Com. v. Smith, B. (memorandum)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

J-S20002-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. BRADLEY SMITH Appellant No. 67 WDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 28, 2012 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0015947-2010 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DONOHUE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED: April 29, 2014 Appellant, Bradley Smith, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for voluntary manslaughter and firearms not to be carried without a license.1 We affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. On November 13, 2010, [Appellant] and Abraham Mitchell f The purchase was facilitated and arranged by Jasmine Howard and Clarence White, who were relatives and friends of [Victim]. That evening, Howard and White drove to the Carnegie section of Allegheny County and picked up Appellant and [Co____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2503(b), 6106, respectively. ___________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S20002-14 apartment in the Crafton Heights section of the City of approximately 7:00 p.m., [Victim] arrived with a small cardboard box containing the heroin. [Victim] had a brief conversation with Howard in her bedroom and then went to the living room where he approached Appellant and [CoDefendant] to discuss the heroin purchase. The money and drugs were placed on the couch for the transaction, but Appellant took back the money when he saw that [Victim] had only brought approximately thirty bundles of heroin. When Appellant took back the money, ensued between Appellant and [Victim]. [Victim] managed to get on top of Appellant, and Appellant pulled out a .22 revolver and shot it once, apparently not striking [Victim]. Appellant and [Victim] began to wrestle over the gun, and [Co-Defendant] pulled out a .380 semiautomatic and fired a warning shot into the couch. Howard ran into her bedroom to retrieve her handgun, and Appellant and [Victim] continued to struggle. [Co-Defendant] ran over to apartment. Appellant, now freed from the struggle as a result of [Victim] being shot by [Co-Defendant], also shot [Victim], grabbed the heroin, and fled the apartment. He was pursued by Howard, who shot him in the leg as he ran down the hallway. [Co-Defendant] and Appellant escaped down a staircase to the outside of the building. Howard returned to her apartment to find [Victim] unresponsive and lying on his face. After turning him over, she called 911 and yelled out the window for help. [Victim] was pronounced dead on scene by responding paramedics. As a result of being shot a total of seven times, [Victim] suffered a perforated lung, spleen, stomach, pericardium, aorta, and femoral vein, as well as a fractured rib and left shoulder. The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk, and the manner of death was homicide. apartment complex security guard], who saw Appellant and [Co-Defendant] emerge from the building. [The guard] drew his weapon and ordered both fleeing shooters -2- J-S20002-14 to stop. Appellant and [Co-Defendant] fled down the fence line adjacent to the building, with [the guard] in pursuit and continuously ordering them to stop. [Co-Defendant] jumped down a steep hill to a parking lot below, and escaped through a pathway. Appellant jumped down the hill and fell, dropping the box of heroin, and ran away limping to the pathway without the heroin. [The guard] pursued Appellant until [the guard] tripped at the entrance to the pathway. The pathway led to the Crucible Street side of the apartment complex and access to a Port Authority Busway. Unable to continue the pursuit, [the guard] returned to the apartment building and gave a detailed description of what Appellant was wearing and his direction of flight to City of Pittsburgh Police on scene. Officers Aaron Loughran and Vincent Pacheco began to search for Appellant and [Co-Defendant] in their respective marked police vehicles. Officer Loughran quickly located and pursued Appellant, who had made his way onto the busway. Officer Loughran continuously ordered Appellant to stop, but Appellant continued to run away. When Officer Loughran could no longer pursue Appellant in his car, he exited his vehicle and chased Appellant down a staircase that was part of the busway complex. Appellant left the complex and ran up a of flight to Officer Pacheco. Shortly thereafter, Officers Pacheco and Loughran apprehended Appellant, and [the guard] identified Appellant as one of the individuals he chased from the apartment building complex. Appellant was transported to the hospital for a gunshot wound to the leg. Police recovered one .22 caliber bullet, four .380 cartridge casings, and one .380 caliber bullet fragment from inside one .22 caliber bullet and two .380 caliber bullets from [Victim] during the autopsy. The crime lab was able to determine that the .380 caliber bullets and fragment matched each other and were discharged from the same firearm. (Trial Court Opinion, filed July 18, 2013, at 6-9) (all internal citations and -3- J-S20002-14 footnotes omitted). On January 11, 2011, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging Appellant with criminal homicide, robbery, conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a license. Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of voluntary manslaughter and carrying a firearm without a license. The jury found Appellant not guilty of the remaining counts. Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth provided notice of its intent to seek a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for a crime of violence committed with a firearm, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. hearing on March 28, 2012. With the benefit of a pre-sentence At the conclusion of the hearing, the court voluntary manslaughter conviction.2 The court imposed a consecutive term of two (2) to f Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on Monday, April 9, 2012. In it, Appellant argued that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs, based its decision solely on the seriousness of the offense, and failed to provide adequate reasons to justify the sentence ____________________________________________ 2 With a prior record score of zero (0), an offense gravity score of eleven on was fifty-four (54) to seventytwo (72) months. The aggravated range was up to eightyimprisonment. The statutory maximum for this offense (first degree felony) is twenty (20) years. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1). -4- J-S20002-14 imposed. After Appellant obtained the trial and sentencing transcripts, the court permitted him to file a supplemental post-sentence motion on August 31, 2012. In it, Appe adequate reasons on the record to justify the sentencing decision and why it sentenced outside of the sentencing guidelines on the Voluntary -Sentence Motion, filed 8/31/12, at 2). Appellant also contended that the court imposed a sentence that was disproportionate to the criminal conduct. On December 12, 2012, -sentence motions by operation of law. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on January 4, 2013. The court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant, however, voluntarily filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on July 1, 2013. Appellant now raises three issues for our review: WAS EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER WHEN THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT WAS RECOVERED FROM THE VICTIM DID NOT CAUSE A FATAL INJURY? DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING TAPE RECORDED STATEMENTS BY A WITNESS WHEN THE COMMONWEALTH IMPERMISSIBLY USED THESE STATEMENTS TO IMPEACH ITS OWN WITNESS AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY TREATED THE STATEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE? -5- J-S20002-14 DID THE SENTENCING COURT ABUSE ITS SENTENCING DISCRETION BY IMPOSING AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE OUTSIDE OF THE AGGRAVATED RANGE WITHOUT CONSIDERING ALL STATUTORILY REQUIRED FACTORS? In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial evidence demonstrated that Co-Defendant shot and killed the victim. he feared for his life. Appellant emphasizes Co- Appellant asserts the ballistic and medical evidence confirmed that Co-Defendant fired the fatal shots. Specifically, Appellant shoulder, causing a non-fatal injury, and the .380 caliber bullets that caused the death of [Victim] came from [Co- Victim, Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to support his voluntary manslaughter conviction. We disagree. When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our standard of review is as follows: The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a -finder unless -6- J-S20002-14 the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)). The Crimes Code defines voluntary manslaughter as follows: § 2503. Voluntary manslaughter (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by: (1) the individual killed; or (2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed. (b) person who intentionally or knowingly kills commits voluntary manslaughter if at the killing he believes the circumstances to be they existed, would justify the killing under this title, but his belief is unreasonable. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(a), (b). -7- A an individual time of the such that, if Chapter 5 of J-S20002-14 T]he elements necessary to establish unreasonable belief voluntary - belief that deadly force was required Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1143 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 604 Pa. 706, 987 A.2d 161 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tilley principles of justificatio Ventura, supra at 1143 (quoting Tilley, supra at 141, 595 A.2d at 582). A person may be convicted as an accomplice if: (1) there is evidence the defendant intended to aid or promote the commission of the underlying offense; and (2) the defendant actively participated in the crime by soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to help the principal. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306; Commonwealth v. Brewer, 876 A.2d 1029 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, may be established by circumstantial evidence, a defendant cannot be an accomplice simply based on evidence that he knew about the crime or was Id. at 1033 (quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy some additional evidence that the defendant intended to aid in the -8- J-S20002-14 Brewer, supra at 1033 (quoting Murphy, supra at 286, 844 A.2d at 1234). Instantly, Appellant and Co- apartment to purchase heroin from Victim. During the transaction, Appellant pellant accused Victim of providing an insufficient quantity. 