De Botton, C. v. Kaplin, M. (memorandum)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CLAUDE DE BOTTON, NEWTOWN
:
SQUARE EAST, L.P., NATIONAL
:
DEVELOPERS, INC. AND NEWTOWN G.P., :
LLC,
:
:
v.
:
:
KAPLIN STEWART REITER & STEIN, P.C., :
MARC B. KAPLIN, ESQUIRE, BARBARA
:
ANISKO, ESQUIRE AND PAMELA M.
:
TOBIN, ESQUIRE
:
:
:
Appellants
:
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
No. 1635 EDA 2012
Appeal from the Order Dated May 22, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division No(s).: 001997, October Term, 2010
CLAUDE DE BOTTON, NEWTOWN
:
SQUARE EAST, L.P., NATIONAL
:
DEVELOPERS, INC. AND NEWTOWN G.P., :
LLC,
:
:
v.
:
:
BPG REAL ESTATE INVESTORS, CAMPUS :
INVESTORS OFFICE B, L.P., CAMPUS
:
INVESTORS 25, L.P., CAMPUS
:
INVESTORS I BUILDING, L.P., CAMPUS :
INVESTORS H BUILDING, L.P., CAMPUS :
INVESTORS D BUILDING, L.P., CAMPUS :
INVESTORS COTTAGES, L.P., CAMPUS
:
INVESTORS OFFICE 2B, L.P., ELLIS
:
PRESERVE OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
:
KELLY PRESERVE OWNERS
:
ASSOCIATION, COTTAGES AT ELLIS
:
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, GENBER/
:
MANAGEMENT CAMPUS, LLC, BERWIND :
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
PROPERTY GROUP, LTD., EXECUTIVE
BENEFIT PARTNERSHIP CAMPUS,
MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP BENEFIT,
L.P. AND ELLIS ACQUISTION, L.P.,
KAPLIN STEWART MELOFF REITER &
STEIN, P.C., MARC B. KAPLIN, ESQUIRE,
BARBARA ANISKO, ESQUIRE, AND
PAMELA M. TOBIN
APPEAL OF: BPG DEFENDANTS
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
No. 1734 EDA 2012
Appeal from the Order Dated May 22, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division No(s).: 001997, October Term, 2010
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:
FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2014
Appellants, Kaplin Stewart Reiter & Stein, P.C., Marc B. Kaplin, Esq.,
Real Estate Investors, Campus Investors Office B, L.P., Campus Investors
25, L.P., Campus Investors I Building, L.P., Campus Investors H Building,
L.P., Campus Investors D Building, L.P., Campus Investors Cottages, L.P.,
Campus Investors Office 2B, L.P., Ellis Preserve Owners Association, Kelly
Preserve
Owners
Association,
Cottages
at
Ellis
Owners
Association,
Genber/Management Campus, LLC, Berwind Property Group, Ltd., Executive
Benefit Partnership Campus, Management Partnership Benefit, L.P., and Ellis
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
-2-
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
1
appeal from the
order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas ordering
the production of privileged documents to Appellees, Claude de Botton,
Newtown Square East, L.P., National Developers, Inc., and Newtown G.P.,
2
Kaplin and BPG contend that the trial court
erred by ordering the production of privileged information. As set forth in
further detail below, this case
which has been litigated in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Court of Common
Pleas of Delaware County, and the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County has consumed significant judicial resources. We vacate the order
below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
We quote the findings of facts and conclusions of law as set forth in a
prior decision by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania:3
[BPG] sue the defendants[4] for, inter alia, federal
antitrust violations[.]
According to the Amended
1
BPG contends that BPG Real Estate Investors-Straw Party 1, L.P. and BPG
Real Estate Investors-Straw Party 2, L.P., are also parties to the appeal but
they are not named in the caption. See
2
Kaplin and BPG each filed a notice of appeal and an appellate brief.
ease of disposition, we resolve both appeals together.
For
3
numbers and parentheticals.
4
In the federal lawsuit, there were numerous defendants not involved in the
instant, underlying Philadelphia County lawsuit. The federal court labeled
-3-
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
Complaint, BPG and the de Botton Defendants own parcels
of land in Newtown Township, on which each of them
integration of mutually supportive commercial, retail,
residential, entertainment and community uses in a
Am. Compl. at ¶ 2[.] Simply stated, BPG alleges that the
defendants have done a variety of illegal things to slow
parcel of land[.] The defendants have purportedly taken
these actions to eliminate competition with their own
MUTC in Newtown Township[.]
