In the Interest of: R.H.R.J.; Appeal of: S.J. (memorandum)
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J-S38017-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: R.H.R.J., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. APPEAL OF: S.J., MOTHER, Appellant No. 302 EDA 2014 Appeal from the Order Entered December 3, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000607-2012, CP-51-DP-0025145-2010 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and SHOGAN, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2014 S.J wherein the trial court involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her then-four-yearR.J. was born during 2009, when Mother was fourteen years old. The 1 For the first four months of his life, R.J. resided Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Philadelphia Department of Human Services with the family on January 26, 2010, in response ____________________________________________ 1 On December 3, 2013, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the unknown father. J-S38017-14 against R.J. The report indicated that Mother held R.J. by his feet and tossed the infant on a bed during a physical altercation with Grandmother behavioral issues. Mother had returned to the residence seeking to reclaim R.J. The report also faulted Mother for failing to provide appropriate supervision, creating a risk of physical harm, and imposing inappropriate Grandmother, DHS determined Mother to be an indicated perpetrator of child abuse.2 On March 8, 2010, the juvenile court adjudicated R.J. dependent by agreement of the parties. In addition to the indicated CPS report, the use, and prior hospitalization for mental illness. Indeed, immediately after ____________________________________________ 2 Indicated reports, satisfy the lowest evidentiary standard of the two classes of substantiated child abuse reports under the Child Protective Services Law. That statute defines an indicated report as follows: chapter if an investigation by the county agency or the Department of Public Welfare determines that substantial evidence of the alleged abuse exists based on any of the following: (1) Available medical evidence; (2) the child protective service investigation; (3) an admission of the acts of abuse by the perpetrator. judicial finding of abuse, i.e., a conviction or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a criminal charge stemming from the allegation of abuse. Id. -2- J-S38017-14 the January 2010 incident that was the genesis of DHS involvement, Mother was admitted into a behavioral health facility. When DHS spoke with a representative from that facility, the agency was advised that Mother suffered from post-partum depression and bi-polar disorder and that she was too unstable emotionally to care for R.J. DHS initially placed R.J. in kinship foster care with his maternal great aunt. However, over the next two years, he was transferred to a second kinship care home, and two additional foster homes, until he was finally placed in his current pre-adoptive foster home, where he has lived since June of 2012. As the initial permanency goal was reunification, DHS fashioned a FSP objectives were to understand the effect of her behavior on R.J., learn and employ non-physical discipline methods, recognize appropriate behavior expectations, stabilize mental health issues, attend regular visitation, and participate in a structured academic or educational program. As it relates to the mental health component, Mother was required to participate in a structured treatment program and comply with treatment recommendations. She was provided supervised visitation with R.J. twice per week. In order to address her mental health issues, during June 2010, Mother was admitted into Wordsworth Academy, an in-patient residential facility for minors with serious mental health and behavioral issues. Over the next two years, Mother thrived in the structured environment provided -3- J-S38017-14 by the semi-restrictive facility. She completed nearly all of her FSP objectives, and the supervised visitations progressed to unsupervised visitations in the community. In preparation for what appeared reunification with R.J., DHS and Mother agreed that Mother would leave Wordsworth in order to participate in a therapeutic mother-baby foster home where she could adjust to her new-found independence before caring for her son. The plan required Mother to commit herself to DHS care as a dependent minor so that she would be eligible for foster placement. The parties contemplated that Mother would be allotted several weeks to assimilate to her new routine in the foster home, including attending school and outpatient mental health treatment, before R.J. joined her. Mother moved into the mother-baby foster home during March 2012. foster home, Mother derailed her significant reunification efforts. She attended only one day of school, she failed to attend consistent visitation with R.J., and after a disagreement with her foster mother, Mother was transferred to another foster home, briefly, before she left the home and shelters between March and September 2012. She also tested positive for -making and slack drug and mental health treatments -4- J-S38017-14 until she returned to placement. As Mother failed to return to DHS placement, she has had no visitation since May 15, 2012. In addition, Mother failed to send any gifts or correspondence to her son for approximately two years following the unsuccessful reunification plan. to adoption. The trial court appointed counsel December 12, 2012. and convened termination proceedings on However, after hearing a single witness, the matter was continued several times in order to appoint substitute counsel and to reassign the case to another trial judge. Upon receiving the case, the newly assigned trial court decided to hear the matter anew. Following two days of hearings on November 4, and December 3, 2013, the trial court granted option, and terminated and (b). This timely appeal followed. Mother presents the following issues for our review: 1. Did the lower court err by relying on facts that were not introduced into evidence[?] 