Strausser Ent. v. Segal and Morel (memorandum)
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J-S08043-13 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 STRAUSSER ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellant v. SEGAL AND MOREL, INC. and SEGAL AND MOREL AT FORKS TOWNSHIP VII, LLC, Appellees : : : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 2380 EDA 2012 Appeal from the Order entered on July 31, 2012 in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Civil Division, No. C0048CV2006-001108 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2013 Strausser Enterprises, Inc. ( SEI or Plaintiff ) appeals from the Order denying its Petition to Strike and/or Open ( Petition to strike/open ) the judgment entered against it and in favor of Segal and Morel, Inc., and Segal and Morel at Forks Township VII, LLC (collectively S&M or Defendants ). We affirm. The trial court set forth the relevant underlying facts and procedural history in its Opinion, which we adopt herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/12, at 2-4. Contemporaneously with the issuance of its Opinion, the trial court entered an Order denying [SEI s] Petition to strike/open. denied. SEI filed a Motion for reconsideration, which the trial court Thereafter, SEI timely filed a Notice of appeal. In response, the trial court ordered SEI to file a concise statement of errors complained of on J-S08043-13 appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). SEI timely filed a Concise Statement, raising twelve separate claims of trial court error. On appeal, SEI raises the following issues for our review: 1. Is an enforceable written agreement between the parties required to confer subject matter jurisdiction on a Court to employ the summary procedures and remedies set forth in the Pennsylvania [Uniform] Arbitration Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7301, et seq[.] ( the Act [or PUAA ]), including but not limited to the confirmation of, and entry of judgment on, an arbitration award under Sections 7341 and 7342 [of the Act]? 2. Did the Lower Court commit error by denying a [P]etition to open based on fraud on the Court where, in an action to confirm an arbitration award under ¦ [section] 7342(b) [of the PUAA], [S&M] did not disclose to the Lower Court that it was no longer a party to the written arbitration agreement[?] 3. Did the Lower Court err when it decided disputed issues of fact in connection with a [P]etition to open against [SEI] without allowing [SEI] the opportunity to proceed under Pa.R.C.P. 206.7(c)[?] 4. Where [SEI] filed a [P]etition to strike[/]open, and [S&M] raised disputed issues of fact in the response to the [P]etition, and the parties and the Lower Court agreed that the determination of factual disputes in the [P]etition to open would be bifurcated from the resolution of preliminary legal issues in the [P]etition to strike, and determined, if necessary, in a subsequent proceeding after the legal issues were resolved, did the Lower Court err in determining the factual issues without permitting [SEI] a separate proceeding? Brief for Appellant at 4. Our standard of review of SEI s claims is well settled: A petition to strike a judgment raises a question of law and relief thereon will only be granted if a fatal defect appears on the face of the record. Alternatively, a petition to open rests within -2- J-S08043-13 the discretion of the trial court, and may be granted if the petitioner (1) acts promptly, (2) alleges a meritorious defense, and (3) can produce sufficient evidence to require submission of the case to a jury. The decision of the trial court on a petition to strike or open judgment will not be disturbed unless there is an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion. Rait P ship, L.P. v. E Pointe Props. I, Ltd., 957 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted). SEI s first two issues on appeal are closely related, and we will thus address them simultaneously.1 SEI argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration agreements contained in the contracts that formed the basis for the underlying breach of contract action, or to enter judgment against SEI on the arbitration award. See Brief for Appellant at 14, 26. SEI asserts that jurisdiction was lacking because S&M never had standing to enforce the contracts arbitration provisions, or to assert claims for breach of contract against SEI in the arbitration proceedings, because S&M had assigned its interest in the contracts and was thus not a party to those contracts when this case was initiated. Id. at 2627, 28. SEI further argues that the judgment must be stricken or opened because it was obtained through fraud; i.e., S&M allegedly had perpetrated a fraud upon SEI and the trial court by failing to disclose that S&M was no longer a party to the contracts in question. Id. at 31-32. Finally, SEI contends that [t]he remedies employed by [S&M] and the Lower Court were exclusively created by the Act[,] and [w]ithout standing under the Act, the 1 We note that SEI does not divide its Argument section into as many parts as there are questions to be argued, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). -3- J-S08043-13 Lower Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 15, 30. According to SEI, the trial court erred in concluding that the proceedings were not governed by the Act since the arbitration agreements involved in this case allegedly provided for common law arbitration. See id. at 15-18. In its Opinion, the trial court thoroughly addressed SEI s claims, set forth the applicable law, and determined that these claims lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/12, at 4-13. After review of the certified record and the parties briefs, we find that the sound rationale advanced by the trial court is supported by the record and the law, and we thus affirm on this basis with regard to these issues. See id. As an addendum, we note that Pennsylvania law mandated that the trial court deny SEI s Petition to strike/open since, at the time of filing the Petition, the judgment against SEI had already been satisfied.2 The Judicial Code provides that the satisfaction of a judgment forever discharge[s] the judgment. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8104(a). Accordingly, a judgment that has been satisfied no longer exists and cannot be attacked either by a motion to strike or by a motion to open. Kalman v. Muzikar, 450 A.2d 1025, 1026 (Pa. Super. 1982) (emphasis added). This Court has stated that [b]ecause the law contemplates an end to litigation, further proceedings may not commence upon a judgment which has been satisfied. Where a judgment has been satisfied, there no longer exists an obligation which may be opened or stricken, and all questions of liability and damages are deemed extinguished. 2 On January 17, 2012, satisfaction of the judgment was entered on the trial court s docket, at the request of counsel for SEI. SEI filed its Petition to strike/open approximately three months later. -4- J-S08043-13 Satisfaction of a judgment, however, may be stricken where it has been obtained through fraud or mistake. Wilk v. Kochara, 647 A.2d 595, 596-97 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citations omitted). In the instant case, SEI never asserted that the satisfaction had been obtained due to fraud or mistake. Rather, SEI argues that the judgment was void ab initio, based upon the trial court s purported lack of jurisdiction to enter a judgment against SEI on the arbitration award. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 17. Thus, according to SEI, the general rule regarding the inviolability of satisfied judgments is inapplicable. See id. (arguing that the Courts have been consistently clear in their instruction that void judgments remain subject to attack indefinitely. (footnote omitted)). However, since we have already determined that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction and the judgment against SEI is not void, SEI s claim in this regard lacks merit. Next, in SEI s closely related remaining two issues, SEI argues, in the alternative, that assuming, arguendo, that waiver was an issue[, i.e., SEI s waiver of its challenge to S&M s standing], it was a disputed issue of fact. As such, since it was disputed, it should have been decided according to [Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure] -5- J-S08043-13 206.7(c).[3] procedure. The Lower Court erred by not following that Brief for Appellant at 33 (footnote added; citation to record omitted). SEI points out that the trial court s Rule to show cause explicitly stated that it was to be decided pursuant to the provisions of Rule 206.7. Id. at 36 (citing Rule to Show Cause, 4/25/12, at ¶ 3). According to SEI, S&M s response to the trial court s Rule to show cause raised disputed issues of material fact regarding whether SEI was aware of S&M s assignment of its rights under the contracts at issue and, relatedly, S&M s standing to sue under those contracts. See Brief for Appellant at 33-34, 36. Therefore, SEI asserts, pursuant to the clear language of Rule 206.7(c), it was entitled to conduct discovery on these issues. Id. at 36. Here, any dispute regarding the issue of S&M s standing was irrelevant, as the trial court determined, as a matter of law, that SEI had waived any challenge to S&M s standing. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/12, 3 By means of background, in response to SEI s April 25, 2012 Petition to strike/open, the trial court filed a Rule to show cause on that same date, directing S&M to show cause why SEI s Petition should not be granted. Rule 206.7, governing the procedure after a trial court s issuance of a Rule to show cause, provides, in relevant part, as follows: (c) If an answer is filed raising disputed issues of material fact, the petitioner may take depositions on those issues, or such other discovery as the court allows, within the time set forth in the order of the court. If the petitioner does not do so, the petition shall be decided on petition and answer and all averments of fact responsive to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of this subdivision. Pa.R.C.P. 206.7(c) (emphasis added). -6- J-S08043-13 at 5 (wherein the court stated that [w]e need not examine the record in order to determine whether or not Defendants had standing to enforce any portion of the relevant contracts, or, in particular, the arbitration agreements therein. The simple, well settled rule of Pennsylvania law is that a lack of standing is waived if it is not timely raised in an objection. (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying SEI s Petition to strike/open. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Prothonotary Date: 5/16/2013 -7-
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