12/16/11, at 734.) (See N.T. Trial, Appellant and Victim began to scuffle and fell to the floor. During the scuffle, someone produced a firearm, 3 and it discharged. Fearing for his own safety and that of Appellant, Co-Defendant drew a weapon and fired multiple shots at Victim. After running out of ammunition, Co-Defendant fled the scene. Appellant fired an additional shot at Victim before fleeing. Here, the testimony demonstrated that Appellant acted in concert with Co-Defendant to abort the drug transaction with Victim. Victim and Appellant began to struggle after Appellant accused Victim of trying to cheat Appellant out of heroin. At that point, Co-Defendant opened fire on Victim. After the struggle, Appellant fired an additional shot at Victim with his own ____________________________________________ 3 Ms. Howard claimed that Appellant produced the firearm. (See N.T. Trial, 12/14/11, at 198, 250.) The other eyewitness, Clarence White, told police (See N.T. Trial, 12/15/11, at 564.) Co-Defendant confirmed that Appellant carried a firearm on the night in question, but Co-Defendant was unsure about whether Appellant actually drew the weapon during the scuffle. (See N.T. Trial, 12/16/11, at 737.) -9- J-S20002-14 firearm. Regardless of which firearm produced the fatal shot, the testimony homicide and was an active participant. See Brewer, supra. Based upon manslaughter conviction, and Appellant is not entitled to relief for his first issue. See Ventura, supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b). In his second issue, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth presented Clarence White to testify about what happened inside the apartment at the the Commonwealth requested to play a previously recorded police interview with Mr. White, arguing that the audiotape constituted a prior inconsistent Appellant avers the previously recorded statement did not amount to a prior inconsistent state with the statements he had made to police. Appellant concludes the court erroneously admitted the previously recorded statement as substantive evidence. We disagree. and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 570 Pa. 117, 135, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 919, 123 S.Ct. 2284, 156 L.Ed.2d 137 (2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349, - 10 - J-S20002-14 363, 781 A.2d 110, 117 (2001)). Admissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact. Drumheller, supra at 135, 808 A.2d at 904 (quoting Stallworth, supra at 363, 781 A.2d at 117-18). ourts long have permitted non-party witnesses to be crossexamined on prior statements they have made when those statements contradict their in-court testimony. inconsistent statements, are Such statements, known as prior admissible for impeachment purpos Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa.Super. 2002). impeaching evidence; the dissimilarities or omissions must be substantial imony to be admissible as prior Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1056 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 83 A.3d 414 (2013). substantive evidence provided the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and one of the following is true: 1) the prior inconsistent statement was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, deposition, or other proceeding; 2) the prior inconsistent statement is contained within a signed writing adopted by the declarant; and/or, 3) the rendition of the statement offered is a verbatim contemporaneous recording of an oral statement. - 11 - J-S20002-14 Commonwealth v. Henkel, 938 A.2d 433, 442-43 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 756, 955 A.2d 356 (2008). Instantly, Mr. White testified that Ms. Howard was his girlfriend, and arranged for two buyers, who were Ms. Howar drugs from Victim. Mr. White claimed to have never met the buyers prior to the day of the transaction. Mr. White and Ms. Howard personally picked up purchase. At trial, Mr. White did not identify Appellant and Co-Defendant as See N.T. Trial, 12/15/11, at 457.) At trial, Mr. White testified that once inside the apartment, the parties waited for Victim to arrive with the drugs. When Victim arrived, he immediately spoke with Ms. Howard. Mr. White could not recall any details from this conversation. After Victim spoke to Ms. Howard, he began to negotiate with the buyers in the living room of the apartment. At that point, Mr. White exited the living room and entered a bedroom. While inside the bedroom, Mr. White heard approximately six to ten shots fired. Mr. White did not see who fired the shots, and he did not have a view into the living room. When the gunfire ceased, Mr. White returned to the living room and saw Victim on the floor. - 12 - J-S20002-14 Mr. White testified that he recalled participating in a police interview on the day after the shooting. Although Mr. White did not remember any of the specific questions posed during the interview, he said he could not identify the shooters to police. At that point, the Commonwealth confronted Mr. White with a photo array that he viewed during the interview. Mr. White