Com. v. Tate, E. (memorandum)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

J.S04033/14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. EDDIE TATE, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1404 EDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 2, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division No(s).: CP-23-CR-0004358-2012 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J., SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2014 Appellant, Eddie Tate, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas following his jury convictions of murder in the second degree,1 robbery,2 and conspiracy3 to commit robbery. He argues the trial court erred in finding: (1) his waiver of Miranda4 rights was valid where detectives presented Miranda warnings to * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b). 2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i) (inflicting serious bodily injury). 3 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a). 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). J. S04033/14 him on a laptop computer for him to read to himself, without any accompanying verbal advisement, and (2) the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence where there was no physical evidence to corroborate his own statements to investigators. We affirm. The trial court summarized the underlying investigation of this case as follows. At 6:25 a.m. on September 13, 2008, while waiting at a bus stop, Ms. Nicole Smith saw two African American men, one wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and the other wearing a white hooded sweatshirt, walking down Church Lane from the direction of Redwood Avenue in Yeadon Borough, Delaware County, PA. She watched them cross the street diagonally and turn into the driveway of 645 Church Lane where she lost sight of them. At 6:45 a.m. Ms. Scott heard two gunshots coming from that direction and saw the two males quickly run out of the driveway back towards Redwood Avenue. About ten minutes later, police found Veno Leigertwood, Jr. dead in the driveway of his home. The cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the back of the neck from a .22 caliber handgun. and car were left at the scene, his cell phone and pocket Bible were missing. The Yeadon Borough Police Department and the Delaware County Criminal Investigation Division initiated a homicide investigation that was joined by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in February 2010. Trial Ct. Op., 7/25/13, at 1-2 (citations to trial transcript omitted). The focus of the investigation eventually shifted to a Brahiem interviewed Appellant on February 18, 2011. -2- J. S04033/14 Appellant told Robinson1 officials that a man named Marquis him and that the victim punched him and when he indicated that Mr. Roberts had stolen a cell phone and a laptop from the victim. Finally, Appellant told officials that Mr. Roberts had shot Mr. Leigertwood with either a .22 or .25 caliber, small, black handgun. ____________________________ 1 Marquis Roberts. __________________________________________ The FBI conducted a second interview of Appellant on July 22, 2011. . . . Appellan a car with Marquis Roberts and Braheim Thompson when Braheim and Marquis were having a conversation about the murder [of Mr. Leigertwood], and . . . [Appellant] deduced from listening to the two of them talk . . . that they Appellant also revealed that Mr. Roberts and Mr. Thompson had previously committed other robberies and that when they did so, Mr. Roberts wore a white zip-up hooded sweatshirt while Mr. Thompson wore a black hooded sweatshirt. However, Appellant averred that despite knowing about the murder, he was not present when Mr. Leigertwood was shot. Appellant was interviewed a third time by Special Agent Thomas Scanzano on July 27, 2011.2 At this time, Mr. Thompson and Mr. Roberts were both suspects in this beginning the interview, he placed his laptop, which was displaying an electronic version of the standard Miranda form,[5] in front of Appellant and directing him to read through it. Appellant acknowledged that he understood and was waiving his Miranda rights by signing an electronic signature pad. When asked what he knew about murder, Appellant initially repeated that 5 -3- J. S04033/14 he heard about the robbery/murder from Mr. Thompson and Mr. Roberts a few days after it took place. He maintained that he was not present for and did not participate in the murder. ____________________________ 2 . . . Agent Scanzano was brought into the investigation [to administer] a polygraph test to Appellant. Any reference to the polygraph test was not mentioned during Trial. __________________________________________ However, after observing that when these questions d to tell the truth because he could be When prompted to explain, Appellant stated that on the morning of September 13, 2008, he was driving around r they saw Mr. Leigertwood, and Mr. Roberts and Mr. Thompson exited the vehicle. Appellant said he could tell there was an altercation and then heard multiple gun shots, after which Mr. Roberts