Com. v. Perez-Toledo, R. (memorandum)

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J-S30024-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. RICARDO PEREZ-TOLEDO Appellant No. 738 MDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 15, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0001329-2011 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 06, 2014 Appellant, Ricardo Perez-Toledo, appeals from the March 15, 2013 after a jury found him guilty of rape of a child, and two counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child and indecent assault.1 After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence. The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows. On June 28, 2011, the Luzerne County District Attorney filed a [c]riminal [i]nformation charging [Appellant] with [r]ape of a [c]hild and related repeated sexual assault of a minor female victim, ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), and 3126(a)(7), respectively. J-S30024-14 S.R-year period from January 2005 to December 2010, during which S.R-S. was between six and 11 years old. The victim disclosed these assaults to her school guidance counselor, who subsequently alerted police.] [Appellant] pleaded not guilty and a jury trial commenced on October 16, 2012. [At trial, the victim testified in a manner inconsistent with her testimony during the April 27, 2011 preliminary hearing.] On October 18, 2012, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. A Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) was ordered to be completed by the Luzerne County Adult Probation and Parole Department, and a sentencing date was scheduled. A sentencing hearing commenced on March 15, 2013, when [Appellant] stipulated to a determination by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) that he be classified as a sexually violent predator. Upon consideration of the submissions of counsel, the SOAB Report, and a review of the PSI, [the trial court] sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of correctional institution. Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/13, at 1-2 (citation to notes of testimony and footnotes omitted).2 The record reflects that although Appellant was advised of his postsentence rights at the March 15, 2013 sentencing hearing, he did not file ____________________________________________ 2 For the ease of our discussion, we have assigned each page a corresponding number. -2- J-S30024-14 any post-sentence motions. See N.T., 3/15/13, at 15-16. On April 15, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.3 On appeal, Appellant raises the following 11 issues for our review. [A.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in denying [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 in that trial commenced more than 365 days after the initiation of the case and there was not sufficient excludable time? [B.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in not appointing an attorney to [the victim] as requested by [Appellant] where [she] made inconsistent statements that could subject [her] to perjury or other charges []? [C.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in admitting the testimony of Michel[l]e Planutis as to statements of the [victim] [], where such statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and were also admitted in violation of the ntation under the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions and related case law? [D.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in admitting the testimony of Jackie Silveri as to statements of the [victim] [], where such statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and were also of confrontation under the U.S. and ____________________________________________ 3 excluded from the computation of time. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (providing that when the last day of a calculated period of time falls on a Saturday or Sunday, such day shall be omitted from the computation). Additionally, Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. -3- J-S30024-14 Pennsylvania Constitutions and related case law? [E.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in admitting the testimony of minor child S.C. as to statements of the [victim] [], where such statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and were also of confrontation under the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions and related case law? [F.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Gary Lawrence as to statements of the [victim] where such statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and were also admitted in violation of U.S. and Pennsylvania related case law? Constitutions and [G.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in admitting and permitting a portion of the preliminary hearing transcript to be read to the Jury [], where such statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and were also admitted in violation of under the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions and related case law? [H.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in instructing the jury that the testimony read by Detective Zipovski could constitute truth of the matter asserted[, s]pecifically because there was no analysis or showing that this could be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted under Pa.R.E. 804 or any other rule of [e]vidence or relevant case law? [I.] Whether the [trial c]ourt erred in giving the flight instruction to the jury, where there was not a legally sufficient basis to give that instruction as there was no evidence -4- J-S30024-14 [Appellant] knew of the charges and [Appellant] was returning to the jurisdiction? [J.] Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict as to all convictions as no substantive evidence of guilt was provided at the time of trial, and evidence that suggested that a crime had occurred was only admitted as inadmissible hearsay and/or hearsay that was not for the truth of the matter asserted? [K.] Whether the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence? -6 (citations to notes of testimony omitted). For the ease of our discussion, claims in a slightly different order than presented in his appellate brief. address those claims concurrently. In Issue A, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his Rule Id. at 11. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Appellant has waived this claim. case, an appellate court will reverse only if the trial court abused its Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 700 (Pa. 2012). Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after [a] hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely -5- J-S30024-14 an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused. The pro evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a manner consistent urts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement as well. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (citations omitted), affirmed, 44 A.3d 655 (Pa. 2012). In the instant matter, our review of the record reveals that at no time 4 file a motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to Rule 600. See Pa.R.Crim.P (600)(D)(1) ____________________________________________ 4 Appellant was represented at trial by Charles G. Ross, Jr., Esquire (Attorney Ross). -6- J-S30024-14 attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that Appellant acknowledges this fact in his that this issue was properly prese See Brief at 8, 11- ssues not raised in the lower Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Appellant has waived his Rule 600 claim. pursuant to Rule 600. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/13, at 3 Accordingly, there is no reviewable issue for In Issue B, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint counsel [victim] made inconsistent statements that could subject [her] to perjury or The victim, it should be noted, testified inconsistently with her testimony at the April 27, 2011 preliminary hearing, and was questioned further by the Commonwealth after denying at trial that Appellant had committed the crimes in question. See N.T, 10/1718/12, at 33-48. Our review of the record reveals that Appellant has failed to properly develop this claim for appellate review. Notably, the argument section for -7- J-S30024-14 without s -15. Appellant has failed to cite any relevant authority in support of his claim that the trial court was required to appoint counsel for the victim, and, in fact, concedes in his appellate brief that he has found no case law in this regard. Id. at 16. Furthermore, Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that he possesses standing to assert the privileges afforded by the Fifth Amendment on behalf of another individual. This Court has long recognized that we will not consider issues where Appellant fails to cite to any legal authority or otherwise develop the issue. Commonwealth v. McLaurin, 45 A.3d 1131, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013). In an appellate brief, parties must provide an argument as to each question, which should include a discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. This Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived. Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371-372 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (some citations omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has waived this claim. See also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 341 (Pa. 2011) (holding that arguments which are undeveloped and lack -8- J-S30024-14 citation to relevant authority are waived), cert. denied, Briggs v. Pennsylvania, 132 S.Ct. 267 (2011). In Issue G, Appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing the Police Detective Kenneth referencing N.T., 10/17-18/12, at 80-84. Appellant maintains, inter alia, that said testimony evidence, our standard of review is one of deference. Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence Commonwealth v. Selenski, 18 A.3d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2011) in reaching a conclusion the trial court over-rides [sic] or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 986 A.2d 150 (Pa. 2009). Herein, our review of the record reveals that Appellant waived his the preliminary hearing transcript by expressly stipulating during the jury -9- J-S30024-14 Attorney Ross, stated the fo examination of the victim. [Attorney Ross]: Your Honor, as the Court is aware, the Commonwealth is going to proceed with her witnesses and they are going to be testifying as to prior inconsistent statements. It is the position of the defense that the only statements -excuse me. The only statement or recording that can be introduced as substantive evidence is the preliminary hearing transcript, because at the time, the [victim] was under oath and defense counsel was allowed to cross-examine her. N.T., 10/17-18/12, at 38-39 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we conclude al court abused its discretion in various instructions it gave to the jury. Specifically, in Issue H, Appellant argues that t referencing N.T., 10/17-18/12, at 90. In Issue I, Appellant further contends where there was not a legally sufficient basis to give that instruction as there was no evidence [Appellant] knew of the charges and [Appellant] was returning to the disagree. - 10 - J-S30024-14 Our standard of review in addressing challenges to jury instructions is an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Leber, 802 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2002). instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1272, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted), affirmed, 9 A.3d 613 (Pa. 2010). propriety of jury instructions, this Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated portions, to determine if the instructions were Id. the instruction under review contained fundamental error, misled, or confused the or Appellant suffered prejudice. Commonwealth v. McRae, 5 A.3d 425, 430-431 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 23 A.3d 1045 (Pa. 2011). Our review of the record reveals that Appellant waived his challenge to the aforementioned jury instruction on by failing to at the time they were given. