Com. v. Rock, G. (judgment order)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

J-S09038-18 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. GARY LEE ROCK Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1605 MDA 2017 Appeal from the PCRA Order September 25, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-MD-0000283-1977 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT*, J. JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 15, 2018 Appellant, Gary Lee Rock, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as untimely his serial petition for collateral relief (labeled a petition for writ of habeas corpus), per the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 95419546. In May 1978, a jury convicted Appellant of six counts of attempted murder and two counts of first-degree murder. The court sentenced Appellant in September 1980, to life imprisonment, and our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in 1981. In 1984, Appellant obtained habeas corpus relief in federal court. Following a new trial, a jury convicted Appellant on January 22, 1985, of four counts of attempted murder and two counts each of first-degree murder and aggravated assault. On March 26, 1986, the court again sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. This Court ____________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S09038-18 affirmed the judgment of sentence on April 16, 1987, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on July 8, 1988. See Commonwealth v. Rock, 526 A.2d 1235 (Pa.Super. 1987) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 519 Pa. 653, 546 A.2d 58 (1988). Appellant sought no further direct review, so the judgment of sentence became final sixty days later, on September 6, 1988. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1 (effective 1984 to 1990). Between 1988 and 2001, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court and two PCRA petitions. On June 8, 2015, Appellant filed his third pro se PCRA petition, arguing police records sealed during his 1978 trial might contain exculpatory evidence. The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely on September 3, 2015; this Court affirmed on April 1, 2016, concluding Appellant failed to show he exercised due diligence to obtain the sealed police records. See Commonwealth v. Rock, 143 A.3d 770 (Pa.Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum). On June 16, 2017, Appellant filed the current pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the PCRA court deemed a fourth PCRA petition. In the petition, Appellant recast the argument from his third PCRA petition in light of Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc), aff’d, 638 Pa. 687, 158 A.3d 618 (2017). The PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice on September 15, 2017; Appellant filed a pro se response on September 22, 2017. On September 25, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal and voluntary -2- J-S09038-18 Rule 1925(b) statement on October 13, 2017. Preliminarily, any petition for post-conviction collateral relief will generally be considered a PCRA petition, even if captioned as a request for habeas corpus relief, if the petition raises issues for which the relief sought is available under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638 (1998); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for same purpose). As well, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016). A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is “final” at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be excused; a petitioner asserting an exception must file a petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2). The timeliness exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), known as the newly-discovered facts exception, requires a petitioner to plead and prove he: (1) did not know the facts upon which he based his petition; and (2) could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. A.3d 553 (Pa.Super. 2017). Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 Generally, Pennsylvania courts presume that -3- J-S09038-18 information of public record is not “unknown” for purposes of the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception. A.2d 520 (2006). Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468, 895 Pennsylvania courts, however, do not apply a public record presumption to pro se incarcerated PCRA petitioners; but, a pro se incarcerated petitioner is still required to plead and prove the petitioner’s due diligence. Burton, supra at ___, 158 A.3d at 638; Shiloh, supra at 559. Additionally, to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove, inter alia, his allegations of error were not previously litigated. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). Instantly, Appellant claims police records sealed during his 1978 trial might contain exculpatory evidence. As presented, Appellant’s claim is cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). Thus, the PCRA court properly treated this most recent prayer for relief as a PCRA petition. Nevertheless, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 6, 1988, upon expiration of the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1 (effective 1984 to 1990). Appellant filed the current PCRA petition on June 16, 2017, which is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant attempts to invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, insisting police records sealed during his 1978 trial might contain exculpatory evidence. In his third PCRA petition, Appellant litigated a substantially identical claim based on the same exception, which failed for lack of due -4- J-S09038-18 diligence in seeking access to the same sealed records. Appellant cannot now rely upon Burton to resurrect a claim previously decided against him in his third PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). Thus, Appellant’s petition remains time-barred, and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review it. See Zeigler, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 5/15/18 -5-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.