Trowbridge v. McCaigue (memorandum)
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J-A32007-12 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 HAROLD TROWBRIDGE, Appellant v. RICHARD AND MARY McCAIGUE, v. SYLVAN GLEN, INC. : : : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1935 WDA 2011 Appeal from the Judgment entered on November 21, 2011, in the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County, Civil Division, No. 257 of 2008 BEFORE: MUSMANNO, WECHT and COLVILLE*, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: Filed: March 18, 2013 Harold Trowbridge ( Trowbridge ) appeals from the Judgment1 entered against him and in favor of Richard and Mary McCaigue ( the McCaigues ) and Sylvan Glen, Inc. ( Sylvan Glen ), in this contract dispute. We affirm. The trial court has thoroughly recited the pertinent facts underlying this appeal, which we adopt herein by reference. See Findings of Fact, 7/6/11, at 1-8. 1 Although Trowbridge purports to appeal from the trial court s July 6, 2011 Order entering a non-jury verdict against him and the court s subsequent Order denying Trowbridge s Motion for post-trial relief, an appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment. See, e.g., Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. Tedco Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc). Since the trial court s docket reveals that the Prothonotary entered Judgment on November 21, 2011, and Trowbridge timely filed a Notice of appeal, there is no jurisdictional impediment to our review. We have corrected the caption accordingly. *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A32007-12 In April 2008, Trowbridge filed a Complaint against the McCaigues, asserting that they had breached the purported contract to sell the real property in question (hereinafter the Property ) to Trowbridge. Trowbridge sought specific performance of the Purchase Offer executed by the parties, which, according to Trowbridge, was a final, binding agreement for the sale of the Property.2 Subsequently, Sylvan Glen filed a Petition to intervene, seeking to protect its equitable interest in the Property. The trial court granted Sylvan Glen permission to intervene in the case. In August 2008, Sylvan Glen filed a Motion, in which the McCaigues joined, requesting the trial court to enter a judgment on the pleadings and dismiss Trowbridge s Complaint with prejudice. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that there was no enforceable contract between Trowbridge and the McCaigues. Trowbridge timely filed an appeal. On appeal, a panel of this Court held that the trial court had erred in granting the Motion for judgment on the pleadings because, given the preliminary state of the record, we cannot state that the law bars recovery absolutely, or that the case is so free and clear from doubt that a trial would prove fruitless. Trowbridge v. McCaigue, 992 A.2d 199, 203 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation, quotation marks, 2 and ellipses omitted) (hereinafter Pertinent to this case, the Purchase Offer provided that [i]f Sellers Richard & Mary McCaigue accept this offer, than [sic] both buyer[, i.e., Trowbridge,] & sellers will enter into a sales agreement. Purchase Offer, 3/29/08, ¶ 5. -2- J-A32007-12 Trowbridge I ); see also id. (stating that, [a]ccepting as true [Trowbridge s] well-pled facts and the adverse facts admitted by [Trowbridge], [Trowbridge] has alleged the essential terms of a contract for the sale of real estate. ). Accordingly, the panel reversed the trial court s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. On remand, the trial court scheduled the case for a non-jury trial to commence in May 2011. Following the trial, on July 6, 2011, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of the McCaigues and Sylvan Glen and issued an Opinion (hereinafter Trial Court Opinion/Verdict ). Trowbridge thereafter timely filed a post-trial Motion asserting, inter alia, that the trial court judge should have recused himself from presiding over the trial due to a conflict of interest between the judge and counsel for Trowbridge, thus entitling Trowbridge to a new trial. On November 17, 2011, the trial court entered an Order denying Trowbridge s post-trial Motion and issued a supplemental Opinion explaining the court s reasons for determining that recusal was unnecessary. On December 12, 2011, Trowbridge timely filed a Notice of appeal. On appeal, Trowbridge raises the following issues for our review: Did the trial court err as a matter of fact and law when it: a. Failed to find [that] a contract [existed] when the overwhelming evidence clearly demonstrates that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties [and] that [the McCaigues] actually had objectively acted upon the belief that the agreement of sale formed the basis of a contract to sell real property and that all [of] -3- J-A32007-12 the requirements of the statute of frauds w[ere] satisfied? b. Failed to apply the objective standard in [sic] as opposed to the [McCaigues ] subjective intent and actions in determining if there was a meeting of the minds necessary to form a contract and the terms of the contract of March 29, 2008[,] were clear and unequivocal as they appear on the four corners of the contract? c. Failed to find that the [McCaigues ] agent was the drafter and creator of the agreement of sale[, which document] at all times is to be construed against the [McCaigues,] and there were no terms lacking that would have terms [sic] that were unclear or to be resolved at a future time? d. Failed to apply the prior Superior Court[ s decision on] remand and finding that the necessary elements of a contract were present[,] as opin[]ed in Trowbridge [I,] and determine that absent any factor that would vitiate or prevent the formation or [sic] meeting of the mind[s] necessary to determine a contract existed between the parties? e. Failed to recuse itself su[a] []sponte or on post[-]verdict motion or declare a mistrial after the close of trial and before publishing its verdict when the trial court [judge who presided at trial] was the Commonwealth s chief complainant in [an] unrelated criminal matter concerning [Trowbridge s] trial counsel as the named Defendant[, and this information] was not known to any party until approximately ten [] days after the evidentiary record closed[, thus depriving Trowbridge of his right to] a fair and impartial tribunal? Brief for Appellant at 34. Our standard of