Com. v. Graham, M. (memorandum)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

J-S33019-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. MICHAEL D. GRAHAM, Appellant No. 1940 EDA 2013 Appeal from the PCRA Order of June 14, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1005341-2000 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND STABILE, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 19, 2014 Appellant, Michael D. Graham, appeals pro se from the order entered on June 14, 2013, dismissing his first petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. On July 11, 2001, a jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, theft by receiving stolen property, vehicular homicide, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence, accidents involving death or personal injury while not properly licensed, fleeing or attempting to elude police officer, and driving under the influence.1 On September 10, 2001, the ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 2702(a)(1), and 3925(a), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3732(a), 3735(a), 3735.1(a), 3742.1(a), 3733(a), and 3731, respectively. J-S33019-14 trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 30 to 60 years in prison. N.T. Sentencing, 9/10/01, at 14. On December 3, 2002, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction collateral relief, wherein Appellant sought the nunc pro tunc restoration of his direct appellate rights. On October 2, 2003, the PCRA court granted nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal to this Court and, on Commonwealth v. Graham, 860 (unpublished memorandum) at 1-10. A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2003) Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. On May 31, 2011, Appellant filed the current, pro se PCRA petition which Appellant named habeas corpus [Appellant] to lose his Sixth Amendment right[] to [c]onfront his accusers, by stipulating to the various medical reports and testimony about the effects jury instruction; and, the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing Habeas Corpus -20. -2- J-S33019-14 Given that the current PCRA petition is considere first petition for post-conviction collateral relief, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d reinstated nunc pro tunc in his first PCRA petition, a subsequent PCRA After reviewing the case, however, appointed counsel filed a petition to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). Within these filings, counsel declared that the PCRA petition w claims were meritless. Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 1/22/13, at 1-3. On February 14, 2013, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice that, in 20 days, it intended to dismiss Ap hearing, as the petition was untimely. PCRA Court Order, 2/14/13, at 1; Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). On June 14, 2013, the PCRA court entered an order, petition. PCRA Court Order, 6/14/13, at 1. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and Appellant now raises the following two claims: -3- J-S33019-14 [1.] The [PCRA] court erred when denying [Appellant] relief habeas corpus filed May 31, 2011. The [PCRA c]ourt erred by allowing appointed counsel to file a Finley Constitutional Due Process claims: that trial counsel failed to argue and preserve substantial claims as explained in pro se writ of habeas corpus. Amendment rights by adopting the Finley Letter which was not in [accordance with] the standard set [forth] in Commonwealth v. Glover, 738 A.2d 460 [(Pa. Super. 1999)] and d claims that he was abandoned by all prior counsel on prior appeals violated [Appellant] from ever having his claims heard within this Commonwealth. 2 On appeal, Appellant primarily claims that the PCRA court erred in construing his self- habeas corpus to Appellant, the PCRA does not encompass his claims and, therefore, the timeliness requirements of the PCRA do untimely PCRA petition. evidence of record and Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. 2003). ____________________________________________ 2 Appellant listed the above two claims in his court-ordered statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Ap 7/24/13. -4- J-S33019-14 they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. substantive claim is one that could potentially be remedied under the PCRA, that claim is exclusive to Commonwealth v. Pagan, 864 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. Super. 2004) (emphasis in original). habeas corpus entitled to relief because his prior counsel was ineffective and because the trial court either erred or abused its discretion at trial and at sentencing. Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007), quoting Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. 2001) (Castille, J., concurring); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences Appe -5- J-S33019-14 Pagan, 864 A.2d at 1233; see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited statutory exceptions. This time- including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the unless [the] petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further, since the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts, we are required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are able to consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained: the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from considering untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000) requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no court may properly disregard or alter them in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is filed in an untime Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (holding that where a petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA time requirements, this -6- J-S33019-14 Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition). [The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] also held that even where the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the PCRA timing mandate, th[e court would] consider the issue sua sponte, as it is a threshold question implicating our subject matter jurisdiction and ability to grant the requested relief. Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 475-476 (Pa. 2003). sentence on August 18, 2004 and Appellant did not thereafter file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. Thus, App of sentence became final for purposes of the PCRA on September 18, 2004, when the period for seeking review in our Supreme Court expired. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). As Appellant did not file his current petition until May 31, 2011, the current petition is manifestly untimely and the burden thus fell upon Appellant to plead and prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year time-bar applied to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a statutory exception to the one-year time-bar, the PCRA demands that the petitioner properly plead and prove all required elements of the relied-upon exception). Here, Appellant did not even attempt to plead a valid statutory -year time-bar. Thus, s petition is manifestly untimely and Appellant did not plead any of the statutory exceptions to the one-year timejurisdiction to offer [Appella Commonwealth v. -7- J-S33019-14 Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). without a hearing. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 6/19/2014 -8- We, therefore, affirm the

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.