BPG Real Estate Investors
Straw Party 1, L.P. v. de Botton, 09-1714
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2010) (order), at 2-3 (footnotes om
For example, in support of their antitrust allegations, BPG alleged that de
Botton, inter alia, disparaged BPG, deterred potential MUTC tenants from
signing leases with BPG, and abused the judicial process.
Compl., 6/15/09, at 20, 29.
Fed. First Am.
BPG also claimed that de Botton bought a
development. Id. at 16.
BPG sues the de Botton Defendants in Count I for
attempted monopolization in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman [Antitrust] Act, and BPG brings claims in Count II
against all defendants for antitrust conspiracy pursuant to
§ 1 of the Sherman Act[.] The de Botton Defendants
move to dismiss Count I, and all defendants move to
dismiss Count II[.] The defendants raise many arguments
Claude de Botton, National Developers, Inc., and Newtown G.P., LLC, as the
-4-
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
in favor of dismissal, but we will address only their
contention that BPG fails to allege a relevant geographic
market, as BPG must do to maintain its antitrust claims[.]
BPG has the burden of proving the relevant geographic
market, and at this stage BPG must therefore allege facts
in the Amended Complaint that could plausibly support its
proposed relevant geographic market[.]
The relevant
geographic market is
may rationally look for the goods or services he or she
Tunis Brothers Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d
715, 726 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted),
quoted in U.S. Horticultural Supply v. Scotts Co., 2010
market is not comprised of the region in which the seller
attempts to sell its product, but, rather, is comprised of
the area where customers would look to buy such a
U.S. Horticultural Supply, 2010 WL 729498 at
*4[.]
action is the business of developing and operating mixed
use town centers located at the intersection of Route 3, an
east/west axis, and Route 252, a north/south axis in
approximately five mile area surrounding the cross roads
of the two major access and travel roads (Routes 3 and
Id. at ¶ 38[.] In BPG
that the relevant geographic market is Newtown Township,
BPG Resp. to de Botton Mot. Dismiss at 22-23[.]
We could dismiss the antitrust claims due to the
ilure to clearly and consistently allege a
relevant geographic market[.] But BPG does not allege
facts that could support a conclusion that any of its
proposed geographic boundaries the intersection, a fivemile radius around the intersection, or the Township as a
whole meets the requirements for a relevant geographic
market[.]
BPG does not, for example, allege any facts
that could support a conclusion that the intersection or a
five-mile radius of it as opposed to a four-mile or ten-mile
radius is the boundary of the area in which a customer
-5-
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
would rationally seek look to buy or use any of the goods
or services that BPG hopes to offer at its MUTC[.] The
same is true with respect to the entirety of Newtown
cal area,
without reference to a market as perceived by consumers
and suppliers, fails to meet the legal standard necessary
Tunis Brothers, 952
F.2d at 727[.]
BPG argues that the defendants target similar
geographic areas for marketing their MUTC, but this is
not determine the relevant geographic market for antitrust
purposes and (2) the relevant geographic market is
Philadelphia area where a mixed use town center can
factor in defining the relevant geographic
market and that it is possible to have a relatively small
geographic market, Pl. Resp. Madison Marquette Mot.
Dismiss at 21[.] This may be true, but BPG fails to allege
that could
support much less plausibly support a conclusion that its
customers would not take advantage of MUTC offerings
outside the small areas that BPG proposes as relevant
geographic markets[.]
We may take judicial notice of geography, and we
therefore note that Newtown Township is a suburb of
Philadelphia that is surrounded by other suburban towns
MUTC e.g., residential renters and buyers, upscale
retailers, shoppers, and those seeking office space could
easily get those services from an MUTC at a different
intersection, outside the five-mile radius, or outside of
Newtown Township[.] BPG does not allege any facts to
suggest that a potential customer of its MUTC would not
seek goods or services from an MUTC that is, for example,
five-and-a-half miles away from the intersection or in a
neighboring suburb[.] We thus conclude that BPG has
failed to allege a relevant geographic market, and we will
-6-
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
dismiss its antitrust claims in Counts I and II, which are
the only federal law claims in the Amended Complaint[.]
Fed. Order, at 3-9 (footnotes omitted).
dismissed the two federal antitrust claims.
Accordingly, the district court
It also declined to exercise
g state claims of business
disparagement, tortious interference, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy,
and transferred the case to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.
Id. at 12; see also Fed. First Am. Compl., 6/15/09, at 33-37.
The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas received the federal case
on June 15, 2010.
