Parrish, J. v. Wilson, G. (memorandum)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
J-S14035-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 JOHN A. PARRISH & MARIA PARRISH IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF TUNGOL, PENNSYLVANIA v. GILBERTO A. WILSON AND JOHN A. PARRISH & MARIA PARRISH TUNGOL v. TAYSTEE BAKING CO., INDIVIDUALLY AS THE GENERAL PARTNER OF, AND T/A STROEHMANN LINE HAUL, L.P., ET AL APPEAL OF: JOHN A. PARRISH AND MARIA PARRISH TUNGOL, H/W No. 2597 EDA 2013 Appeal from the Order July 17, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No.: 1902 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.* MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2014 Appellants, John A. Parrish and Maria Parrish Tungol, husband and wife, appeal pro se from the order directing the prothonotary to release and pay to Appellee, the law firm of Zarwin, Baum, DeVito, Kaplan, Schaer & ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S14035-14 Toddy, P.C. (Zarwin), $41,440.83, plus $4.48 per day interest from October 27, 2011, with the remainder to be paid to Appellants. We affirm. This is an appeal from an order directing the payment of legal fees to Appellee law firm, Zarwin, from a fund generated by the settlement of 1 assessment. The trial We summarize only the facts and procedural history most relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. At the time the underlying civil suit commenced, in 2001, Appellee Zarwin represented Appellants. By the time of settlement, in 2004, Appellants had engaged new counsel.2 Appellants maintain that there is a dispute in this appeal whether Appellant Parrish Tungol discharged Appellee ____________________________________________ 1 Ms. Parrish Tungol alleged direct injury from the accident. (See Mrs. Parrish are apparently both Pennsylvania attorneys. (See Motion for Leave to Withdraw of Robert B. White Esq., 1/22/08, at 4 ¶ 23; see also -million dollar business employing scores of attorneys. The amount claimed by Appellee is a mere (Id.). 2 The trial court subsequently permitted successor counsel, Robert B. White, Jr., Esq., to withdraw. He is not a party to this appeal. A third attorney, John M. Dodig, Esq. apparently served as counsel to Appellants after Zarwin (and before White). (See Letter of John M. Dodig, Esq. to Robert White, f lien). Attorney Dodig is not a party to this appeal. -2- J-S14035-14 from representation, or not. However, Appellants concede that in a related, but independent case, Appellee Zarwin obtained a judgment by directed verdict for breach of contract against Appellant Parrish-Tungol. (See see also Trial Court Opinion, 6/01/06, at 1-2; Trial Ct. Op., 9/11/13, at 1 n.1).3 On March 4, 2004, the parties agreed to settle the underlying motor vehicle accident case, but apparently could not reach agreement on the terms of the release. The trial court directed that the parties sign the witnessed and notarized; it represented inter alia, that they would be or charges . . . including any liens by prior counsel or any other attorney 10/31/07, at 2) (emphases added). As noted in the trial court opinion for this appeal, Appellee filed denied by the then-presiding trial court judge, the Honorable Nitza Quiñones Alejandro. (Trial Ct. Op., 9/11/13, at 2). The ongoing process included an appeal to the Superior Court, which this Court quashed per curiam on December 5, 2012, as interlocutory. (See Parrish v. Wilson, 64 A.3d 10 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum)). ____________________________________________ 3 For reasons not entirely clear from the record, Appellee did not pursue a companion claim against Appellant Parrish (husband). -3- J-S14035-14 It is undisputed that as part of the orders denying payment to Appellee, Judge Quiñones Alejandro ordered Zarwin to file a petition for fees.4 (See e.g., Order, 3/21/13). Following the confirmation of Judge Quiñones Alejandro to the federal bench, this case was reassigned to the Honorable Mark I. Bernstein, who continues to be the presiding trial judge. By order of July 17, 2013, on motion for reconsideration, Judge Bernstein ordered the release of the funds reconsideration. This timely appeal followed.5 Appellants raise four questions for our review: [1.] Did the Trial Court err/abuse its discretion in overruling several interlocutory orders and findings of a prior presiding judge and by modifying a judgment rendered by another judge in a different action? [2.] Did the Trial Court err in finding that Appellee had to Pennsylvania law? [3.] Did the Trial Court err/abuse its discretion in issuing the Order of July 17, 2013 because the Trial Court did not have ____________________________________________ 4 Appellee maintains that it had already done so. (See Brief, at 9). In any event, the certified record and accompanying docket confirm that Appellee filed the directed petition on May 16, 2013. Therefore, the trial attorney fee petiti 9/11/13, at 2). 5 Judge Bernstein did not order a statement of errors. 1925(b). He filed an opinion on September 11, 2013. 