Metcalf, W. et al v. Trika, J. (memorandum)

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J.S76031/13 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 WILLIAM METCALF T/A EURO CLASSICS, : : Appellant : : v. : : : JEEVE TRIKA, : : Appellee : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1206 MDA 2013 Appeal from the Order May 22, 2012 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Civil Division No(s).: 11-02062 BEFORE: ALLEN, LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 07, 2014 Appellant, William Metcalf T/A Euro Classics, appeals from the order entered in the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Jeeve Trika. Appellant contends the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment based upon res judicata. We affirm. This Court summarized the facts of this case in the prior appeal. Appellee lives in the state of Indiana and owns a Porsche replica. Appellant owns a business in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, where he, inter alia, builds eplica. In the fall of 2010, Appellee damaged his Porsche and * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J. S76031/13 attempted to have it repaired in Indiana. He, however, for repairs. Appellee filed a lawsuit in Indiana against a former mechanic and requested an estimate from Appellant to use in that case. Appellant provided an estimate. Appellant, however, advised Appellee that Appellant needed additional parts to repair the vehicle. Appellee subsequently sent $3,000 to Appellant. However, the additional costs, including storage costs, exceeded the $3,000.00 payment, and Appellee has refused to make any additional payments to Appellant. Appellant claimed damages in excess of $15,000.00. Appellee initially responded to the complaint by filing an answer, New Matter, and Counterclaim. Appellee claimed, inter alia, that he filed suit against Appellant in Indiana. According to Appellee, Appellant failed to appear for the possession of the Porsche and entered a default judgment in the amount of $3,000.00. In the New Matter, Appellee maintained, inter alia, that the doctrines of accord and satisfaction, res judicata claims. In his Counterclaim, Appellee averred that vehicle for $3,000.00. He further contended that Appellant has wrongfully retained the vehicle. Appellee asked that the court award him immediate possession of the vehicle, $3,000 for the payments Appellee made to appellant, and Matter and counterclaim, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. . . . Appellee argued that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, res judicata, and estoppel Trika, 1138 MDA 2012 at *1-*3. Appellant admitted that Appellee sent his car to him. See Appellant conce Id. at 2. It is -2- J. S76031/13 undisputed that Appellee filed a civil complaint for immediate possession of 5/1/12, 1. Appellant did not answer the complaint filed by Appellee in Indiana. summary judgment. On June 21, 2012, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the May 22, 2012 order. This Court quashed the appeal on November counterclaim. We found that the order granting summary judgment was not a final order. William Metcalf T/A Euro Classics v. Jeev Trika, 1138 MDA 2012 (unpublished memorandum at *4) (Pa. Super. Nov. 19, 2012). On June 6, 2013, Appellee withdrew the counterclaim. appeal filed on Monday July 8, 2013 was timely. Thus, the instant See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (providing that when last day of any period of time referred to in any statute falls on Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from computation). Appellant was not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On July 16, 2013, the trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporating its May 22, 2012 opinion. Appellant raises the following issue for our review: 1. Whether a foreign judgment that is not transferred to Pennsylvania and entered as a judgment can act as res judicata of a claim pending in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania? -3- J. S76031/13 1 Appellant argues that the doctrine of res judicata should not bar his claim in Pennsylvania for additional costs to repair the vehicle and storage fees because the state of Indiana did not have jurisdiction over him in Id. at 5. Appellant contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based upon res judicata in the absence of an inquiry into the validity of the judgment entered in Indiana, based upon lack of in personam jurisdiction.2 Id. at 6. summary judgment will only be disturbed upon a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists or where the moving party was not entitled to such a judgment as a matter of law. In conducting our review, the record must 1 it should be noted that the purported judgment from Indiana has never been transferred to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and specifically, not to Lycoming County where the underlying action in this matter was filed. Therefore, this case does not involve the interpretation of whether [Appellant] is barred from challenging the judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act (42 Pa.C.S. § 4306(b)) but rather, whether res judicata should bar his claim in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. at 5. 2 avenue to raise the defense of res judicata. Res judicata is an affirmative defense that Id. at 6. This claim is unavailing because Appellant raised the defense of res judicata in new matter. See Answer, New Matter and Counterclaim, 12/28/11, at 4 ¶ 32. -4- J. S76031/13 be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be construed against the moving party. We review pure matters of law de novo. Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d 366, 375 (Pa. 2006) (citations omitted). As a prefatory matter, we consider whether to apply Pennsylvania or res judicata. This Cour jurisdiction's res judicata doctrine should prevail in an instance in which the prior lawsuit arose in another jurisdiction has been unclear. For example, in Commonwealth ex. rel. McClintock v. Kelly, 287 Pa. 139, 134 A. 514, 516 (1926), this Court applied its own res judicata doctrine to decide if the decision of a Maryland court should be provided res judicata effect. Nearly a half century later, however, this Court gave res judicata effect to an Ohio judgment without applying Pennsylvania res judicata doctrine; there we rejected a challenge to the validity of an Ohio divorce decree. Barnes v. Buck, 464 Pa. 357, 346 A.2d 778, 782 & n. 11 (1975). Although and Credit Clause jurisprudence, McClintock, 134 A. at 515-16; Barnes, 346 A.2d at 781, different approaches were ultimately employed in the two cases. mirrored in the academic authority which exists on the question. Thus, some commentators have argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not dictate that courts res judicata doctrine in cases such as this. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 945 (1998) (analyzing different approaches to choice of law issue). It also has been argued that no authority precludes a state from using its own res judicata preclusion law would give at least as much, or more, preclusive effect as the out-ofmandate. E.g., Comment, Gregory S. Getschow, If At -5- J. S76031/13 First You Do Succeed: Recognition of State Preclusion Laws in Subsequent Multistate Actions, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 253, 276 (1990); see also Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1209, 1227-28 (1986) (discussing ability of federal courts to give greater preclusive effect to state court judgments). Finally, it has been argued that differing circumstances may warrant a court in declining to follow an immutable rule that the outofres judicata analysis must be used in every case. 188 Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4467 (2d ed. 2002) (providing several examples of when it may be wise to depart from res judicata rules of out-ofstate court). On the other hand, there is ample authority weighing in favor of the proposition that the court should apply the res judicata law of the state that rendered the prior judgment. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts provides as follows: When a court has jurisdiction over the parties, the local law of the State where the judgment was rendered determines, subject to constitutional limitations, whether the parties are precluded from collaterally attacking the judgment on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the thing or status involved or lacked competence over the subject matter of the controversy. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 97 (1998). In addition, it is certainly safe to say that the U.S. Supreme Court and several state courts have generally applied the res judicata doctrine of the court where the judgment under collateral attack was rendered to determine if and when a collateral attack on that judgment is permissible. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 87, 104 S. Ct. 892, 899, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984) (remanding to District Court to apply Ohio claim preclusion law); Omega Leasing Corp. v. Movie Gallery, Inc., 859 So.2d 421, 424 (Ala. 2003) (looking to Virginia law to determine if judgment was final); O'Connell v. Corcoran, 1 N.Y.3d 179, 770 N.Y.S.2d 673, 676, 802 N.E.2d 1071 (2003) (according preclusive effect to Vermont divorce decree based on -6- J. S76031/13 res judicata law); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. , 204 W.Va. 465, 513 S.E.2d requires the courts of this State to give the New York judgment at least the res judicata effect which it would be Smith v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 867 P.2d 1260, 1265 (Okla. 1994) (applying Arkansas claim preclusion law); Nottingham v. Weld, 237 Va. 416, 377 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1989) (holding that Virginia courts must give federal court judgment same preclusive effect federal court would have given that judgment). But see, e.g., Ditta v. City of Clinton, 391 So. 2d 627, 629 (Miss. 1980) (applying preclusion law of Mississippi where Louisiana judgment was argued to have preclusive effect); Finley v. Kesling, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1, 60 Ill. Dec. 874, 433 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (1982) (declining to apply collateral estoppel rules of Indiana). Id. at 376-77. Instantly, the parties have not raised the issue of whether Pennsylvania or Indiana law on res judicata applies in this case. The instant doctrine of res judicata. This Court has stated: The doctrine of res judicata has been judicially created. It reflects the refusal of the law to tolerate a multiplicity of rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or The doctrine] forbid[s] relitigation of matters actually decided, on the ground that there is no assurance the second decision will be more correct than the first. Moreover, a party is commonly forbidden to raise issues that could have -7- J. S76031/13 been litigated in the first suit but were not, because of the desirability of settling the entire controversy in a res judicata to prevail there must be a concurrence of four conditions: (1) identity of issues, (2) identity of causes of action, (3) identity of persons and parties to the action, and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or res judicata applies to and is binding, not only on actual parties to the litigation, but also to those who are in privity with them. A final valid judgment upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any future suit between the same parties Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citations omitted and emphasis added). In Indiana, the court applies the doctrine as follows: Res judicata serves to prevent repetitious litigation of res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently ccepted principles of res judicata The doctrine of res judicata consists of two distinct components, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion is applicable when a final judgment on the merits has been rendered and acts to bar a subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties. When claim preclusion applies, all matters that were or might have been litigated are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in the prior action. Claim preclusion applies when the following four factors are present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former -8- J. S76031/13 action was between parties to the present suit or their privies. Perry v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ind. App. 2007) (citations omitted and emphasis added); accord Luxury Townhomes, LLC v. McKinley Properties, Inc., 992 N.E.2d 810 (Ind. App. 2013). res judicata be barred by that doctrine. . . . He should have brought that claim in the based upon the doctrine of res judicata. See Perry, 871 N.E.2d at 1048; Day, 464 A.2d at 1316-17. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 7/7/2014 -9- J. S76031/13 - 10 -

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