On November 22, 2010, BPG filed a second amended
complaint in that court raising four claims: abuse of process, business
disparagement, tortious interference with contractual rights and prospective
7352, 11/10/10, at 25-30 (Delaware Co.).
Similar to the federal action, BPG alleged in the Delaware County
slow down or
See Fed. Order at 3.
For
example, for its abuse of process claim, BPG alleged that de Botton
purchased a particular parcel of land in order to establish legal standing to
Co.).
De Botton, BPG claimed, subsequently abused legal process to
Id.
-7-
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
tual
relations with potential MUTC tenants. Id. at 29.
Meanwhile, on October 15, 2010, de Botton filed the instant suit in
101001997, 10/15/10 (Phila. Co.). De Botton alleged claims of wrongful use
of civil proceedings and abuse of process.
Id. at 25, 28.
The complaint
id. at
10, and that the parties were competing for prospective MUTC tenants. Id.
at 9.
In response, BPG, in Delaware County, filed a motion to stay the
Philadelphia County lawsuit and transfer it to Delaware County for
e Botton
prejudice. Order, 2/2/11 (Delaware Co.). In denying the motion, the court
Philadelphia County ac
-
probable cause and for an improper purpose in filing [federal antitrust]
Id. at 1. The court permitted BPG to renew its
-
-8-
Id. at 2.
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
Discovery thus continued in the Philadelphia County lawsuit. On April
13, 2011, de Botton served interrogatories and requests for documents on
Kaplin and BPG.
BPG and Kaplin objected on grounds of, inter alia,
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
The parties then
executed, and the Philadelphia court approved, a clawback agreement.5
and interrogatories served on April 13, 2011, [Kaplin] and
BPG shall produce documents that constitute work product
which was [sic] collected or created in connection with
defining the relevant market for purposes of bringing the
Federal Antitrust Claims in the Federal Court Action (herein
Designated Work Product Documents shall not constitute a
waiver of the Work Product Protection in the Philadelphia
Action for all other documents which constitute work
product in the Federal Action. Nor shall production of the
constitute a waiver by Defendants of Work Product
Protection or any other privilege for the Philadelphia
Action, Delaware County Action, or any other action
Designated Work Product Documents shall be protected
from disclosure in the Delaware County Action, the
Philadelphia Action, and any other action to the same
Designated Work Product Documents in the Philadelphia
Action pursuant to this agreement. [De Botton] may use,
Work Product Documents.
2. This Agreement does not constitute a waiver, or an
agreement to waive, attorney-client privilege by any party.
5
A clawback agreement permits the production of documents without an
intent to waive privilege and requires the return of mistakenly produced
documents. See cmt. to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
-9-
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
3. [De Botton] agree[s] that they will not utilize in the
Delaware County Action or any other pending or
subsequent litigation any documents designated as
produced in the Philadelphia Action. Nothing contained in
this Agreement shall prohibit the use of any documents in
the Delaware County Action properly obtained during the
course of discovery in the Delaware County Action.
4. [De Botton] agree[s] that they will not use or rely on
Product Documents to advance or support any argument in
the Philadelphia Action or in any other pending or
subsequent litigation between the parties that BPG or
[Kaplin] have waived the Attorney-Client Privilege, Work
Product Protection (except, in the Philadelphia Action, to
the extent set forth above in paragraph 1 and subject to
paragraph 5 below), or any other applicable privilege
recognized at law.
Stipulated Non-Waiver and Clawback Agreement and Order, 10/26/11, at 45 (Phila Co.). Kaplin subsequently produced 290 pages of work product and
a privilege log identifying withheld documents.
The parties, however, disputed the adequacy of the production.
On
February 7, 2012, de Botton filed a motion to compel Kaplin to produce
in camera review.
Kaplin opposed and
At the heart of this wrongful use of civil process action
are the very communications which [Kaplin] seek[s]
protection for under the attorney-client privilege or the
attorney work product doctrine.
Therefore, they are
relevant and discoverable and ostensibly not covered by
the cited privileges. As an added layer of protection, this
Court will conduct an in camera inspection of the unLog attached to their Answer. . . .
- 10 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
Order, 4/18/12 (Phila. Co.).
Meanwhile, Kaplin and BPG filed a motion to stay the Philadelphia
lawsuit in Philadelphia County on February 10, 2012. The Philadelphia trial
court denied the motion on March 21, 2012, and adopted the rationale of the
Delaware County trial court. Order, 3/21/12, at 9-10 (Phila. Co.).