1925(a). -4- See Pa.R.A.P. See Pa.R.A.P. J-S14035-14 settlement funds when the claim is based on a judgment for breach of contract granted by a different court in a different matter against Appellant Wife individually? [4.] Did the Trial Court err by considering and granting Appellee does not have standing to file motions or petitions in the personal injury action? Briefly summarized, Appellants dispute a purported modification of a prior judgment in a related case, (the directed verdict in favor of Zarwin against Wife Parrish Tungol), which concluded that Appellant Parrish Tungol had breached her contract with Appellee Zarwin. (See 25-29). They invoke the coordinate jurisdiction rule, and assert that the settlement funds are marital property immune from release to Appellee. (See id. at 30-36). We disagree. Our standard and scope of review are well-settled: The enforceability of settlement agreements is determined according to principles of contract law. Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as [the appellate] court may review the entire record in making its decision. With respect to factual conclusions, we may reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are predicated on an error of law or are unsupported by competent evidence in the record. The law of this Commonwealth establishes that an agreement to settle legal disputes between parties is favored. There is a strong judicial policy in favor of voluntarily settling lawsuits because it reduces the burden on the courts and -5- J-S14035-14 expedites the transfer of money into the hands of a complainant. If courts were called on to re-evaluate settlement agreements, the judicial policies favoring settlements would be deemed useless. Settlement agreements are enforced according to principles of contract law. There is an offer (the settlement figure), acceptance, and consideration (in exchange for the plaintiff terminating his lawsuit, the defendant will pay the plaintiff the agreed upon sum). Where a settlement agreement contains all of the requisites for a valid contract, a court must enforce the terms of the agreement. This is true even if the terms of the agreement are not yet formalized in writing. Mazzella v. Koken, 559 Pa. 216, 221, 739 A.2d 531 536 (1999); see Commerce Bank/Pennsylvania v. First Union Nat. Bank, 911 A.2d 133, 147 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating an agreement is binding if the parties come to a meeting of the minds on all essential terms, even if they expect the agreement to be reduced to writing but that formality does not take place.). Pursuant to well-settled Pennsylvania law, oral agreements to settle are enforceable (1) a counter-offer by the offeree; (2) a lapse of time; (3) a revocation by the offeror; or (4) death or incapacity of either party. However, once the offeree has exercised his power to create a contract by accepting the offer, a purported revocation is ineffective as such. Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 517-18 (Pa. Super. 2009) (most citations, internal quotation marks and other punctuation omitted), appeal denied, 991 A.2d 313 (Pa. 2010).6 As a prefatory matter, we observe that Appellants in this case are pro se pro ____________________________________________ 6 We note that both parties agree that this Court reviews findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by the record, that our standard of review for questions of law is de novo, and that our scope of review for questions of law is plenary. (See 2). -6- J-S14035-14 se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage O'Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citation omitted). pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, in their brief Appellants continually ignore proper standards of argument. For example, Appellants patently disregard the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2117, Statement of the Case. (See Brief, at 7-24). First, Appellants fail to present a brief procedural history of the case, (Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(1)), a brief statement of prior determinations with reference to the place of reporting, (see Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(2)), a condensed chronological statement . . . with an appropriate reference in each instance to the place in the record where the evidence emphases added). Notably, here, the statement is improperly and repeatedly argumentative, violating Pa.R.A.P. 2117(b). pages. (See -29); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2118, Note -7- J-S14035-14 the page limit on the summary of the argument was eliminated in 2013, verbosity continues to be discouraged. The appellate courts strongly of Appellate Procedure, at minimum, interferes with and often inhibits meaningful appellate review. Appellants only sporadically and inconsistently reference the place in the record where the issues addressed were raised with the trial court, or preserved, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e). -58). (See This is inadequate to enable meaningful appellate review. Issues not properly preserved and referenced are waived. See J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 411 (Pa. Super. appellant], nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied sub nom. Commonwealth v. Imes, 603 Pa. 680, 982 A.2d 509 (2009)); see also appeal for any or all of these reasons. See Branch Banking and Trust v. Gesiorski 904 A.2d 939, 943 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quashing appeal due to However, in view of the already protracted history of this convoluted case, -8- J-S14035-14 and in the interest of judicial economy, to the extent possible, we shall to Appellee violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. (See at 30-40). We disagree. The salient case on the coordinate jurisdiction rule is Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326 (1995). Id. at 1331. exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create Id. at 1332. The rule serves to protect the settled expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation Id. at 1331. It is manifest that a judge may not lightly overrule the prior decision of another judge of the same court. In some circumstances, however, application of the rule i.e., Salerno v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 377 Pa. Super. 