Com. v. Laboy, J. (memorandum)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
J-S08035-13 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. JOSE C. LABOY, Appellee : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1950 EDA 2012 Appeal from the Order entered on June 6, 2012 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No. CP-51-CR-0012842-2011 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MAY 16, 2013 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Order granting the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Jose C. Laboy ( Laboy ) and quashing the criminal charges against him. We affirm. The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history in its Opinion, and we incorporate them herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/25/12, at 1-4. In this timely appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review: Did the lower court apply an erroneous standard of review to overturn the preliminary hearing court s finding that the Commonwealth made a prima facie showing sufficient to hold [Laboy] for court on charges of J-S08035-13 attempted murder, aggravated assault and other serious offenses? Brief for Appellant at 3.1 Our standard of review of an order granting a habeas corpus petition is as follows: The decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be reversed on appeal only for a manifest abuse of discretion. Our scope of review is limited to deciding whether a prima facie case was established. The Commonwealth must show sufficient probable cause that the defendant committed the offense, and the evidence should be such that if presented at trial, and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury. Commonwealth v. James, 863 A.2d 1179, 1181-82 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Cordoba, 902 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that [i]n reviewing a trial court s order granting a defendant s petition for writ of habeas corpus, we must generally consider whether the record supports the trial court s findings, and whether the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings are free from error. (citation omitted)). Here, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting Laboy s habeas corpus Petition, and quashing the charges against him, since the court applied an erroneous standard of review in determining whether the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, when viewed in the proper light, established a prima facie case of Laboy s guilt. 1 We note that Laboy did not file a responsive brief on appeal. -2- Brief for J-S08035-13 Appellant at 9. The Commonwealth points out that the applicable standard of review provides that [w]hen deciding whether a prima facie case was established, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and we are to consider all reasonable inferences based on that evidence which could support a guilty verdict. The standard clearly does not require that the Commonwealth prove the accused s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage. James, 863 A.2d at 1182 (internal citation omitted; emphasis added); see also Brief for Appellant at 9. The Commonwealth summarizes its argument as follows: Properly viewed, the preliminary hearing evidence and reasonable inferences showed that [Laboy] shot [the victim] five times. [The victim] told the police that he was shot by a male on the 1600 block of Dyre Street. Moments after the shooting, the police received information directing them to 1642 Dyre Street, where [Laboy] resided. When the police went to that house, they found [Laboy] on the first floor. He was the only male there. He falsely identified himself to the police. A detective went to the crime scene and found fired shell casings on the sidewalk in front of [Laboy s] house, and blood in the front vestibule. The police obtained a warrant to search 1642 Dyre Street and found two guns in a first[-]floor closet. Firearms testing showed that one of them fired the cartridge casings [found] outside [of Laboy s] house where [the victim] was shot. This evidence was more than sufficient to establish a prima facie showing, i.e., that a shooting occurred and [Laboy] probably was the shooter. The preliminary hearing judge correctly credited this evidence and held [Laboy] for court on attempted murder, aggravated assault and related offenses. At [the] hearing on [Laboy s] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the lower court completely misapplied the standard of review and dismissed all charges. In concluding that the Commonwealth had not made out a prima facie case, the court impermissibly recited the evidence in the light most favorable to [Laboy], drew inferences in his favor, [and] listed a number of perceived flaws in the police investigation ¦. -3- J-S08035-13 The [trial] court was required to credit all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and draw reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth s favor[,] to decide if a crime was committed and [Laboy] probably committed it. The [trial] court was not allowed to weigh the evidence, accept some of it, reject some of it, and reach issues like the propriety or adequacy of the police investigation, which were reserved for pretrial motions and testing at trial. Brief for Appellant at 7-8. In its Opinion, the trial court adeptly set forth the applicable law, thoroughly addressed the Commonwealth s claims, and cogently explained the court s reasons for determining that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case against Laboy. 7/25/12, at 4-8, 10-12. See Trial Court Opinion, Our review confirms that the trial court s sound rationale is supported by the record and the law, and we thus affirm on this basis. See id. As an addendum, we note that, from our review of the record and the Notes of Testimony from the hearing on Laboy s habeas corpus Petition ( habeas corpus hearing ), we determine that the trial court did not apply an improper standard of review in considering whether the Commonwealth had established a prima facie case. The court considered the totality of the evidence, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, but still found that the Commonwealth s evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be derived therefrom, failed to establish a prima facie case of Laboy s guilt. At the habeas corpus hearing, the trial court expressly acknowledged, inter -4- J-S08035-13 alia, that (1) the victim had reported that his assailant was a male; (2) Laboy was the only male occupant in the first-floor apartment in question at the time of the police search; and (3) firearms testing revealed that one of the handguns seized from the first-floor apartment fired the shell casings found outside of the apartment building where the victim was shot. See N.T., 4/27/12, at 8, 9. However, the trial court also correctly pointed out that there was no witness identification evidence of Laboy as the shooter, and that, on two separate occasions, the victim had failed to identify Laboy as his assailant. Id. at 7, 8. In closing, the trial court explained its rationale for granting Laboy s habeas corpus Petition as follows: It s a multiple family dwelling[, i.e., the building in which the police arrested Laboy]. It s apartments. That means more than one family lives in that place[,] and the only place they [the responding police officers] go is the first floor and then they stop looking, and it s a 16-year-old male in there[, i.e., Laboy]. Since he s the only male, they arrest him. I acknowledge that a crime was committed. There s no issue as to that. As to the person who committed the crime, based upon what I heard[,] I think it was improper to hold [Laboy] for court. ¦ It s not just mere presence. It s that there s no evidence linking [Laboy] to the crime other than the fact that he s male. That s all. I admit the gun that apparently matches was found in the apartment[,] but that in and of itself doesn t mean [that Laboy] was the -- was more likely than not[,] or even on a prima facie level[,] the person who fired a weapon. Id. at 9. We agree with the trial court s sound reasoning and find that it is supported by the record. The circumstantial evidence presented in this case, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, fails to rise -5- J-S08035-13 above mere suspicion or conjecture that Laboy was the shooter or was involved in the crime. See Commonwealth v. Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10-11 (Pa. 1978) (where the circumstantial evidence presented at the defendant s preliminary hearings, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, failed to rise above mere suspicion or conjecture that the defendant was the shooter, holding that the trial court properly discharged the defendant for lack of a prima facie case); see also Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 466 A.2d 991, 997 (Pa. 1983) (stating that where the Commonwealth s case relies solely upon a tenuous inference to establish a material element of the charge, it has failed to meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case of criminal culpability. (emphasis in original)). Discerning no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm the Order granting Laboy s habeas corpus Petition and quashing the charges against him. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Prothonotary Date: 5/16/2013 -6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
