Com. v. Ortiz-Medina, J. (memorandum)

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J-S19040-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : : : : : : : : : Appellee v. JUAN DANIEL ORTIZ-MEDINA, Appellant IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 2036 MDA 2013 Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on October 15, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-36-CR-0000042-2012, CP-36-CR-0000280-2011, CP-36-CR-0000284-2011, CP-36-CR-0000286-2011, CP-36-CR-0000289-2011, CP-36-CR-0000291-2011, CP-36-CR-0000292-2011, CP-36-CR-0000293-2011, CP-36-CR-0000295-2011 BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: Juan Daniel Ortiz- FILED MAY 12, 2014 - appeals, pro se, from the Order dismissing his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post See 42 Pa.C.S.A. ยงยง 9541-9546. We affirm. In January 2010, the police arrested Ortiz-Medina, after having observed him make numerous sales of cocaine to a confidential police informant. The Commonwealth charged Ortiz-Medina with nine counts of - Medina entered into a negotiated guilty plea, in which he agreed to plead agreement to request that the sentencing court impose the statutory J-S19040-14 mandatory minimum sentence of five to ten years in prison. During the guilty plea proceedings, Ortiz-Medina was represented by Douglas Conrad, plea agreement, on June 20, 2012, the trial court sentenced Ortiz-Medina to serve an aggregate prison term of five to ten years. Ortiz-Medina did not file timely post-sentence motions, nor did he file a direct appeal. On April 12, 2013, Ortiz-Medina timely filed a pro se PCRA Petition. T represent Ortiz-Medina. After review, Attorney Quinn filed a Turner/Finley1 Ortiz- pro se PCRA Petition lacked merit and that there were no meritorious issues to raise on appeal. Attorney Quinn also filed a Petition to Withdraw as Ortiz- 2 The PCRA court subsequently granted Attorney Quinn permission to withdraw as counsel. On July 17, 2013, the PCRA court gave Ortiz-Medina Notice of its intent to dismiss his PCRA Petition without a hearing, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 (hereinafter referred to as the Ortiz-Medina did not respond to the Rule 907 Notice. 1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). 2 Ortiz-merit letter or Petition to Withdraw, nor did he retain alternate counsel for this appeal. -2- J-S19040-14 By an Order entered on October 15, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed Ortiz-Medina timely filed a pro se Notice of Appeal. On appeal, Ortiz-Medina presents the following issues for our review: 1. Did the trial court err when it [] denied a copy of the presentence report to [Ortiz-Medina?] 2. Was [plea] counsel ineffective due to his failure to advise [Ortiz-Medina] with adequate representation in explaining the consequences of pleading guilty[] versus taking this case to trial[?] Brief for Appellant at 2 (issues numbered; capitalization omitted). In his first issue, Ortiz-Medina appears to argue that his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to request the preparation of a pre-sentence Id. at 4. We disagree. The applicable standards of review regarding ineffectiveness claims and the dismissal of a PCRA petition are as follows: petition for post[-]conviction relief is well-settled: We must determination, and whether the PCR disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. *** It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal any objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his error. The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the -3- J-S19040-14 pe Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). In its Rule 907 Notice, the PCRA court addressed Ortizineffectiveness claim as follows: [Ortiz-Medina] entered a negotiated [guilty] plea in which he agreed to the sentence of 5 to 10 years [in prison]. He agreed to the terms of the plea on the record, and given the maximum sentence he could have received,[3] it was likely [that] those very terms [] induced him to plead guilty. He cannot to request a PSI report because [Ortiz-Medina] received the exact sentence [that] he negotiated for. Moreover, the result of the proceeding would not have been different had a PSI been ordered because [the trial c]ourt may not unilaterally alter the agreed-upon terms of a valid plea agreement between a defendant and the Commonwealth. Although [a trial court] may refuse to accept [a] plea altogether, the parties enter the plea agreement on the record, and the court accepts and approves the plea, then the parties and the court must abide by the terms of the Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2009) [(en banc)]. If [the trial c]ourt had refused [to accept Ortiz-Medina] would be facing a possible sentence that dwarfs the sentence that he actually received. For this reason, Attorney Quinn understandably questioned the 3 If the trial court imposed sentence on each of Ortizconvictions, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively, Ortiz-Medina could have received a maximum sentence of 90 to 180 years in prison. -4- J-S19040-14 wisdom of bringing this [PCRA P]etition in the first instance.[4] analysis is supported by the record and the law, and we therefore affirm on this basis in rejecting Ortiz- Id. Next, Ortiz-Medina asserts that his plea counsel was ineffective for -Medina] of the consequences [of] entering a guilty ple Initially, we observe that [t]he law does not require that an appellant be pleased with the results of the decision to enter a guilty plea; rather all knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. A defendant is bound by the statements made during the plea colloquy, and a defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he guilty plea will provide a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness actually caused an involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277-78 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record reveals that Ortiz-Medina completed a written guilty plea colloquy, stating that (1) he was advised and aware of his rights; (2) he understood the possible penalties for each charge; (3) he understood 4 appellate or post-conviction relief[, a trial c]ourt can impose a sentence [that is] substantially in excess of the sentence which was previously imposed. See Commonwealth v. Tapp, 997 A.2d 1201[, 1205] (Pa. Super[.] -Merit Letter, 5/20/13, at 5 (unnumbered). -5- J-S19040-14 the terms of the plea agreement; and (4) he was entering his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/20/12, at 2-7. Additionally, the trial court conducted a thorough oral guilty plea colloquy prior to accepting Ortiz- See N.T., 6/20/12, at 4-12. Ortiz-Medina stated that he was guilty of the charges and, thus, he wished to plead guilty. Id. at 6, 9-10. Furthermore, Ortiz-Medina confirmed his understanding that, if the trial court sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement, he would receive a sentence of five to ten years in prison. Id. at 11. When the trial court asked Ortiz-Medina whose choice it Id. Finally, Ortiz-Medina stated that he did not have any questions about his rights. Id. Because the record clearly shows that Ortiz-Medina understood his rights and the consequences of entering a guilty plea, his claim of plea See Franklin, supra (stating that in order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA petitioner must plead and prove that there is arguable merit to the underlying legal claim). We conclude that there are no meritorious issues that Ortiz-Medina could present on appeal, and the PCRA court neither abused its discretion nor committed an error of law by dismissing his PCRA Petition. Therefore, we affirm the Order dismissing OrtizOrder affirmed. -6- J-S19040-14 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 5/12/2014 -7-

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