Id. at 469). Mr. White conceded he had viewed the confirm that he actually saw Appellant remove something from his pocket immediately before the shooting. The prosecutor pressed Mr. White about this detail, but Mr. White provided evasive responses. audiotaped interview Mr. White had given to police on the day after the shooting. The Commonwealth argued the tape included statements which admission of the tape, but the court ultimately permitted the Commonwealth to play it. In the taped statement, Mr. White claimed an individual known to him 4 had contacted Ms. Howard on Facebook about one month prior to the shooting. BG asked Ms. Howard to put him into contact with Mr. White. ____________________________________________ 4 CoAppellant. a nickname for - 13 - J-S20002-14 Subsequently, Mr. White instructed Ms. Howard to give his phone number to BG. BG contacted Mr. White and inquired about making a heroin purchase. Id. at 559). Mr. White did not find a seller right away, but BG persisted with his requests. After about a month, Mr. White called Victim, who agreed to conduct a drug approval, Mr. White contacted BG. Mr. White instructed BG that Mr. White and Ms. Howard would pick up BG and transport him to the site of the transaction. On the day of the transaction, Mr. White and Ms. Howard picked up BG and another individual at a gas station in Carnegie. Having never personally met BG, Mr. White did not know which of the individuals BG was, and neither of the buyers identified himself as BG. Mr. White and Ms. Howard for Victim to arrive. While inside the apartment, one of the buyers asked to use the bathroom. When the buyer exited the bathroom, Mr. White watched like 5 (Id. ____________________________________________ 5 Later in the statement, Mr. White confirmed he had viewed a photo array prior to the interview and identified Appellant as the individual who removed the gun from his pants. - 14 - J-S20002-14 bedroom and heard shots fired. When Mr. White returned to the living room, he saw Victim on the floor. testimony and his prior statement to the police as follows: Here, the [t]rial [c]ourt found enough significant differences between what [Mr. White] testified to at trial and his prior taped statement to admit the taped statement as a prior inconsistent statement. For example, at trial White consistently said that he did not know what Appellant pulled out of his pocket, but on the taped other inconsistencies as follows: In this instance, for example, in the taped statement he indicates a more long-standing, not necessarily monetary, relationship, but the contact between him and [Appellant] began a month before [the shooting]. In his trial testimony he said he never heard of the guy until that day. Then the details of the phone calls back and forth between himself, Jasmine Howard and the persons involved in the drug deal, the alleged drug deal, the details of the events in the apartment, his presence, his position, what he saw and what he heard. (See Trial Court Opinion at 21) (internal citations to the record omitted). testimony regarding his role in arranging the drug transaction as well as his observations of a firearm on App objection. See Luster, supra; Carmody, supra. In his third issue, Appellant maintains the court contravened a fundamental norm of the sentencing process by imposing a sentence for - 15 - J-S20002-14 voluntary manslaughter, above the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines, without providing sufficient reasons to support the deviation from the guidelines. Appellant argues the court failed to articulate why the circumstances surrounding this particular voluntary manslaughter conviction were so much more egregious than a typical voluntary manslaughter case. Moreover, Appellant claims that the court substantially deviated from the sentencing guidelines without considering all relevant sentencing factors. Appellant concludes the court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. See Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing). Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. 910 (Pa.Super. 2000). Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue: [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). - 16 - J-S20002-14 Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted). When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a substantial question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any challenges to the trial decision to exceptional Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1387 (Pa.Super. 1989) (en banc)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the - 17 - J-S20002-14 Sierra, supra at 912-13. excessive and/or disproportionate to the offense can raise substantial Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2006). Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 734 (Pa.Super. 2003)). -sentence motions, voluntary Rule 1925(b) statement, and Rule 2119(f) statement properly preserved his claim that the court imposed an excessive sentence and failed to provide adequate claim appears to raise a substantial question as to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. supra. See Dunphy, See also Commonwealth v. Davis, 737 A.2d 792 (Pa.Super. 