2. Was appellant denied a fair hearing and due process of law by the Court permitting the social worker to testify from her 3. Did DHS mother[?] 4. make reasonable efforts to assisting [sic] Did the department sustain their [sic] burden [of proving] -5- J-S38017-14 [5]. Did the trial court err in determining that it was in the best interest of the child finding there was no bond between child and mother? arental rights pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). While and implicate different considerations. See In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 339-340 (Pa.Super. 200 Indeed, unlike involuntary termination proceedings, which concentrates 3 the focus of dependency - In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-823 (Pa.Super. 2006); In re K.J., 27 A.3d 236, 241 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citations omitted) clearly places trial court's focus on best interests of child). discretion. As our Supreme Court reiterated in In re J.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, ____________________________________________ 3 Only after clear and convincing evidence is presented to establish that a pursuant physical, and emotional needs and welfare under § 2511(b). -6- J-S38017-14 credibility determinations that are supported by the record. Id. However, we are not constrained to adopt the inferences drawn on those facts or the Id. As it relates to the involuntary termination of parental rights, this In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa.Super. record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported In re C.W.U., Jr., 33 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2011). If the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm even if the record could support the opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., supra at 191-192. the its factual findings. Mother accurately highlights that the portion of the trial statement of facts that parental rights. Reasoning that the unsworn assertions that DHS leveled in its petition were not tantamount to evidence, Mother argues that the trial court erred in relying upon them. In a related argument, Mother also -7- J-S38017-14 juvenile court proceedings that occurred during February and July 2012. intermittently in placements for four years. While certain aspects of infra, no relief is due. tatement of Facts as a basis for those findings is determination, the trial court should rely upon the certified record when outlining its findings. Thus, it was improper for the court to cite the DHS petition instead of evidence adduced during the hearings as support for the because the case. In reality, the analysis section of the trial court opinion set forth a comprehensive review with specific citation to the certified record. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/14, at 9the trial court did not rely upon any extrajudicial facts to reach its decision. The court considered the evidence adduced during the dependency and termination proceedings and concluded that clear and convincing evidence -8- J-S38017-14 infra ons. Accordingly, we do not disturb them. consideration of testimony from earlier permanency review hearings in support of the instant determinations. Specifically, Mother challenges the testimony that Emma Brant, a DHS social worker, proffered during permanency review hearings that occurred during February 2012 and July 2012, respectively. outlining its rationale in the trial court opinion, the trial court noted Ms. anticipation of her reunification with R.J., but before Mother could adjust to her new living situation and initiate the reunification process, she went AWOL several times in less than two months. Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/14, the gradual reunification of Mother and R.J. was preferable to an abrupt reunification. Id. That testimony also revealed that (1) Mother had not visited R.J. since May of 2012; (2) Mother was advised that visitation with R.J. would be suspended until Mother entered safe and appropriate placement; and (3) Mother continued her AWOL status after being so -9- J-S38017-14 advised. Id assessments during June 2012. Id. at 12. t, since Ms. Brant did not testify during the termination/goal change proceedings, it was improper for the F is baseless. Indeed, it is axiomatic that dependency hearings, including the recurrent permanency review hearings, are components of a single ongoing action and that the notes of testimony from a prior hearing may be considered at later proceedings. E.g., In re A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 601 (Pa.Super. 2006) (considering testimony proffered at previous dependency testimony in addressing the goal change petition is meritless. The case dependency proceedings. As the termination of parental rights under the Adoption Act is not a component of the dependency proceedings, the foregoing rationale that - 10 - J-S38017-14 rationale regarding the termination of parental rights. Nevertheless, any as a basis t as we will discuss infra AWOL status, rejection of mother/baby foster care, and her failure to attend visitation since May of 2012, all were established independently during the two-day termination hearings. Thus, to the extent that the court erred in evidence properly admitted and considered during the termination proceedings. Accordingly, no relief is due.4 Next, Mother argues that she was denied a fair hearing because the trial court permitted Charlene Monroe, a DHS Supervisor, to testify about Monroe to ____________________________________________ 4 that Mother was intermittently in placement for four years, that error also is harmless. The record establishes that Mother was compliant with DHS requirements and made substantial progress toward her FSP goals during the two-year period that she resided in a residential inpatient treatment facility. The ensuing twodischarge from the residential facility and her unsuccessful placement in a series of