Com. v. Stoneroad, C. (memorandum)

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J-S63020-13 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. CHAD DONALD STONEROAD, Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 403 MDA 2013 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 12, 2013, In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Criminal Division, at No. CP-38-CR-0000376-2011. BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and PLATT*, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 13, 2013 Appellant, Chad Donald Stoneroad, appeals from the order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ( PCRA ), 42 Pa.C.S.A. ยงยง 9541-9546. We affirm. The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter were set forth by the PCRA court as follows: The Appellant was charged with three counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, one count of Unlawful Contact or Communication with Minor, one count of Statutory Sexual Assault, three counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault, two counts of Corruption of Minors, and one count of Indecent Assault. The Appellant ultimately pled guilty to Counts IV through XI. The terms of the plea agreement were that the Commonwealth would nolle pros Counts I, II, and III, which were the Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse charges, and the Appellant would enter an open plea on the remaining counts. On October 19, 2011, the Appellant was sentenced. On Counts I, II and III, Involuntary Sexual Intercourse, on the __________________ *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S63020-13 motion of the District Attorney to nolle pros, the motion was granted. The Appellant was further sentenced as follows, in relevant part: Count IV, Unlawful Contact or Communication with Minor: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $250, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a minimum of 4 years and a maximum of 20 years; Count V, Statutory Sexual Assault: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $500, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a minimum of 14 months and a maximum of 10 years, concurrent with Count IV; Count VI, Aggravated Indecent Assault: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $500, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 10 years, concurrent with Count IV; Count VII, Aggravated Indecent Assault: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $500, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 10 years, concurrent with Count IV; Count VIII, Aggravated Indecent Assault: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $500, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 10 years, concurrent with Count IV; Count IX, Corruption of Minors: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $250, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a minimum of 9 months and a maximum of 5 years, concurrent with Count IV; Count X, Corruption of Minors: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $250, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a -2- J-S63020-13 minimum of 9 months and a maximum of 5 years, concurrent with Count IV; Count XI, Indecent Assault: to pay the costs of prosecution, to pay a fine of $100, and to be incarcerated in a state correctional facility for a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 2 years, concurrent with Count IV. (October 19, 2011 Sentencing Order). PCRA Court Opinion, 4/26/13, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted). On June 25, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and Appellant filed an amended and counseled PCRA petition on August 13, 2012. Following a hearing held on February 12, 2013, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing Appellant s PCRA Petition. Thereafter, Appellant filed this timely appeal on February 28, 2013. On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues: 1. Whether plea counsel was ineffective for unlawfully inducing defendant to plead guilty by advising him that he would get a lesser sentence if he took an open plea? 2. Whether plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file any pre-trial motions to have defendant s statement suppressed after his Miranda[1] rights were violated? 3. Whether plea counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with defendant regarding an appeal? Appellant s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted) (footnote added). 1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that prior to a custodial interrogation, the suspect must be informed of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has a right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to him). -3- J-S63020-13 In reviewing the propriety of the PCRA court s dismissal of Appellant s petition, we are limited to determining whether the court s findings are supported by the record and whether the order in question is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). Great deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 2007). Here, each of Appellant s effectiveness of plea counsel. issues presents a challenge to the When evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of counsel s performance must be highly deferential. Indeed, few tenets are better settled than the presumption that counsel is effective. Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380 (Pa. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must satisfy a threepronged test and must demonstrate: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) that the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the appellant prejudice. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). Prejudice requires proof that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. When it is clear that an appellant has failed to meet the prejudice prong of his -4- J-S63020-13 ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claim may be disposed of on that basis alone, without a determination of whether the first two prongs have been met. Commonwealth v. Baker, 880 A.2d 654, 656 (Pa. Super. 2005). Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 570 (Pa. 2009). Upon review of the issues raised, the credibility determinations made by the PCRA court, the certified record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable legal authority, we conclude that the PCRA court opinion entered on April 26, 2013 comprehensively and correctly disposes of Appellant s appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing Appellant s PCRA petition, and we do so based on the PCRA court s opinion. The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 12/13/2013 -5-

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