review following a non-jury trial is as follows: Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court -4- J-A32007-12 committed error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope of review is plenary. The trial court s conclusions of law on appeal originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is the appellate court s duty to determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. Allegheny Energy Supply Co., LLC v. Wolf Run Mining Co., 53 A.3d 53, 60-61 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation, brackets, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). We will address Trowbridge s first four issues simultaneously, as they are closely related and each challenge the trial court s determination that no contract existed between Trowbridge and the McCaigues.3 According to Trowbridge, the Purchase Offer is a legally binding agreement that the McCaigues would convey the Property to Trowbridge for the specified purchase price of $250,000. See Brief for Appellant at 59-77. In support of this claim, Trowbridge initially points out that this Court, in Trowbridge I, held that the Purchase Offer satisfied the requirements for a contract for the 3 We note that Trowbridge s brief is 81 pages long, and many of the arguments raised therein are lengthy and redundant. -5- J-A32007-12 sale of real property under the Statute of Frauds.4 Brief for Appellant at 60. Additionally, Trowbridge argues that the trial court, in determining whether the parties mutually assented to an agreement for the sale of the Property, erred in failing to apply the applicable legal standard, which provides that, [i]n ascertaining the intent of the parties to a contract, it is their outward and objective manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and subjective intentions, that matter. Ingrassia Constr. Co. v. Walsh, 486 A.2d 478, 483 (Pa. Super. 1984). According to Trowbridge, [t]he trial court s [] verdict ¦ simply ignores the entire trial record and the numerous inconsistencies and predicates it[s] decision on the subjective intention and beliefs of the [McCaigues]. ¦ The trial court failed to view [Mary McCaigue s] overwhelming overt manifestations and repeated conduct affirming her mutual assent in an objective realm. Brief for Appellant at 62. Trowbridge further asserts that the fact that the McCaigues refused to sign the Standard Sales Agreement that the realtor, Willis Garman, Jr., had prepared following the execution of the Purchase Offer was wholly irrelevant and [] legally insignificant as [it] did not alter []or modify the party s [sic] contract of March 29, 2008[,] i.e., the Purchase Offer. Id. at 64. Finally, Trowbridge contends that the trial court erred on remand in its application of this Court s decision in Trowbridge I, since, 4 The Trowbridge I Court stated that [a] writing required by the Statute of Frauds need only include an adequate description of the property, a recital of the consideration and the signature of the party to be charged[,] and the Court found that the Purchase Offer satisfied each of these requirements. Trowbridge I, 992 A.2d at 201-02 (citation omitted). -6- J-A32007-12 Trowbridge asserts, this Court reversed and remanded with a clear legal directive to find that a contract existed. Brief for Appellant at 70. In the Trial Court Opinion/Verdict, the trial court addressed the arguments of the parties, aptly set forth the applicable law, and thoroughly explained its rationale for determining that no enforceable contract existed between Trowbridge and the McCaigues. 7/6/11, at 8-18. See Trial Court Opinion/Verdict, After review, we agree with the trial court s sound rationale, which is supported by competent evidence in the record, and affirm on this basis as to Trowbridge s first four issues. See id. As an addendum, we note our disapproval of Mary McCaigue s actions and her misleading representations made to Trowbridge during their discussions regarding the potential sale of the Property. However, we are compelled to conclude that Trowbridge had no actionable claim against the McCaigues, since the Purchase Offer was not a legally binding contract for the sale of the Property given the lack of a meeting of the minds between the parties. Moreover, we discern no error by the trial court on remand in its application of the Trowbridge I decision. Contrary to Trowbridge s assertion, the Trowbridge I Court did not conclude that a contract existed between the McCaigues and Trowbridge. Rather, the Court simply concluded that, given the preliminary state of the record, under the limited standard of review applicable to an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court cannot state that the law bars recovery absolutely, or -7- J-A32007-12 that the case is so free and clear from doubt that a trial would prove fruitless. Trowbridge I, 992 A.2d at 203 (citation, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). As to Trowbridge s final issue on appeal, concerning the trial court judge s purported obligation to recuse himself from this case, we note that this issue is raised after page 70 of Trowbridge s appellate brief. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2135(a)(1) explicitly states that an appellate brief must not exceed 70 pages. However, [a] litigant may always seek [an appellate court s] permission to extend the page limits for briefs by making an application for relief under Pa.R.A.P. 123. Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 n.49 (Pa. 2011). Here, Trowbridge did not seek leave of court to exceed the page limit. Accordingly, Trowbridge s brief violates the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (stating that [b]riefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed ¦. ); see also Briggs, 12 A.3d at 343 (stating that [t]he briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; ¦ compliance with these rules by appellate advocates who have any business before our Court is mandatory. ). Nevertheless, despite this defect, we have reviewed Trowbridge s claim and determine that the learned trial court judge properly -8- J-A32007-12 found that it was unnecessary to recuse himself from presiding over this case. In this regard, we affirm based on the rationale advanced in the trial court s supplemental Opinion dated November 17, 2011, which we adopt herein by reference. See Trial (unnumbered). Judgment affirmed. -9- Court Opinion, 11/17/11, at 1-4
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