mother/baby foster homes and other foster facilities. Thus, while the trial court misstated the le secure visitation with R.J., and remained absent without permission. - 11 - J-S38017-14 on appeal is t rule and the rule against hearsay. Essentially, she complains that the trial court should have ordered DHS to produce the CYS file before it accepted The following facts are relevant to our determination. At the outset of offer of proof, I am going to ask what Ms. [Monroe] can testify to as to personal knowledge and if she needs to refer to business records, I am Ms. Monroe explained that she was the case supervisor for approximately eighteen months between March 2011 and September 2012, and that she was personally involved in the case in that capacity. Id. at 53. She further elucidated that, as the supervisor, she directed everything that pertained to the FSP. Id. at 53-54. further inquiries, raise a hearsay objection, or invoke the best evidence rule. Likewise, after the hearing reconvened on December 3, 2013, Mother failed to invoke the best evidence rule. Instead, her counsel launched into a soliloquy regarding her inability to review the DHS case file at the time the - 12 - J-S38017-14 agency allotted for its review, and she requested a continuance so that the file could be produced. N.T., 12/3/13, at 4-5. DHS countered that Mother had more than one year to request discovery of the DHS file, yet she waited until November 2013 to request the records. Id. at 7. The trial court memory of matters of which she had personal knowledge. Significantly, at no time during the ensuing testimony did Mother invoke the best evidence rule or level any objections based on the fact that Ms. Monroe was testifying from her memory. To the extent that Mother objected to Ms testimony, those individual protests concerned whether the witness had personal knowledge of the specific topic she was discussing. The trial court sustained some of those objections and overruled others. guments are waived because she herein, i.e., that the absence of the DHS file violated either the best evidence rule or the rule against hearsay. It is beyond cavil that issues that are not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Simply stated, rather than raise the absence of the case file, Mother sought to verify that Ms. Monroe could testify from personal knowledge and requested that DHS produce the file for if the witness needed to refer to it. Later, although Mother received assurances that Ms. Monroe would testify from memory, - 13 - J-S38017-14 Mother nevertheless complained that she was not able to review DHS file, and she requested a continuance to examine the file. Again, however, Similarly, while Mother did level hearsay objections, some of which were sustained, raising Ms invokes the best evidence rule to complain that DHS did not produce the case file. Accordingly, these issues are waived.5 As Mo issues collectively. First, Mother complains that DHS failed to proffer clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to reunify her with R.J. Specifically, she argues that DHS failed to appreciate the circumstances ____________________________________________ 5 Moreover, we observe that since DHS never sought to introduce testimony evidence rule in this case is dubious. Our Supreme Court codified the best evidence rule in Pa.R. photograph is required in order to prove its content unless these rules, other Accordingly, where a case or the central issue of a case is based upon the contents of a writing, the proponent of that evidence must produce the original document. See 8 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 53:8. Instantly, DHS did not introduce any evidence about the contents of a writing, recording dependent on a dispositive writing contained in the file. Even though Ms. Monroe testified capably without the assistance of the case file, Mother desired that DHS produce the file for her review. Mother evidence rule in what essentially is a discovery dispute is unavailing. - 14 - J-S38017-14 care and that the agency abruptly altered its course in favor of adoption rather than allow Mother more time to comply. DHS counters that the record demonstrates that it consistently made a good faith effort to reunify -year placement. It highlights that it worked closely with Mother during the two years that she was in a reunification with her son. However, once DHS put the plan into action, eing from the foster home, and refusing to satisfy the prerequisite requirement of returning to placement before she could resume visitations with R.J. Before filing a petition for termination of parental rights, the Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts to promote reunification of parent and child. However, the Commonwealth does not have an obligation to make such efforts indefinitely. The Commonwealth has an interest not only in family reunification but also in each child's right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment, and the two interests must both be considered. . . . When reasonable efforts to reunite a foster child with his or her biological parents have failed, then the child welfare agency must work toward terminating parental rights and placing the child with adoptive parents. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa.Super. 