and Mr. Thompson immediately ran back to the car. All three men then went that he pulled out a gun, attempted to rob the black male, the black male punched him in the face, and as he was falling backwards Appellant said that the men concluded that Mr. Leigertwood was likely dead. Finally, Appellant told Agent Mr. Roberts used either a .22 or .25 caliber black handgun, but he did not know what happened to either of those items. When he had concluded his interview, Agent Scanzano asked Appellant if he would be willing to speak to Agent Carter and Detective Benham, and Appellant agreed. Agent Carter testified that both he and Detective Benham first verbally reminded Appellant of his Miranda rights, which Appellant chose not to invoke. Appellant repeated -4- J. S04033/14 the story he had told Agent Scanzano, adding that before stopping the car to let Mr. Roberts and Mr. Thompson out, he made a right turn onto the next street past Mr. this street is Redwood Avenue, which corroborated the testimony, the only incons 27 statements concerned where the discussion after the shooting took place, since he indicated to Agent Scanzano that the conversation took place in his apartment, but told Agent Carter it occurred while the men were still in the car. Trial Ct. Op. at 2-5. Appellant was charged with murder in the second degree, murder in the third degree, conspiracy, and robbery. On October 16, 2012, he filed a motion to suppress all statements he made to FBI agents on July 27, 2011. The court held a hearing and denied the motion on January 22, 2013. Appellant then filed a second motion to suppress, seeking suppression of all statements he made while in federal custody. After another hearing, the court denied the motion on the first day of trial, February 26, 2013. A fourFBI agents were admitted. witnesses. He did not testify or present evidence or Appellant was found guilty of murder in the second degree, robbery by infliction of serious bodily injury, and conspiracy to commit robbery. On April 2, 2013, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the murder charge and a consecutive 8½ to 20 years for conspiracy. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which the -5- J. S04033/14 court denied on April 18, 2013. Appellant then took this timely appeal. 6 As in finding he validly waived his Miranda rights. He does not challenge the content of the Miranda warnings or claim that he did not understand them, but rather contests the manner in which they were provided to him. His central argument is that Agent Scanzano should have orally advised him of his Miranda rights and erred in only showing him the Miranda warnings on a laptop computer and having him read the Miranda warnings to himself. Miranda Warnings to rev assumptions as to whether Appellant read and understood his Miranda Warnings, despite his alleged acknowledgment by signing the electronic Id. at 24. We find no relief is due. We note: This Court does not, nor is it required to, defer to the Miranda waiver was knowing or voluntary. Instead, we examine the record to determine if it supports the 6 After sentencing, Appellant first filed a pro se post-sentence motion; he then filed two counseled motions, one challenging the weight of the evidence and one challenging the sentence. Following the denial of all three of these motions on April 18, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Counsel then filed a timely notice of appeal on May 15th. -6- J. S04033/14 support the conclusion that, as a matter of law, Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. . . . Regardless of whether a waiver of Miranda is voluntary, the Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver is also knowing and intelligent. Miranda holds that the defendant may waive effectuation of the rights conveyed in the warnings provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First[,] the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda rights have been waived. Commonwealth v. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 949 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal granted in part on unrelated issue, 84 A.3d 699 (Pa. 2013), cross appeal denied, 85 A.3d 483 (Pa. 2014). Our review of Pennsylvania authority has not revealed a discussion on the propriety of providing Miranda warnings in written format only. However, we note that the federal appellate courts have consistently held that verbal warnings, while preferred, are not required. For example, in U.S. v. Sledge, 546 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a case in which the defendant was dard Miranda -7- J. S04033/14 orally gave the defendant the Miranda Id. at 1121. The Court stated: We agree with the First, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that it is not essential that the warnings required by Miranda [ ] must be given in oral rather than written form. See: [U.S.] v. Coleman, 524 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1975); [U.S.] v. Alexander, 441 F.2d 403 (3rd Cir. 1971); [U.S.] v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970); [U.S.] v. Osterburg, 423 