Com. v. Sprankle, J. (memorandum)

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J-A16001-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. JUDY SPRANKLE, Appellant : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : : : : : : : No. 165 WDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 19, 2012, Court of Common Pleas, Jefferson County, Criminal Division at No. CP-33-CR-0000455-2011 BEFORE: DONOHUE, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JULY 2, 2014 om the judgment of sentence entered following her convictions of attempted murder in the first degree, into an occupied structure.1 denial of her motion seeking to withdraw her guilty pleas to the abovementioned crimes. Following our review, we affirm. Our review of the record reveals that on September 8, 2011, al the vehicle, stated that she wanted to kill Mr. Sprankle, and then attempted 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2501(a), 2705, 2727.1(a). J-A16001-14 girlfriend while she was seated in the car. As Mr. Sprankle attempted to drive away, Sprankle retrieved a handgun from her car. Another bullet was recovered from inside a nearby house. Sprankle was arrested on the same day this incident occurred. She was subsequently charged with two counts each attempted homicide in the first degree, aggravated assault, and criminal mischief; three counts each of simple assault and REAP; and one count of discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure. On September 10, 2012, she entered open guilty pleas to one count each of attempted murder, REAP, and discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure. The sentencing court sentenced Sprankle to 78 months to 20 years of incarceration; six months to two years of incarceration; and 12 months to seven years of incarceration on these charges, respectively. The sentencing court ordered these sentences to run consecutively. On September 28, 2012, Sprankle filed a post-sentence motion, seeking, inter alia, to withdraw her guilty pleas. The sentencing This timely appeal follows, in which Sprankle presents the following post-sentence motion seeking to withdraw guilty plea where the court failed to conduct a guilty plea colloquy pursuant to Rule 590 of the Rules of Our standard of review for such -2- J-A16001-14 a claim provides that we will not disturb the sentencing court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Miller, 748 A.2d 733, 735 (Pa. Super. 2000). may be withdrawn only upon a showing of manifest injustice, which may be Commonwealth v. Leidig, 850 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. Super. 2004), aff'd, 956 A.2d 399 (Pa. 2008). It is on this basis that Sprankle seeks to withdraw her certain requirements during her plea colloquy rendered her plea involuntary and unknowing. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590, upon which Sprankle relies, provides, in relevant part, that counsel shall state the terms of a plea ate inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether the defendant understands and voluntarily accepts the terms of the plea agreement on colloquy [by the sentencing court] must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis for the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea -3- J-A16001-14 Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc). Sprankle first argues that her guilty pleas were invalid because the sentencing court failed to establish the factual basis for the pleas on the record. She relies on the case of Commonwealth v. Stolle, 386 A.2d 53 (Pa. Super. 1978), in support of her claim. In Stolle, when administering a understand what the facts are in the two charges against you, forgery and the crimes to which the defendant was pleading. This Court concluded that this was an insufficient effort to establish a factual basis for the plea. of the offenses, we concluded that the plea was involuntary and unknowing. Id. at 55. We have a different set of circumstances in the present case. The record reveals that the sentencing court directed the District Attorney to recite the facts underlying the charges to which Sprankle was pleading, while 9/10/12, at 6. Before the District Attorney could begin, there was a -4- J-A16001-14 Id. The following exchange then occurred: [Sentencing Court]: Your attorney has indicated that you would waive a reading of the facts. So have you had sufficient time to review the facts charged against you with [Counsel]? [Sprankle]: Yes. [Sentencing Court]: And are you satisfied with her services? [Sprankle]: Yes. [Sentencing Court]: Having reviewed those facts and understanding the charge of criminal attempt at third degree murder, how do you plead? [Sprankle]: Guilty. [Sentencing Court]: To [REAP]? [Sprankle]: Guilty. [Sentencing Court]: And to unlawful discharge of a firearm, how do you plead? [Sprankle]: Guilty. Id. at 6-7. stressed its strong preference for a dialogue in colloquies with meaningful participation by the defendant throughout, there is no set manner, and no fixed terms, by which factual basis m -5- Commonwealth v. J-A16001-14 Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 500 (Pa. 2004). In this case, while there was no recitation of the facts on the record, Sprankle acknowledged the facts as contained in the criminal information. The criminal information indicates that the charge of attempted first degree murder was based on Sprankle 10/21/11, at 1-2. It further states that the charge of REAP was based on Id. at 2. The information also states that the discharge of a firearm into an Id. at 2. These assertions lay plain the alleged facts upon which each charge was based, and Sprankle affirmatively acknowledged reviewing these facts. N.T., 9/10/12, at 6. Sprankle also argues that her pleas were invalid because the sentencing court did not explain the elements of attempted first degree -14. The record reveals that during the plea colloquy, the sentencing court addressed each crime and explained to Sprankle what the Commonwealth would have to prove to establish her guilt thereof. N.T., 9/1/0/12, at 5-6. However, when addressing the attempted homicide ch -6- J-A16001-14 you would have taken a substantial step toward committing third degree murder, which would not be a specific intentional killing, but you would have to know the consequences of your action in attempting to use a weapon on a Id. at 5-6. Thereafter, the District Attorney pointed out that the charge was attempted first degree murder. The sentencing court responded with the following: [Sentencing Court]: I I guess i the Commonwealth is saying you intended to kill should have said that you specifically wanted to kill him. Does that change your mind in any way on your [Sprankle]: No. Id. at 7-8. The determination of whether a sentencing court has adequately explained the elements of the crimes to which a defendant is pleading is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) may be determined from the totality of the circumstances attendant upon In Commonwealth v. Flanagan, supra, as in the present case, the sentencing court erred when explaining the law to the defendant. In Flanagan, the sentencing court was required to explain accomplice liability -7- J-A16001-14 to the defendant in connection with his pleas to murder and robbery. During accomplice makes him vicariously liable for any crimes committed by the principle.2 Flanagan, 854 A.2d at 501. At no point did the sentencing court correct its mistake and advise the defendant as to the correct state of the law. The Supreme Court found that this error rendered the colloquy ete example of a facially defective colloquy, and correspondingly legally unknowing plea, than a circumstance in which the plea court causes the defendant to affirm a materially erroneous understanding of the substantive law establishing criminal liability Id. at 502. We find the present case distinguishable from the situation in Flanagan and conclude that the totality of the circumstances here establish that the sentencing court adequately apprised Sprankle of the elements of attempted first degree murder. First degree murder is distinguished from third degree murder in that it requires the specific intent to kill. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a),(c). Although the sentencing court initially outlined the elements for attempted third degree murder, it subsequently explained that the Commonwealth would have to prove that Sprankle intended to kill her 2 This was incorrect because a person must act with the requisite mens rea to be convicted as an accomplice. Flanagan, 854 A.2d at 501; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(d). -8- J-A16001-14 husband and took a step toward achieving that objective when it clarified its prior statement. Accordingly, we do not find the colloquy deficient in this regard.3 Because we find that the record contains evidence of an adequate informed Sprankle of the elements of first degree murder, we find no merit to her claims and affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 7/2/2014 3 Sprankle argues that the absence of any explanation of the elements of a crime charges is a fatal defect and that this defect alone renders a guilty -14 (citing Commonwealth v. Belleman, 446 A.2d 304 (Pa. Super. 1982)). Sprankle test to determine whether a plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. This standard evolved following the decision in Belleman. See, e.g., Morrison, 878 A.2d at 107; Commonwealth v. Schultz, 477 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1984). -9-

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