2006) (emphasis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). hearing, Ms. Monroe testified that since Mother was thriving at Wordsworth - 15 - J-S38017-14 Academy, the agency initiated a transition plan that would culminate in Mother and R.J. residing together in a mother/baby foster home. N.T., 11/4/13, at 54- -time caretaker. Id. at 55. In addition to the CYS caseworkers, Mother, Grandmother, and the child advocate all collaborated on the plan. Id. Ms. Monroe explained that the plan was for Mother to integrate into the foster home and adjust to her school and outpatient mental health treatment before R.J. joined her. N.T., 12/3/13, at 8. In contrast to reunite with R.J. immediately and only became disenchanted with the situation after learning that the process of reunification would be gradual, Ms. Monroe testified that Mother was personally involved in formulating the plan, understood the plan, and agreed to it. Id. at 8-9, 13-14. Although DHS had difficulty locating an appropriate foster home, it eventually found a therapeutic foster home for Mother to begin the transition. Id. at 9. Ms. Monroe continued that, shortly after Mother moved into the foster home, she stopped attending school and therapy. Id relationship with her foster parent disintegrated, and Mother left placement. ecific complaint that DHS was unresponsive to her school situation and incompatibility with the foster mother, Ms. Monroe testified that Mother had missed approximately two months of school before she advised the agency that two young men implicated in her - 16 - J-S38017-14 Id. at 16. Thereafter, to a different campus. Id. at 17, 19. Mother never returned to school at any location. DHS also a foster parent. Id. at 19-21, 24-25, 28. Mother left that foster home abruptly, however, and over the next several months, DHS placed her in five different placements from which she ultimately fled. Id. at 10-11. During this period that Mother was noncompliant and AWOL, Ms. Monroe feared that Mother had resumed abusing drugs. Id. at 12behavior, during July 2012, the trial court ordered that visitation with R.J. be suspended until Mother retuned to DHS placement. Id. at 11. As she never May 2012, approximately two years. Id. make reasonable efforts toward reunification. When Mother was compliant and progressing toward her FSP goals, DHS fashioned a plan that would semi-restrictive facility into the therapeutic mother/baby foster home, the agency continued to work with her to overcome the hurdles associated with her transition to independence. However, after Mother disengaged from the process completely by refusing to return to school and repeatedly leaving her different foster placements, the agency moved away from reunification. - 17 - J-S38017-14 2010, DHS made reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with her son, and it only altered its course after Mother became dissatisfied with the process and prove by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds to terminate her parental ri governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which provides in pertinent part: (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. .... (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the - 18 - J-S38017-14 parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. .... (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. .... (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. The test for terminating parental rights consists of two parts. In In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007), we explained: Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the - 19 - J-S38017-14 needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond. Herein, Mother relies upon her initial progress while a resident at Wordsworth Academy and her self-serving testimony that she was currently attending to her mental health and educational needs to support her boilerplate assertion that the record was insufficient to terminate her -year period that she was completely noncompliant with every aspect of her FSP plan, including maintaining visitation with her now-four-year-old son. subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and the subsection (b) analysis in order to affirm the termination of parental rights, and our review of the certified parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b), we do not address the remaining statutory grounds. We have explained our review of the evidence pursuant § 2511(a)(8), as follows: In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super. 2003). - 20 - to J-S38017-14 Thus, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case at bar, DHS was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1) R.J. has been removed from Mother for at least twelve months; (2) the conditio welfare. See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa.Super. 2006). 8), does not require an evaluation of Mother's willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led Id. at 511 (emphasis in original). approximately thirty-four months before DHS filed its petition to terminate November 29, 2012. Thus, CYS satisfied the threshold requirement of § 2511(a)(8) that R.J. has been removed from Mother for at least twelve months. Next, the certified record reveals that and welfare. abandonment of her reunification efforts and relapse into her prior negative behaviors, DHS presented additional testimony during the evidentiary hearing from Regina Wright, the DHS social worker and services manager - 21 - J-S38017-14 assigned to the family since May 2013. Ms. Wright testified that she only met with Mother on one occasion, an unexpected encounter that occurred 12/3/13, at 36looking for bus fare to Archibald, Pennsylvania. Id. at 37. Ms. Wright stated that Mother informed her that she was attending mental health treatment at the Wright Center in Archibald. Id. However, when Ms. Wright contacted that facility, she was advised that, while Mother attended monthly psychiatric appointments and obtained medication, she was not participating in therapy consistently. Id. at 38, 59. Ms. Wright added that she contacted the facility prior to the November 2012 hearing and was advised that Mother had not been to therapy for several weeks. Id. at 38. that Mother appeared under the influence of a substance during their conversation. Id. at 38. She observed that Mother was antsy and nervous and could not keep still. Id. While Ms. Wright admitted that Mother could have simply been nervous during their first-time exchange, Ms. Wright believed that the behavior was abnormal. Id. Moreover, when Ms. Wright confronted Mother about her drug use, Mother admitted that she smoked marijuana and consumed alcohol on her eighteenth birthday. Id. at 39. Mother also advised her that she knew she had to comply with DHS placement requirements before