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 914, 26 L. Ed. 2d 571, 90 S. Ct. 2216 (1970). Here the defendant admitted he could read and write, was given a legally sufficient rights form, was observed reading it, orally admitted that he fully understood his rights and then signed a legally sufficient waiver form. We remind the Government, however, that a heavy burden rests upon it to prove that a person in custody did knowingly and intelligently waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel, Miranda[, ] 384 U.S. at 475, and, although each particular case must depend upon its own facts, [U.S.] v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 [ ] (1968), the preferred practice would include both an oral recitation of the required Miranda warnings coupled with the delivery of a written explanation thereof to the accused and the request that he execute a legally sufficient waiver prior to the commencement of custodial interrogation. Sledge, 546 F.2d at 1122. In the Ninth Circuit opinion of Bell v. U.S., 382 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1967), an FBI agent asked the defendant whether he could read, and the defendant replied in the affirmative. Id. at 986. The agent then presented required under Miranda -8- J. S04033/14 a statement. Id. The defendant argued that his statement should have Miranda Id. at 987. The Court summarily rejected this claim as follows: This is absurd. If [the defendant] read and understood the written advice, then he acquired knowledge of his rights in a very satisfactory and most unimpeachable way. There is no requirement as to the precise manner in which police communicate the required warnings to one suspected of crime. The requirement is that the police fully advise such a person of his rights, and [the defendant] made no showing that he did not read or understand the written warnings which were presented to him. Id. In the instant matter, the trial court, Appellant, and the Commonwealth have all referred to the United States Supreme Court decision in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989),7 which stated: We have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.[ ] In Miranda s required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam), Miranda [does not] extend to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal . . . The prophylactic Miranda themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] 7 -21. -9- J. S04033/14 instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory selfcourts therefore need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably Miranda Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202-03 (some citations omitted). Here, the trial court considered the following suppression hearing Miranda procedure is to ask an individual if he can read and write English, and that if the t. Op. at 9. Id. Appellant responded that he could; Agent Scanzano stated Id. Id. Agent Scanzano provided the form and the consent portion, and watched him read both on the computer screen. Id. Agent Scanzano asked Appellant if he had any questions about his rights, and Appellant stated he to have any trouble understanding who Agent Scanzano was or why he was - 10 - J. S04033/14 Id. at 9-10. Agent Scanzano further testified that the electronic form notified Appellant that he rig the right to stop answerin Id. at 10. reasonably conveyed to Appellant his rights as required by Miranda 8 Id. to Appellant in writing on a computer screen rather than in paper format was inconsequential. Id. (citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202-03; Bell, 382 electronic format hindered or prevented Ct. Op. at 10-11. Appellant makes no allegation that he was intimidated, coerced, or deceived into signing a waiver of his rights. See Rushing, 71 A.3d at 949. 8 lawyer, one will be appointed for you befor Commonwealth Exhibit, Advice of Rights. - 11 - J. S04033/14 He likewise advances no claim that he did not understand the form.9 action . . . is for the law enforcement officer to read the form outlining the rights aloud of the oral recitation Miranda Warnings coupled with the delivery of a written Sledge, 546 F.2d at 1122; U.S. v. Choice, 392 F. Supp. 460, 466 (E.D.Pa. 1975)). We agree with Appellant that in advising an individual of his Miranda rights, the preferred manner is to provide both oral and written warnings. See Sledge, 546 F.2d at 1122. In the instant case, federal investigators interrogated Appellant. The warnings were provided to Appellant on a laptop computer, and required him only to provide one signature after reading all the warnings, rather than signing or initialing after each warning. As stated in Sledge to prove that a person in custody did knowingly and intelligently waive his See id. The practice of showing Miranda warnings on a laptop computer and having an individual read them to himself should not be standard procedure, but instead an infrequent occurrence with sufficient reasons for the variance shown. 