In Re: Adoption of: L.I.M. (memorandum)
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J-S78029-12 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN RE: ADOPTION OF L.I.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: B.L.M.O., Father : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA No. 1377 MDA 2013 Appeal from the Decree entered June 21, 2012 in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans Court Division, No. A-7743 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, and ALLEN, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: Filed: January 31, 2013 B.L.M.O. ( Father ) appeals from the decree in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County granting the petition for the involuntary termination of his parental rights filed by C.B. ( Mother ) and M.C.B. ( Stepfather ), with respect to the female child, L.I.M. ( Child ), born out-of-wedlock in March of 2009. We affirm. The trial court has ably recounted both the procedural and factual history of this case, and we adopt them herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/12. We reiterate the history of this case insofar as it is necessary for this disposition. Father and Mother are the natural parents of Child. On March 11, 2011, Mother and Stepfather, her husband, filed the subject petition pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b). In the petition, Mother and Stepfather alleged Father has not contacted Child since June of 2009, when J-S78029-12 Child was three months old. See Petition, 3/11/11, at ¶ 7. The trial court held a hearing on the termination petition on June 21, 2012, during which the following witnesses testified: Father; Stepfather; Mother; and L.F., Father s mother. By decree dated June 21, 2012, and entered on the same date, the trial court granted Mother s and Stepfather s petition. Father filed a timely notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On appeal, Father presents the following questions: Whether the trial court committed reversible error by terminating the parental rights of the biological Father, where such determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence establishing grounds for such? Whether refusal by the natural mother of any contact for the natural Father can explain, excuse and justify the Father s failure to maintain contact with the child? Father s Brief, at 5. We review this appeal according to the following standard: Appellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court s determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [___ Pa. ___, ___, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [___ Pa. ___], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d -2- J-S78029-12 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id. As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). In re Adoption of S.P., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (2012). Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond. -3- J-S78029-12 In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). Instantly, the trial court terminated Father s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows: § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. ... (b) Other considerations. The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. ... 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held, -4- J-S78029-12 [o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa. 595, 602, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (1988). This Court has explained that [a] court may terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) where the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties for at least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition. The court should consider the entire background of the case and not simply: . . . mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his . . . parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). Regarding the definition of parental duties, we have stated, [t]here is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with the child. -5- J-S78029-12 Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child s life. Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one s parental responsibilities while others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional needs. In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). In addition, with respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite analysis as follows: Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child. In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 63. In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). Upon a comprehensive review of the record, the controlling case law, -6- J-S78029-12 and the opinion of the Honorable Chester Muroski, Senior Judge, we conclude the trial court s decision to terminate Father s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) is supported by competent evidence. Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, we adopt the opinion of the trial court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) as dispositive of Father s issues on appeal. The parties are directed to attach a redacted copy1 of the trial court s opinion in the event of further proceedings. Decree affirmed. 1 The copy shall include the redacted names of Mother, Father, Stepfather, and Child. -7-
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