1999) (stating claim that sentencing court imposed unreasonable sentence outside guideline ranges raises substantial question). Our standard of review concerning the discretionary aspects of sentencing is as follows: Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for - 18 - J-S20002-14 reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 143 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 214 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc)). Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1148, 125 S.Ct. 2984, 162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005). Id. the sentencing guidelines, it must provide a written statement setting forth the reasons for the deviation and the failure to do so is grounds for reCommonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 567, 926 A.2d 957, 963 (2007). stated in A the -the-record statement of reasons for deviation d contemporaneous written statement. Commonwealth v. Styles, 812 A.2d 1277, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2002). judgment in reviewing a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines to assess whether the sentencing court imposed a sentence Walls, supra at 568, 926 A.2d at 963. - 19 - that is In making this J-S20002-14 § 9781. Appellate review of sentence * * * (d) Review of record. In reviewing the record the appellate court shall have regard for: (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation. (3) based. The findings upon which the sentence was (4) The commission. guidelines promulgated by the 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d)(1)-(4). In Walls, supra, our Supreme Court s -dependent concept that is Id. at 568, 926 A.2d at 963. Thus, given its nature, we decline to fashion any concrete rules as to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence that falls outside of applicable guidelines under Section intended that considerations found in Section 9721 inform appellate review for unreasonableness. That is, while a sentence may be found to be unreasonable after review of sentence may also be unreasonable if the appellate court finds that the sentence was imposed without express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721, i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and - 20 - J-S20002-14 the community; and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Moreover, even though the unreasonableness inquiry lacks precise boundaries, we are confident that rejection of a unreasonableness grounds would occur infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges, especially when the unreasonableness inquiry is conducted using the proper standard of review. Id. at 568-69, 926 A.2d at 964 (emphasis added). Instantly, the court had the benefit of a PSI report at sentencing. Therefore, we can presume it considered the relevant factors when sentencing Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 366 n.6 (Pa.Super. 2005) (stating where sentencing court had benefit of PSI, law assumes court was aware of and weighed relevant information regarding 6 and the PSI report. The court emphasized that the PSI report included incidents which occurred when Appellant was a juvenile; therefore, the he court detailed le adjudications for ____________________________________________ 6 five days we were here, smiling and grinning, like he feels no remorse. It jus See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 3/28/12, at 10.) - 21 - J-S20002-14 acts such as terroristic threats, criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, fleeing or attempting to elude police, escape, and theft. Thereafter, the court stated: The [c]ourt has taken into account his family history, his education, his background, as consistent with the state law, his rehabilitative needs. The [c]ourt has noted [Appellant] has had multiple opportunities in terms of the juvenile system for therapy, rehabilitation, educational skills, vocational skills, and he has never really availed himself to any of that except to get a G.E.D. But otherwise he failed to adjust at these cases involved [an] escape and ramming a State Police vehicle. The [c]ourt finds an extensive juvenile history that is unaccounted for in his prior record score. That history is permeated with threats or acts of violence and disrespect for lawful authority. The [c]ourt finds the factors positive in his background, so to speak, that have been presented through [defense counsel], and his comment today of remorse and The [c]ourt has weighed all of this, and the [c]ourt finds in terms of his function in terms of protection of the public and gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact of this offense on the community, the surviving family members, is heavily weighted and significant. (See N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 19-20.) Here, the sentencing court stated with particularity its reasons for imposing Appel - 22 - J-S20002-14 noted previous attempts at rehabilitation as a juvenile had proven unsuccessful. announced The court observed Appellant, evaluated the PSI, and its findings at the time of was not unreasonable under Section 9781(d). sentencing. Under these See Walls, supra. Based upon the foregoing, we see no reason to disturb the judgment of sentence. See Coulverson, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 4/29/2014 - 23 -

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.