9 left with assumptions as to whether [he] read and understood his Miranda at 24 (emphasis added), a careful review of his argument reveals no outright claim that he did not understand the form. - 12 - J. S04033/14 Nevertheless, we decline to disregard Pennsylvania authority requiring review of the totality of circumstances in favor of adopting a bright-line rule requiring oral Miranda warnings. See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202-03; Sledge, 546 F.2d at 1122; Bell at 986; Rushing, 71 A.3d at 949. Instead, we agree with the trial court that in this case, the totality of the circumstances support a finding that Appellant comprehended the Advice of Rights and was not coerced into giving a statement to FBI agents. See Rushing denying his post-sentence motion claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.10 [his] alleged statements to law enforcement officers without any maintains that at trial, there was no eyewitness testimony placing him witness, Ms. Scott, could not identify the two black males, did not see any vehicles in the area, and did not see the two males running to any vehicle. 10 This issue is preserved for appeal, as Appellant raised it in a post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3). However, we note that Appellant only mentions the crimes of which he was convicted, and provides no discussion of the elements of these offenses, nor any discussion of conspirator or accomplice liability. - 13 - J. S04033/14 Id. at 29. Appellant adds that the none of the forensic and DNA evidence or th Thompson and Roberts and their Id. one was stolen. Id. at 31. We find no relief is due. We note the relevant standard of review: A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews the exercise of the the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [jury] is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight of the justice. In determining wheth er this standard has been met, appellate r discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Brown, 71 A.3d 1009, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied 77 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2013). - 14 - J. S04033/14 In Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 A.2d 483 (Pa. Super. 1976), the defendant was charged with breaking into a store and stealing a television. Id. nt a television of the same make and size as the one stolen; however, the model and serial numbers were obliterated. Id. The defendant admitted to police that he broke into the store and stole the television. Id. He later sought suppression of this statement on the ground that it was not voluntarily given. Id. The trial court denied the motion and it was admitted at trial. Id. olice made promises of Id. at 486. The jury found him guilty of burglary. Id. at 485. On appeal before this Court, the defendant argued the evidence was person who committed the crime but for the fact that he gave a statement him] was Id. beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt when the entire case rests upon the Id. at 486. This Court disagreed, finding: The jury in the case at bar could properly have based its verdict on the confession because [the defendant] - 15 - J. S04033/14 admitted committing all the elements of the crime of burglary. The jury, as the evaluator of credibility in this mony at trial less worthy of belief than his confession. Id. (citation omitted). The defendant also challenged the weight of the evidence. Id. This Court likewise found no relief was due: the witnesses is solely for the jury and if its finding is us, there was a conflict in the evidence as to the voluntariness and reliability of the confession and the jury chose to disbelieve appellant. This conclusion is supported refusal to grant a new trial on this ground. In the case before us, there was a conflict in the evidence as to the voluntariness and reliability of the confession and the jury chose to disbelieve appellant. This conclusion is supported refusal to grant a new trial on this ground. Id. (citation omitted). -sentence motion, the trial court considered, as Appellant argued, the lack of any forensic evidence linking him to the crime, as well as the testimony of a responding officer, that upon arriving at the scene of the shooting, he did not see Appellant. Trial Ct. Op. t property was taken from [the victim], what caliber weapon was used to shoot the victim, what street Mr. Roberts and Mr. Thompson approached the - 16 - J. S04033/14 victim from and where the car was waiting for them to return, and that [the victim] had been killed in the cou Id. at 21-22. Finally, acknowledging his Miranda rights, confessed to knowingly participating in Id. at 22. The court f evidence that the jury found the FBI agents to be credible and weighed the Id. at 23. As stated above, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and was thus charged with resolving any inconsistencies in See Brown, 71 A.3d at 1013. Furthermore, under Fisher may stand. See Fisher, 364 A.2d at 485. We find the trial court properly exercised its discretion. See Brown, 71 A.3d at 1013. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/15/2014 - 17 -

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.