Kaplin complied and submitted the disputed documents to the
Philadelphia County trial court for in camera review.
The court, focusing
granted in part de Bot
-10
(Phila Co.). The trial court reasoned as follows:
Therefore, the scope of discovery should allow for
inquiry into the areas which include acts by [Kaplin and
BPG] which are relevant to:
1. How the relevant geographic market was defined in
the underlying Federal Complaint;
2. Issues concerning the level of fact pleading
necessary to satisfy the pleading requirement established
under Twombly[6] and its progeny;
6
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court explained
the holding of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007):
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading
held in Twombly, . . . the pleading standard Rule 8
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
- 11 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
3. Issues concerning the Noerr-Pennington[7] Doctrine
agencies as part of permitted political conduct and [de
First Amendment Rights.
4. Issues concerning whether the petition activities
Id. at 4.
The trial court subsequently, for four pages, quoted from the
underlying federal complaint and opined that after an in camera review,
thirty documents were discoverable. Id. at 9. The court did not discuss the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. Kaplin and BPG each filed
a timely notice of appeal8 and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Kaplin raises the following issues:
complaint suffice if i
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (citations omitted); see generally
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
Unlike federal court, Pennsylvania is a fact pleading
jurisdiction. Griffin v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 843 A.2d 393, 395 (Pa.
Super. 2004).
7
The Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity doctrine immunizes an
inter alia,] exercising his First Amendment right
process to harass. Penllyn Greene Assocs., L.P. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d
424, 429 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
8
An order compelling the disclosure of privileged information is appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 552
(Pa. 1999); accord Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 249 (Pa.
2011) (reaffirming holding of Ben, supra, and disagreeing with contrary
holding of Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009)).
- 12 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
Did the lower court err by ordering [Kaplin] to produce
attorney client privileged communications in this wrongful
use of civil proceedings action where (a) reliance on
counsel has not been asserted as a defense; (b) de Botton
acknowledged the privilege was preserved pursuant to a
stipulation previously approved by the lower court and (c)
the privileged communications relate to claims asserted by
[BPG] against [de Botton] in the Court of Common Pleas of
Did the lower court err by ordering [Kaplin] to produce
attorney work product that (a) exceeded the scope of the
greement set forth in the Stipulated Non-Waiver
and Clawback Agreement and Order approved by the lower
in the underlying case against [de Botton] in the Delaware
County Action.
Because the discovery the court ordered in the wrongful
use action infringes on the attorney client privilege and
work product protection in the Delaware County Action,
should the Court exercise its supervisory powers to stay
the wrongful action in accordance with this Court
directive in Betts Industries, Inc. v. Heelan, 33 A.3d
1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
BPG raises the following issues:
Did the trial court err in its Order of May 22, 2012 by
directing [Kaplin] to produce documents protected from
discovery and disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
that exists between [Kaplin] and [BPG]?
Where [BPG has] not asserted advice of counsel as a
defense in this litigation or otherwise waived their
attorney-client privilege with respect to confidential
communications with [Kaplin], did the trial court err in its
Order of May 22, 2012 by directing [Kaplin] to produce
documents protected by the attorney-client privilege that
exists between [Kaplin] and [BPG]?
- 13 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
Where there has been no argument or finding that the
attorney-client privilege was waived by [Kaplin] or [BPG],
did the trial court err in its Order of May 22, 2012 by
directing [Kaplin] to produce documents protected by the
attorney-client privilege that exists between [Kaplin] and
[BPG]?
Where there has been no argument or finding that a
recognized exception to the attorney-client privilege
applies, did the trial court err in its Order of May 22, 2012
by directing [Kaplin] to produce documents protected by
the attorney-client privilege that exists between [Kaplin]
and [BPG]?
-5.
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine applies.
It asserts the
court failed to enforce its own nonstipulation regarding the privilege and doctrine.
Kaplin argues the court
compelled production of the documents without citing any legal authority.
BPG similarly stresses that the trial court never held that the privilege did
not exist, was waived, or otherwise eliminated. BPG also maintains that the
documents are subject to privilege, which has not been waived, and there is
no exception permitting the court to negate the privilege.
We hold that
Kaplin and BPG are entitled to relief.
The standard of review for an order compelling the disclosure of
privileged information is de novo. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming,
924 A.2d 1259, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2007).
- 14 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
[A] two-part inquiry has been used to resolve disputes
over disclosure of communications for which attorneyclient privilege has been asserted. The first part of the
inquiry is whether attorney-client privilege does indeed
apply to a particular communication. If the court holds
that the privilege does apply, then the court must engage
in the second part of the inquiry: whether an exception or
waiver applies, thereby overcoming the privilege and
permitting disclosure.
