Dunham v. Dunham (memorandum)
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J-S69008-12 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 WILLIAM D. DUNHAM, Appellant v. WANDA DUNHAM, Appellee : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 758 MDA 2012 Appeal from the Order entered on March 20, 2012 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Civil Division, No. 2003-20826 WILLIAM D. DUNHAM, Appellant v. WANDA DUNHAM, Appellee : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1191 MDA 2012 Appeal from the Order entered on May 31, 2012 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Civil Division, No. 2003-20826 BEFORE: MUSMANNO, BENDER and COLVILLE*, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: Filed: March 11, 2013 William D. Dunham ( Husband ) appeals from two related trial court Orders: (1) an Order entered on March 20, 2012, that equitably distributed the marital property of Husband and Wanda Dunham ( Wife ); and (2) an Order entered on May 31, 2012, that amended the March 20, 2012 Order by *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S69008-12 formally decreeing that the parties are divorced from the bonds of matrimony. We affirm. The trial court has set forth the relevant facts and procedural history in its Opinion, which we adopt herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/12, at 1-3.1 On appeal, Husband raises the following issues for our review: 1. Did the trial court err by incorrectly valuing the marital estate? 2. Did the trial court err by granting forty percent of the marital estate to [Husband] and sixty percent of the marital estate to [Wife]? 3. Did the trial court err in finding that [Husband] should pay [Wife] the sum of $176,155.39 in equitable distribution? 4. Did the trial court err in determining the value of the Hartford annuity and Franklin Templeton Investment Accounts? 5. Did the trial court err in utilizing stipulated numbers from a hearing on May 2, 2011 court order [sic] as [Husband] had not authorized his prior counsel to enter into a stipulation on [Husband s] behalf? 6. Did the trial court err in not considering that [Husband] was denied his due process rights during the course of the litigation resulting in the ultimate entry of the March 20, 2012 Order? 1 The trial court s Opinion neglects to mention that, on March 20, 2012, the trial court entered an Order equitably distributing the parties marital property. The trial court subsequently entered an Order on May 31, 2012, which amended the March 20, 2012 Order by merely adding a brief decree divorcing the parties. Following the trial court s denial of Husband s Motion seeking reconsideration of these Orders, Husband timely filed a Notice of appeal. -2- J-S69008-12 Brief for Appellant at 12 (capitalization omitted). In addressing Husband s issues on appeal, we are guided by the following: A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a just determination of their property rights. Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). Husband first argues that the trial court erred in valuing the marital estate, and, specifically, in assigning a value to Husband s two retirement accounts: an annuity with The Hartford Company ( the Hartford annuity ) and a brokerage account with Franklin Templeton ( the Franklin Templeton account ) (collectively the retirement accounts ). See Brief for Appellant at 17-18. Husband concedes that the parties had entered into a stipulation regarding the value of the retirement accounts at a hearing on May 2, -3- J-S69008-12 2011.2 Id. at 18. According to Husband, however, the trial court s [u]sing only these stipulated numbers and not evaluating the [retirement accounts] from [the parties ] date of marriage until [their] date of separation or a date close to the hearing on equitable distribution ¦ was clearly an error on the part of the trial court. Id. In the trial court s Opinion dated March 20, 2012, the court addressed Husband s challenge to the valuation of the retirement accounts as follows: For roughly six months, [Husband] was offered the opportunity to provide documentation regarding the value of [the retirement] accounts. He refused. When the [Special Master ( SM )] undertook the unusual action of seeking assistance from [the trial c]ourt, [i.e., by filing a Motion to compel a response from Husband, the trial court] scheduled a hearing [on May 2, 2011]. The parties[, through their respective counsel,] reached certain agreements at this hearing[, see N.T., 5/2/11, at 2-4], and [the trial court] documented those agreements in a [c]ourt Order. Of specific import are paragraphs 1 and 2 of the [c]ourt Order. Paragraph 1 recorded the parties agreement that the Hartford annuity should have a value[,] for purposes of equitable distribution [,] of $102,496.00. Paragraph 2 recorded the parties agreement that the Franklin Templeton account should have a value[,] for purposes of equitable distribution [,] of $223,471.00. The SM accepted the values that were stipulated [to] in open court and then undertook her analysis based upon those values. ¦ If [Husband] truly believed that [the retirement] accounts were worth less, he could have provided documentation to this effect in response to the SM s numerous requests for the same. If [Husband] truly wanted to argue that the value of [the retirement] accounts should have been [less] ¦, he should not have agreed at the May 2, 2011 hearing that [the retirement] accounts possessed the values design[at]ed for purposes of equitable distribution. 2 Husband emphasizes that he did not personally attend the May 2, 2011 hearing. Brief for Appellant at 18. -4- J-S69008-12 Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/12, at 4-5 (emphasis in original). The record supports the trial court s sound reasoning and we affirm on this basis for the purpose of appeal. See id. As an addendum, we point out that this Court has stated the following regarding valuation of marital assets: The Divorce Code does not specify a particular method of valuing assets. Thus, the trial court must exercise discretion and rely on the estimates, inventories, records of purchase prices, and appraisals submitted by both parties. When determining the value of marital property, the court is free to accept all, part or none of the evidence as to the true and correct value of the property. Where the evidence offered by one party is uncontradicted, the court may adopt this value even though the resulting valuation would have been different if more accurate and complete evidence had been presented. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in adopting the only valuation submitted by the parties. Childress, 12 A.3d at 456 (emphasis added; citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, since the parties jointly stipulated as to the value of the retirement accounts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the only valuation submitted by the parties. See id. In his second and third issues, Husband contends that the trial court improperly ordered him to pay Wife $176,155.30 in equitable distribution, which constituted a 60/40 split in favor of Wife. Brief for Appellant at 19. Husband s argument in support of these issues, however, is virtually identical to his arguments advanced in support of his first issue. Since we have already determined that the trial court did not err in using the -5- J-S69008-12 stipulated values of the retirement accounts in formulating the equitable distribution award, Husband s instant, redundant claims do not entitle him to relief. Finally, we will address Husband s fourth, fifth and sixth issues simultaneously, as they are closely related. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in utilizing the stipulated values of the retirement accounts for purposes of equitable distribution because Husband did not authorize his prior counsel, Mark Schappell, Esquire ( Attorney Schappell ), to enter into such stipulation at the May 2, 2011 hearing. See Brief for Appellant at 2023. Husband further argues that Attorney Schappell violated Husband s due process rights by negligently failing to inform him of: (1) the scheduled May 2, 2011 hearing; and (2) numerous requests made by the SM requesting Husband to produce documentation pertaining to the value of the retirement accounts. Id. at 22. Accordingly, Husband contends, the trial court erred in denying his Motion for reconsideration, wherein he alleged that Attorney Schappell had improperly failed to communicate with him. Id. at 22-23. In its Opinion, the trial court thoroughly addressed Husband s claims and stated its reasons for finding that these claims lacked merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/12, at 4-7. After reviewing the parties briefs and the certified record, we affirm based on the trial court s sound rationale with regard to these issues. See id. -6- J-S69008-12 Since we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court in equitably distributing the parties marital property and divorcing the parties, we affirm the Orders on appeal. Orders affirmed. -7-
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