resuming visitation with her son, but that - 22 - J-S38017-14 she nevertheless refused to comply. Id. at 39-40. Mother did not want to return to DHS placement and her suggested alternative placement was inappropriate. Id. at 40. Significantly, Ms. Wright testified that Mother did not inquire about R.J. during their encounter. Id. at 41. The foregoing evidence supports the conclusion that DHS established § Mother thrived under the structured environment of the Wordsworth Academy, she faltered with her newfound independence, and when she was confronted with obstacles, she simply abandoned her efforts and went into remain in a stable residential foster care, attend school, or maintain her mental health. Moreover, she failed to attend visitation with R.J. since May 2012, and refused to remove the one barrier that prevented her from housing. Indeed, although Mother had engaged in a degree of mental health treatment by the date of the termination hearing, she failed to participate in therapy consistently and still had not attended school since January of 2012. Thus, we find the certified record sustains the trial c established by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds to - 23 - J-S38017-14 -andwelfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b) was deficient. Mother contends that bond that he shared with Mother as late as May 2012. We disagree. her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the trial court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535-536 (Pa.Super. 2008). The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. See In re T.D. terminate Rather, the trial court must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its an existing, necessary and beneficial In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa.Super. 2003). Moreover, as we explained in In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis omitted), In addition to a bond examination, the court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child under subsection (b), particularly in cases involving physical or sexual abuse, severe child neglect or abandonment, or children with special needs. The trial court should also examine the intangibles such as the love, comfort, security and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Another consideration is the importance of continuity of relationships to the child and whether the parent - 24 - J-S38017-14 child bond, if it exists, can be severed without detrimental effects on the child. All of these factors can contribute to the inquiry about the needs and welfare of the child. See also In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010) ( can emphasize safety needs, consider intangibles, such as love, comfort, security, and stability child might have with the foster parent, and importance of continuity of existing relationships). In addressing the needs-and-welfare component of the § 2511(b) analysis, the trial court noted that R.J. is closely bonded with his preadoptive foster family and that he has not had any contact with Mother since May 2012. Accordingly, the court concluded that severing the remnants of the parentcertified at 4. She explained that R.J. has been in the current pre-adoptive foster home since June of 2012. Id consistent visitation with R.J. prior to May 2012, and she testified that at the visitation with her son. Id to achieve independence, visitation was suspended due to her noncompliance. Id. at 12. Mother has not had any contact with R.J. since May 15, 2012, nor has she sent him any letters, card, or gifts. She has not - 25 - J-S38017-14 Id. at 12, 16. Likewise, she is not functions. Id. at 16. that he has been in the current foster home since June 2012. She observed him in that environment more than one hundred times during scheduled and random visits to the foster home. Id. at 14intments and at school. Id. at 15. Ms. Snead reported that R.J. is closely bonded with his foster parents, whom Id. The bonds extend beyond the immediate foster family to both sets of grandparents. Id. Ms. Snead opined that based on her two-and-one-half years working with R.J., that the child rights. Id. at 16. When asked to expound further, Ms. Snead testified, Id. at 16- 17. Ms. Wright testified that she observed R.J. in foster placement approximately five times since she was assigned to the case during May in the pre-adoptive foster placement as follows: He is bonded to the family, he has adapted to the home. There are three other children that are in the home who he calls his - 26 - J-S38017-14 sisters and his brother. He refers to the foster [m]other as Mom and the foster [f]ather as Dad. He is really comfortable in the home. Id. at 40. Ms. Wright further described the foster family as very affectionate k it is a good relationship. They are Id. at 42. Thus, mindful that the needs and welfare analysis is reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and with consideration of both the nature and extent of onship with Mother, the intangible factors that we outlined in In re K.Z.S., supra and In re A.S., supra, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability that R.J. enjoys with his foster family, and the importance of continuing those beneficial relationships upon his emotional and developmental well-being, we find sufficient evidence in the certified record R.J. has been in foster care his entire life, and although he had a bond with Mother initially, he has not had any contact with her since May 2012. In contrast to his remote connection to Mother, R.J. considers the members of his pre-adoptive foster family as his actual family. He refers to the pre-adoptive foster parents as mom and dad, considers their children to be his brother and sisters, and even identifies both sets of grandparents as his own. Stated simply, the certified , and emotional needs and welfare. - 27 - J-S38017-14 Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order § 2511(a)(8) and (b). Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 7/14/2014 - 28 -
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