83, 546 A.2d 1168, 1170 (1988). Thus we said in Starr that departure from the rule of coordinate jurisdiction is allowed at 1332. Applying the rule of coordinate jurisdiction too rigidly, therefore, can undermine the purposes which justify the rule. Ryan v. Berman, 813 A.2d 792, 795 (Pa. 2002). Here, it is undisputed that both Appellants signed the settlement release, wh -9- J-S14035-14 law of Pennsylvania is quite clear that a judgment creditor may execute on entireties property to enforce his judgment if both spouses are joint Klebach v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 565 A.2d 448, 450 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the preceding trial court judge, Judge Quiñones Alejandro, erred in concluding that the one Judge Quiñones Alejandro cited Patwardhan v. Brabant, 439 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. 1982), without further explanation, in support of her conclusion. (See id.). We are at a loss to discern the relevance of that decision in this case, particularly in view of the holding in Patwardhan that the wife was an indispensable party who should have been joined in the claim in that case. See Patwardhan, supra at 785. Here, both spouses were joined as parties. F see Order and Opinion, 12/07/11, at 2) is both legally inappropriate and consistently asserted . . . that they reconsideration. He did not violate the rule of coordinate jurisdiction. - 10 - J-S14035-14 In their second claim, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in (See id. at 40- Id. at 44). Their argument is waived, and would merit no relief. lien, an equitable remedy. For support, Appellants rely on Recht v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of City of Clairton, 168 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1961). -43).7 Their reliance is misplaced. (See Appellants appear to assert, but fail to develop an argument, that an alternative claim of an equitable remedy precludes a claim under a contract. (See id. at 40-46). Those are not the facts in Recht. Recht addressed whether an attorney with no contractual claim to a fee was entitled to be paid out of a charging lien. See Recht, supra at 140. The Recht Court does not appear that the right of [the] Attorney . . . to collect his fee has Id. Recht does not apply. This claim lacks merit. Furthermore, Appellants utterly fail to offer any reference in the record or other support for their bald assertion that Appellee has unclean hands. (See ____________________________________________ 7 Appellants consistently misspell and mis-cite - 11 - Recht. (See e.g., J-S14035-14 in support of their claim. (See id.). Therefore, this argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (e); see also J.J. DeLuca, supra at 411. Similarly, In an appellate brief, parties must provide an argument as to each question, which should include a discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). This Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived. In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (case citations omitted). Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, on this claim, as previously noted, Appellants argue they are - likely Id. at 45) (emphasis added). First, Appellants offer no evidence whatsoever to establish that their statements are accurate. Secondly, even if we were to assume them to be true for the sake of argument, they are nevertheless outside the certified Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). - 12 - J-S14035-14 Third, we reject on its face the argument that this Court could or should decide appeals based on the financial status of the litigants, rather than on the law. This Court is an intermediate appellate court of error correction. It is not the role of this Court to play Robin Hood. See Fischer v. Sanford monstrosities which . . . give the plaintiff a handsome sum, simply because he complains, or because he needs the money, and they think the defendant Justice is blind Justice is absolutely fair [to] everyone, and is not subject to any outside or Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 565 claim is waived and would not merit relief. In their third issue, Appellants assert that the trial court did not have See Appellants 46-51). This assertion merits no relief. Appellants offer no pertinent authority in support of the claim. Instead, they merely rehash their claim in reliance on Recht. (See id. at sons already noted, would not merit relief. See Brief, at 51-55). Appellants fail to reference where this claim was raised - 13 - J-S14035-14 with the trial court. Accordingly, the fourth claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. Finally, we note that our reasoning differs from that of the trial court. Dietz v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 41 A.3d 882, 890 n. 7 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 5/12/2014 - 14 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