Id. at 1265-66 (citation omitted).
The inquiry entails shifting burdens of
proof:
The party who has asserted attorney-client privilege must
initially set forth facts showing that the privilege has been
properly invoked; then the burden shifts to the party
seeking disclosure to set forth facts showing that
disclosure will not violate the attorney-client privilege,
e.g., because the privilege has been waived or because
some exception applies.
Id.
at
1266
(citation
omitted).
The
Fleming
Court
conducted
a
comprehensive, detailed review of the document in question in resolving
whether privilege attached. Id. at 1269. The trial court should also review
Gocial v. Indep. Blue
Cross, 827 A.2d 1216, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2003) (remanding to have trial
interpretation and application of a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of the Sisters
- 15 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
of Christian Charity, 32 A.3d 800, 808 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc),
appeal granted, 52 A.3d 221 (Pa. 2012).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure set forth the
attorney work-product doctrine, which provides as follows.
Rule 4003.3. Scope of Discovery. Trial
Preparation Material Generally
Subject to the provisions of Rules 4003.4 and
4003.5, a party may obtain discovery of any
matter discoverable under Rule 4003.1 even
though prepared in anticipation of litigation or
trial by or for another party or by or for that
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer
or agent.
The discovery shall not include
discl
attorney or his or her conclusions, opinions,
memoranda, notes or summaries, legal research
or legal theories.
With respect to the
attorney, discovery shall not include disclosure
of his or her mental impressions, conclusions or
opinions respecting the value or merit of a claim
or defense or respecting strategy or tactics.
Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3 (emphasis added). According to the
explanatory comment accompanying Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3,
-product
doctrine is to shield the mental processes of an attorney,
providing a privileged area within which he can analyze
and prepare his cli
adversary system by enabling attorneys to prepare cases
without fear that their work product will be used against
sions,
opinions, memoranda, notes, summaries, legal research
product privilege is not absolute and items may be deemed
- 16 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
levant
comment reveals that this limited exception to the workproduct doctrine only pertains to situations when an
There are, however, situations under the Rule
where the legal opinion of an attorney becomes
a relevant issue in an action; for example, an
action for malicious prosecution or abuse of
process where the defense is based on a good
faith reliance on a legal opinion of counsel. The
opinion becomes a relevant piece of evidence
for the defendant, upon which defendant will
rely. The opinion, even though it may have
been sought in anticipation of possible future
litigation, is not protected against discovery. A
defendant may not base his defense upon an
opinion of counsel and at the same time claim
that it is immune from pre-trial disclosure to the
plaintiff.
As to representatives of a party, and sometimes
an attorney, there may be situations where his
conclusions or opinion as to the value or merit
of a claim, not discoverable in the original
litigation, should be discoverable in subsequent
litigation. For example, suit is brought against
an insurance carrier for unreasonable refusal to
settle, resulting in a judgment against the
insured in an amount in excess of the insurance
coverage. Here discovery and inspection should
be permitted in camera where required to weed
out protected material.
Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3, Explanatory Comment at ¶ 4 5. Thus,
as the comment makes clear, documents ordinarily
protected by the attorney work-product doctrine may be
discoverable if the work product itself is relevant to the
underlying action. The work-product privilege contained
within Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3 cannot be overcome, however, by
merely asserting that the protected documents reference
relevant subject matter. Rather, to overcome the work-
- 17 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes, summaries,
legal research or legal theories must be directly relevant to
the action.
Id. at 811-12 (emphases and most citations omitted).
As set forth above, in the federal lawsuit, BPG raised claims of
attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act and antitrust
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic acciden
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297,
306-07 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563,
570-71
(1966)).
The
second
element willful
maintenance
acquisition
or
ities of
rivals and either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an
Id. at 308
(citations omitted).
Liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of the following
e
-
competitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets; (3)
that the concerted actions were illegal; and (4) that it was injured as a
proximate result of the concerted
Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp.,
423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
- 18 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
BPG also raised, in the Delaware County action, state claims of abuse
of process, business disparagement, tortious interference with contractual
rights and prospective economic advantage, and civil conspiracy.
We note:
against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for
To establish a claim for abuse of process it must
be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal
process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to
accomplish a purpose for which the process was
not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to
the plaintiff.