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 179 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding, inter alia, that the appellant when - 11 - J-S30024-14 In the instant matter, the trial court instructed the jury on Detective Zipovski With regard to the testimony of [Detective] Zipovski and I am strictly talking about the testimony proved by him in regards to testimony that was given at an April 27, 2011 preliminary hearing before the Magistrate District Judge Zola. You may, if you choose, regard this evidence as proof of the truth of anything that the witness said in the earlier statement. You may also consider this evidence to help you judge the credibility and weight of the testimony given by the witness at this trial. N.T., 10/17-18/12, at 89-90. instruction. See id. Additionally, d parties about whether a flight instruction was warranted, Appellant objected to the t 10/17-18/12, at 137. The trial court overruled this objection, concluding that the standard flight instruction was applicable to this case. Id. Thereafter, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury on flight. There was evidence presented at the trial, including the testimony from Detective Zipovski, that tended to show that [Appellant] either fled from police or hid from police[,] leaving the area to go elsewhere. [Appellant] maintained, as you heard, that he did so because of the illness of his mother and so forth. The credibility, weight and effect of this evidence is for you to decide. Generally speaking, when a crime has been committed and a person thinks he or she is or may - 12 - J-S30024-14 be accused of committing it, and he or she flees or conceals himself or herself, such flight or concealment is a circumstance tending to prove the person is conscious of guilt. Such flight or concealment does not necessarily show consciousness of guilt in every case. A person may flee or hide for some other motive and may do so even though innocent. Whether the evidence of flight or concealment in this case should be looked at as tending to prove guilt, depends upon the facts and circumstances of this case, and especially upon motives that may have prompted the flight or concealment. You may not find [Appellant] guilty solely on the basis of evidence of flight or concealment. Id. at 171-172. We note that basis to support said instruction is belied by the record. The evidence adduced at trial supports the inference that Appellant immediately fled the county after learning he was wanted in connection with the sexual assault of the victim. The record reveals Appellant abruptly fled the county on December 21, 2010, the day after the victim reported the sexual assault to her school guidance counselor, and did so without informing his employer. See N.T., 10/17-18/12, at 47, 71-73, 122-124. Additionally, the reflected the applicable law. Williams, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Housman, 986 A.2d 822, 831 (Pa. 2009), (indicating flight may constitute circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt), cert. - 13 - J-S30024-14 denied, 131 S. Ct. 199 (2010). Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, must fail. In Issue J, Appellant argues, albeit without any citation whatsoever to the certified record, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, and indecent -34. When addressing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, w review the evidence admitted during the trial along with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d 396, 404 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). [are] to be resolved by the trier of fact unless the evidence was so weak and inconclusive that no probability of Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by me Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations [T]he trier of fact, in passing upon the credibility of the Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1220 (Pa. 2009) (citation and - 14 - J-S30024-14 internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, Rivera v. Pennsylvania, 560 U.S. 909 (2010). Upon careful review, we conclude that Appellant has waived his sufficiency claim by failing to specify in his Rule 1925(b) statement the elements of the offenses that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a at of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable who is less than 13 Id. § 3121(c). Likewise, a person commits the crime of involuntary deviate sexual Id. § 3123(1). Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, in turn, involves the commission of Id. § 3123(b). Read in relevant part, a person will be found guilty of the crime of indecent assault, if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the - 15 - J-S30024-14 Id. § 3126(a)(7). reference to the individual elements of the crimes for which he was convicted, but rather, merely states that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because, inter alia no substantive evidence of guilt 8/9/13, at 2, ¶ 10. This Court has repeatedly recognized that, [i]n order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient. Such specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). Based waived for failure to comply with Rule 1925(b). See id. (concluding that non-compliant with Rule 1925(b), and could not be addressed by this Court). The trial court, in turn, - 16 - J-S30024-14 echoed this reasoning in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/13, at 15.5 In Issue K, Appellant argues, again without any citation to the certified Brief at 34-35. true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 566 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Where the not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 528 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, Tharp v. Pennsylvania, 541 U.S. 1045 (2004). In the instant matter, following citation to pertinent case law, is comprised of the following. Appellant contends that when in a case as here, the alleged victim denies that any criminal conduct occurred and the entirety of the evidence ____________________________________________ 5 We further note that, even if Appellant had properly complied with Rule 1925(b), his sufficiency claim would nonetheless be waived for failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119. As noted, the argument section for Issue J in any citation to case law, in violation of Rule 2119(b) and (c). - 17 - J-S30024-14 against a defendant is hearsay evidence, the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The Appellate Court of Pennsylvania should require a minimum standard of evidentiary proof. It is shocking to believe that a jury could find [] Appellant guilty of all the counts in this case where there has been no direct evidence or testimony. 6 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that It is well established that this Court is precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting our credibility determination for that of the factfinder. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and cert. denied, Champney v. Pennsylvania, 542 U.S. 939 (2004) need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be ____________________________________________ 6 We note that Appellant raised this issue during sentencing, albeit briefly. See alleged victim recanted her testimony while on the stand. She specifically Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1) (stating that a weight of the evidence claim shall be . - 18 - J-S30024-14 Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2006). Instantly, Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/13, at 16. The jury, in turn, found the testimony of the version of the events. As noted, we are precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Champney, supra. Accordingly, we decline to disturb these credibility determinations on appeal. which Appellant argues concurrently in his appellate brief. See Brief at 18. Appellant first challenges the admission of the testimony of Michelle Planutis, Jackie Silveri, S.C., and Dr. Gary Lawrence,7 concerning statements the victim made to them, into evidence. Id. This testimony, Appellant avers, was impermissible hearsay, and was improperly admitted ____________________________________________ 7 The record reflects that Michelle Planutis is the guidance counselor at Hazelton Elementary Middle School where the victim attended. N.T., 10/1718/12, at 48. Jackie Silveri is a caseworker for the Luzerne County Children and Youth Services who investigated the vict Id. at 56-58. S.C. is a minor female who attended Hazelton Elementary Middle School with the Id. at 63-64. Dr. Gary Lawrence is a pediatrician who examined the victim. Id. at 92, 94. - 19 - J-S30024-14 by the trial court under the Tender Years exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 19-24. testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Tender Years exception to the hearsay rule governs hearsay statements made by a child 12 years of age or younger and provides, in pertinent part, as follows. § 5985.1. Admissibility of certain statements (a) General rule.--An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was 12 years of age or younger, describing any of the offenses enumerated otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if: (1) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2) the child either: (i) testifies at the proceeding; or (ii) is unavailable as a witness. -of-court statement Commonwealth v. - 20 - J-S30024-14 Lukowich, 875 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 885 A.2d 41 (Pa. 2005). Instantly, the record reveals that prior to trial, the Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to introduce statements made by the victim, pursuant to the Tender Years exception to the hearsay rule. See 10/1/12. The trial court held a hearing on October 15, 2012, at the the [trial c]ourt would find that those statements would be admissible at rt entered an to the Tender Years exception to the hearsay rule. See Trial Court Order, 10/15/12. Upon review, we conclude that Appellant has waived his challenge to the trial court exception to the hearsay rule. pursuant to the Tender Years Specifically, the record reveals that during he Tender Years exception. See N.T., 10/15/12, at 9. Our review of the trial transcript further reveals that at no point did Appellant object to the testimony of the aforementioned witnesses on the basis that it was inadmissible under the Tender Years exception to the hearsay rule. See N.T., 10/17-18/12, at 48-61, 63-65, 91- - 21 - J-S30024-14 n order for a claim of error to be preserved for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection before the trial court at the appropriate stage of the proceedings; the failure to do so will result in Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Accordingly, that the trial statements to be presented to the jury pursuant to the Tender Years exception must fail. Secondly, to the extent Appellant argues, albeit parenthetically, in Issues C, D, E, F, and G that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confrontation by allowing Planutis, Silveri, S.C., Dr. Lawrence, and Detective Zipovski to testify, we conclude he has again waived these claims by failing to preserve them at trial. See at 18, 25. The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to both federal and state prosecutions and provides 8 In ____________________________________________ 8 We note that the Confrontation Clause applies to the states through application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 406 (1965). Appellant makes no specific reference to his confrontation rights under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, our discussion will be limited to Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Laney, 729 A.2d 598, 601 n.1 (Pa. nominal invocation of the state constitution, analysis of the federal (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 22 - J-S30024-14 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits the use of testimonial statements obtained by police officers against a criminal defendant, unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the unavailable declarant. Id. at 51-52, 68. Crawford divests the Confrontation Clause from state hearsay and evidence rules.9 Since Crawford, the Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal and state [statement] is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154 (2011). is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands not that evidence be reliable but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. (Footnote Continued) _______________________ omitted)), appeal denied, 751 A.2d 187 (Pa. 2000). 9 Prior to Crawford, the controlling case in this area was Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause permitted the use of hearsay testimony of an unavailable declarant at trial Id. at 66. - 23 - J-S30024-14 Commonwealth v. Holton, 906 A.2d 1246, 1252-1253 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 918 A.2d 743 (Pa. 2007). of evidence and specifically state the grounds for said objections. Olsen, supra See [a] party may claim error in a objection did not object at trial on the basis of the Confrontation Clause and Crawford. Although Appellant did mention the Confrontation Clause at the October 15, 2012 hearing as to some of the witnesses, this was before the victim recanted on the stand at trial, and the See Commonwealth v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 184 (Pa. Super. 2005) introduction of the out-of-court statements as a violation of his right to Based on these considerations, we conclude Appellant has waived these claims for failure to object on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. See Olsen, supra; Hood, supra. For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief in the instant appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the March 15, 2013 judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. - 24 - J-S30024-14 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 6/6/2014 - 25 -

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