In the Interest of: J.R.A. & A.R.A., Minors (memorandum)

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J-S61014-13 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: MINORS J.R.A. & A.R.A., APPEAL OF: M.L.C., MOTHER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 602 EDA 2013 Appeal from the Decrees entered January 18, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000038-2011, CP-51-AP-0000039-2011 BEFORE: ALLEN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD*, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 04, 2013 M.L.C. ( Mother ) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating her parental rights with respect to her son, J.R.A., born in September of 2005, and her daughter, A.R.A., born in August of 2003 (collectively, the children ). We affirm. On January 28, 2011, J.R.A., Jr. ( Father ), and his wife, N.S.A. ( Stepmother ), filed petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother s parental rights.1 On the same date, Stepmother filed petitions for adoption. The orphans court held a hearing on the termination petitions on February 15, 2012, June 27, 2012, and September 25, 2012, during which the following witnesses testified: Father; Stepmother; Richard Farnum, Jr., * 1 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. On January 18, 2012, Father and Stepmother filed motions to amend the petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother s parental rights that clarified the subsections of the Adoption Act., i.e., 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b), under which they were seeking relief. J-S61014-13 Father s friend; Maryanne Chateau-Flagg, Mother s friend; Eleanor EngersollKoruba, Father s friend and neighbor; Mother; William Russell, Ph.D.; Steven Samuel, Ph.D.; and N.J., the children s maternal grandmother. In addition, counsel for the parties stipulated with respect to what Jessica Hurley, the children s nanny, would have testified if called as a witness. Because the parties are well acquainted with the details of this case, and the orphans court has ably recounted the facts as supported by the testimony of record, we adopt them here. See Order, 1/18/13, at 1-5. By decrees dated and entered on January 18, 2013, the orphans court terminated Mother s parental § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b). rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On appeal, Mother raises one issue for our review: Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated Mother s parental rights where such determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 ([a]) and ([b]). Mother s Brief at 7. We review this appeal according to the following standard: [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court s determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 -2- J-S61014-13 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [___ Pa. ___, ___, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [___ Pa. ___], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id. As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). In re Adoption of S.P., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (2012). Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in -3- J-S61014-13 the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). Instantly, we conclude the orphans court properly terminated Mother s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:2 § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. ... 2 See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that this Court need only agree with any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) in order to affirm the termination of parental rights). As such, we need not review the decrees with respect to Section 2511(a)(2). -4- J-S61014-13 (b) Other considerations. The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. ... 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held, Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 602, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (1998). This Court has explained: A court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) where the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition. The court should consider the entire background of the case and not simply: . . . mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his . . . parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination. -5- J-S61014-13 In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). Regarding the definition of parental duties, we have stated as follows: There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with the child. Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child s life. Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one s parental responsibilities while others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional needs. In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). In addition, with respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite analysis as follows: -6- J-S61014-13 Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child. In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 63. In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). On appeal, Mother argues the evidence of record does not support the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a) because her lack of contact with the children was due to mental illness, which rendered her incapable of pursuing day-to-day activities, let alone legal remedies. Mother s Brief at 12. In addition, Mother argues that for most of her life, she was misdiagnosed. Upon being properly diagnosed with Bipolar II disorder, and treated for this disorder, Mother asserts she began to resume daily activities. 3 Id. With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues, in relevant 3 Mother relies on only one case in the argument section of her brief, In the Matter of A.F., 482 A.2d 1076 (Pa. Super. 1984), for the proposition that [m]ental illness cannot be a basis to terminate [] Mother s parental rights, particularly if she can demonstrate that she can comply with treatment protocols, which she has done here. Mother s Brief at 12. In In the Matter of A.F., this Court reversed the decree terminating the parental rights of the mother, who suffered from schizophrenia, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) and (b). Our Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court s decree of termination. See In the Matter of A.F., 508 Pa. 78, 494 -7- J-S61014-13 part, that [n]o evidence was presented to show that the [c]hildren would be harmed in any way if [Mother] w[as] re-introduced into their lives. Id. at 13. We disagree. In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans court found, pursuant to the testimony of forensic psychologists, Dr. Russell and Dr. Samuel, that: [Mother] has been diagnosed and treated for psychological health issues and has had varying degrees of success and ability to function in her personal life over various time periods. For the six months immediately preceding the filing of the Termination Petitions, [Mother s] mental health did not constitute an obstacle preventing her from performing parental duties. Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/13, at 6 (emphasis in original). With respect to Section 2511(b), the orphans court found: Not only does [Stepmother] identify as their mother, but also the [c]hildren completely identify her as their mother. [J.R.A.] would not even know [Mother] if he saw her today, and does not refer to her at all. When the [c]hildren draw pictures of their family, they include [Stepmother] as the mother figure. [Stepmother] is heavily bonded with the [c]hildren, and [she] has not been away from them since she moved into [Father s] residence in June 2008. The [children] consider [Stepmother s] two older daughters to be their big sisters. Pursuant to the stipulation between the parties, Ms. Hurley also would have testified that there has been a progression in the [c]hildren s development, and that they have a bond with [Stepmother] and refer to her as mommy. A.2d 1049 (1985). Because of the reversal of this Court s order, we conclude that our decision in that case is wholly inapplicable to this matter. -8- J-S61014-13 Id. at 5 (citations to record omitted).4 Upon careful review, we conclude the record evidence overwhelmingly supports the decrees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we adopt as dispositive of Mother s issue on appeal both the order/findings of fact and conclusions of law dated and entered on January 18, 2013, that accompanied the decrees, and the court s opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). See Trial Court Order, 1/18/13; see also Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/13. The parties are directed to attach a redacted copy5 of the orphans court s opinions in the event of further proceedings. Decrees affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 12/4/2013 4 Further, we note that the record is devoid of any parent-child bond between the children and Mother. See In re Adoption of J.M., supra (stating that in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists ). 5 The copies shall include Stepmother, and the children. the redacted names of -9- Mother, Father,

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