Abuse of process is, in essence, the use of legal process as
a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the
legitimate object of the process. Thus, the gravamen of
this tort is the perversion of legal process to benefit
someone in achieving a purpose which is not an authorized
goal of the procedure in question.
Abuse of process is a state common law claim.
Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 766, 785 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
omitted). Unlike a wrongful use claim, an abuse of process claim does not
require establishing gross negligence or absence of probable cause.
See
Cruz v. Princeton Ins. Co., 972 A.2d 14, 19 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en
banc).
Business disparagement, i.e., trade libel or injurious falsehood,
requires proof of the following elements:
(1) the statement is false; (2) the publisher either intends
the publication to cause pecuniary loss or reasonably
- 19 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
should recognize that publication will result in pecuniary
loss; (3) pecuniary loss does in fact result; and (4) the
publisher either knows that the publication is false or acts
in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
Maverick Steel Co., L.L.C. v. Dick Corporation/Barton Malow, 54 A.3d
352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 415
(Pa. 2013).
The following elements are required to establish a claim for tortious
interference with contractual rights:
(1) the existence of a contractual, or
prospective contractual relation between the
complainant and a third party;
(2) purposeful action on the part of the
defendant, specifically intended to harm the
existing relation, or to prevent a prospective
relation from occurring;
(3) the absence of privilege or justification on
the part of the defendant; and
(4) the occasioning of actual legal damage as a
In determining whether a particular course of conduct is
improper for purposes of setting forth a cause of action for
intentional interference with contractual relationships, or,
for that matter, potential contractual relationships, the
court must look to section 767 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. This section provides the following
interests sought to be advanced by the actor; 5) the
interference, and 6) the relationship between the parties.
Id. at 355 (citation omitted).
- 20 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
The elements of a civil conspiracy claim are set forth below:
In order to state a civil action for conspiracy, a
complaint must allege: 1) a combination of two or more
persons acting with a common purpose to do an unlawful
act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means or for an
unlawful purpose; 2) an overt act done in pursuance of the
common purpose; and 3) actual legal damage.
Additionally, absent a civil cause of action for a particular
act, there can be no cause of action for civil conspiracy to
commit that act. Proof of malice is an essential part of a
cause of action for conspiracy. The mere fact that two or
more persons, each with the right to do a thing, happen to
do that thing at the same time is not by itself an actionable
conspiracy.
Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
As discussed above, in the Philadelphia lawsuit, de Botton raised
claims of wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process with respect
to the two federal antitrust claims. The elements for a claim of wrongful use
of civil proceedings are set forth by statute:
(a) Elements of action. A person who takes part in
the procurement, initiation or continuation of civil
proceedings against another is subject to liability to the
other for wrongful use of civil proceedings:
(1) He acts in a grossly negligent manner or without
probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than
that of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties
or adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings
are based; and
(2) The proceedings have terminated in favor of the
person against whom they are brought.
- 21 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
42 Pa.C.S. § 8351(a)(1)proceedings, the plaintiff first must demonstrate that the person taking part
in the initiation, procurement or continuation of civil proceedings either
Werner
abuse of process claim were set forth above.
Instantly, the trial court failed to discuss the attorney-client privilege
or work product doctrine in compelling the production of thirty documents.
See Barrick, 32 A.3d at 811-12; Fleming, 924 A.2d at 1265-66.
The
establishing the claims in the Philadelphia County lawsuit did not justify the
de facto holding that the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine did not apply to the documents in question. The court, similarly,
did not discuss the applicability, if any,
-
enforced clawback agreement. Moreover, the broad, generalized nature of
why the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine did not apply to a
particular document or discrete category of closely related documents. Cf.
Fleming, 924 A.2d at 1268-69 (examining document in ascertaining
whether privilege attached); Gocial, 827 A.2d at 1223 (remanding to have
trial court render individualized rulings for each document at issue). Absent
- 22 -
J.A04035/13 & J.A04036/13
any such meaningful discussion,9 this Court is unable to ascertain whether
the trial court properly compelled the production of these documents.
Accordingly, having discerned an error of law, we are constrained to vacate
the order and remand to have the trial court apply the factors for disclosing
or not disclosing the documents at issue, particularly in the context of the
claims raised in this case, see, e.g., Werner, 799 A.2d at 786, and a courtapproved clawback agreement. See Barrick, 32 A.3d at 808; Fleming, 924
A.2d at 1263; see also Gocial, 827 A.2d at 1223.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/11/2014
9
As with any privilege log, any such discussion need not encroach upon
privileged or otherwise protected information.
- 23 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.