Com. v. Rhoades, E. (memorandum)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

J-S60043-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. EDWIN ALONZA RHOADES Appellant No. 625 MDA 2014 Appeal from the PCRA Order March 26, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0002265-2009 BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2014 Edwin Rhoades (“Appellant”) appeals from the order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of six counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”),1 one count of criminal conspiracy,2 and one count of criminal use of a communication facility.3 On May 17, 2011, the trial court sentenced him to ____________________________________________ 1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. 3 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512. J-S60043-14 an aggregate sentence of seven to fourteen years’ incarceration.4 After the trial court denied his post-sentence motions, Appellant timely appealed. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on October 10, 2012. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal on April 10, 2013. Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on July 22, 2013. Appointed counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on December 10, 2013, alleging that Alleyne v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013),5 applies retroactively to his case. The PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing on March 4, 2014, and dismissed the PCRA petition on March 26, 2014. Appellant timely appealed ____________________________________________ 4 The trial court sentenced Appellant to 5 to 10 years’ incarceration on five of the six PWID convictions, and a concurrent sentence of 3 to 6 years’ incarceration on the remaining PWID conviction. The trial court further sentenced Appellant to a consecutive 2 to 4 years’ incarceration on the conspiracy conviction and a concurrent 1 to 2 years’ incarceration on the criminal use of a communication facility conviction. Although the sentencing order does not explicitly note that the 5 to 10 year sentences were the relevant mandatory minimums, the trial court stated at sentencing that “the court is persuaded that the adequate weight was established through the course of the trial, . . . concerning the weight of the cocaine involved such that the mandatories as set forth in the presentence investigative report are appropriate.” N.T. 5/17/2011. The court then sentenced Appellant to the corresponding mandatory minimums on the PWID convictions. See N.T. 5/17/2011, pp. 33-39. 5 In Alleyne, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155. -2- J-S60043-14 and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on June 4, 2014.6 On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review: I. Did the trial court err in dismissing PCRA Petitioner’s request for a new sentencing trial due to the imposing of mandatory minimum sentence under 18 [Pa.C.S.] § 7508 [] where: i. [Appellant] did not waive his right to a jury trial on the issue of whether the cocaine he possessed was between 10 grams and 100 grams so as to require the trial court to impose the mandatory minimum 3 year sentence on Count 5 and the mandatory 5 year sentence on Counts 6 through 11; ii. These facts were established by the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and iii. The lack of a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt or a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right contravenes the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) as explained in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 314 (2013)? Appellant’s Brief, p. 4. In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, our well-settled standard of review is “to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is ____________________________________________ 6 To explain its denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition, the PCRA court’s 1925(a) opinion adopted the reasoning of its February 25, 2014 opinion. The February 25, 2014 opinion purported to deny the PCRA petition. This opinion, however, preceded the PCRA court’s March 4, 2014 Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss and the March 26, 2014 order that dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. Although this sequence is somewhat unorthodox, we find it acceptable because the PCRA court afforded Appellant the protections of Rule 907. -3- J-S60043-14 supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-192 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In essence, Appellant argues that Alleyne applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 12-15. This argument is unconvincing. A new rule of constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court of the United States is not made retroactive to cases on collateral review unless the Supreme Court of the United States or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held it to be retroactive. Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 812 A.2d 497, 502 (Pa.2002). Further, our Supreme Court has held that “[a] retroactivity determination must exist at the time the petition is filed.” Id. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court of the United States did not address whether the holding would apply to cases on collateral review. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has not issued a decision giving Alleyne retroactive effect; nor has the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Federal circuit courts7 that have addressed the issue have determined that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See ____________________________________________ 7 The holdings of federal circuit courts are not binding on this Court, but may serve as persuasive authority. Commonwealth v. Haskins, 60 A.3d 538, 548 n.9 (Pa.Super.2012). -4- J-S60043-14 United States v. Reyes, 755 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2014), United States v. Winkleman, et al., 746 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2014), In re Payne, 733 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2013), In re Kemper, 735 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2013) (all holding Alleyne is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); see also Simpson v. United States, 721 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that Alleyne is an extension of the case law established by Apprendi, which the Supreme Court has not applied retroactively to cases on collateral appeal). Ultimately, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition because Alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review. See Opinion and Order, February 25, 2014, p. 3. determination. We find no legal error in this Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 12/22/2014 -5- Circulated 12/08/2014 12:58 PM Circulated 12/08/2014 12:58 PM Circulated 12/08/2014 12:58 PM

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.