment, see Commonwealth v. Olds, 192 A.3d 1188, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied, 199 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2018), we affirm. Following his initial conviction and sentencing, Brightwell appealed, but this Court affirmed the trial court. After that, our Supreme Court denied allocatur. Approximately thirty years later, with Miller and Montgomery having been decided, Brightwell filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Correspondingly, Brightwell’s LWOP sentence was vacated, and he was resentenced to thirtyfive years to life for his second-degree murder offense and five to ten years of incarceration for the crime of conspiracy. Brightwell filed a timely appeal challenging this resentencing, and both the PCRA court and Brightwell followed the dictates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Brightwell presents one question for our review: -2- J-S56014-19 1) Did the lower court err by imposing an illegal sentence, which included a mandatory term of life imprisonment for seconddegree murder, as well as a consecutive five- to ten-year sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery with serious bodily injury, where Brightwell committed those crimes when he was under the age of eighteen? See Appellant’s Brief, at 9. Brightwell’s sole issue is a challenge to the legality of his sentence. A challenge to the legality of a sentence presents pure questions of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Brightwell avers: 1) a “one size fits all” mandatory life maximum sentence violates Miller’s individualized sentencing approach for juveniles; 2) a second-degree murder, which does not require intent to kill in Pennsylvania, should necessitate a lower sentence for a juvenile; 3) the sentencing of a juvenile to a maximum of life in prison does not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Appellant’s Brief, at 19, 24, 27. In Olds, this Court determined that “mandatory life maximums for juveniles convicted of felony murder represent conventional sentencing practices.” 192 A.3d at 1197. In so finding, we held that “the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 1102(b)’s mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder, who did not kill or intend to kill.” Id., at 1197-98. -3- J-S56014-19 As in the case of Olds, Brightwell’s new sentence provides for a meaningful opportunity for release. See id., at 1198; see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (remarking that states are not required to guarantee eventual freedom, but provide a meaningful opportunity to obtain released dependent on maturity and rehabilitation) (citation and quotation omitted). However, we also stated that “trial courts must sentence juveniles convicted of seconddegree murder prior to June 25, 2012[,] to a maximum term of life imprisonment under section 1102(b),” Olds, 192 A.3d at 1198 (emphasis added), and held that these “mandatory maximums [did] not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment,” id. Brightwell does not offer any distinguishable basis for a departure from the reasoning in Olds. In fact, he concedes that he is raising this issue in order to preserve the issue in the event the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reverses Olds. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, at 18, n.* We note that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied the petition for allowance of appeal in Olds. See 199 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2018) (Table). Accordingly, we are bound by Olds. See Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 A.2d 881, 882 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“As long as the decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court, it remains binding precedent.”). We therefore affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. -4- J-S56014-19 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 12/30/19 -5-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.