R. D. Weaver v. P. J. Rohrer, et al. (Opinion Per Curiam)

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IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Ronald D. Weaver, Appellant v. P. J. Rohrer, Michael J. Turner, William Mishler, John Doe One, John Doe Two, Eugene Santorella, Elizabeth Nightingale, Sharon M. Burks, and Jerry L. Spangler : : : : : : : : : : : No. 1286 C.D. 2007 Submitted: November 30, 2007 OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM FILED: February 25, 2008 Ronald D. Weaver (Weaver) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County (Trial Court) denying his petition to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing his complaint without prejudice. In that decision the Trial Court found that Weaver s complaint was frivolous and, therefore, denied Weaver s petition and dismissed his complaint pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 240(j). On appeal, Weaver argues: (1) that denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis denies him access to the courts, equal protection, and due process of law, in violation of the U.S. and Pennsylvania constitutions; (2) that the Trial Court violated Weaver s constitutional rights by determining that his complaint was frivolous without first holding a hearing; and (3) that his action is not frivolous because he states valid causes of action and avers facts in support thereof. We find these arguments to be without merit and affirm the Order of the Trial Court. Weaver is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Laurel Highlands (SCI-Laurel Highlands). Weaver alleges that the named officials and staff at SCI-Laurel Highlands (collectively, Defendants) have retaliated against him for using the prison grievance system and for refusing to confess to unspecified crimes (Complaint ¶¶ 14, 18.) Weaver alleges that on May 2, 2005, defendant Eugene Santorella (Santorella), whom Weaver claims is in charge of SCI-Laurel Highlands property room, informed Weaver that certain of Weaver s documents, which Weaver claims were evidence in criminal and civil matters involving Weaver, would be destroyed. (Complaint ¶ 15.) Weaver states that on May 25, 2005, after filing a grievance, he was allowed to store six boxes of documentary evidence in the property room. (Complaint ¶ 16.) Weaver alleges that on May 27, 2005, he requested treatment for a problem with his right knee. (Complaint ¶ 17.) Weaver alleges that in retaliation for his use of the grievance system, a scheme was hatched whereby he would be assigned to a job which he could not perform due to his injured knee. (Complaint ¶ 18.) Weaver does not allege who devised this plan. Weaver alleges that defendant corrections employment vocational coordinator William Mishler (Mishler) and the unnamed corrections food service manager, John Doe One, assigned Weaver a job in dietary knowing that he could not physically perform the job and was not medically cleared to do so. (Complaint ¶ 28.) Weaver alleges that Mishler and John Doe One conspired to place Weaver in a job he could not perform so that he would be placed in the restricted housing unit (RHU), at which time they or other 2 SCI employees could take unspecified legal documents belonging to him. (Complaint ¶ 29.) Weaver alleges that he informed unnamed prison employees that he could not perform this job. (Complaint ¶ 19.) Weaver alleges that a physician assistant, named in the Complaint as John Doe Two, maliciously refused to evaluate or treat Weaver s knee. (Complaint ¶ 21.) Weaver alleges that, on the orders of defendant grievance officer P.J. Rohrer (Rohrer) and with the approval of defendant corrections officer Michael J. Turner (Turner), Weaver was placed in the RHU where he was videotaped naked and placed in a room without a toilet. (Complaint ¶¶ 21, 23, 26.) Weaver alleges that he was kept in this room for three days and forced to urinate into a small plastic bottle. (Complaint ¶ 24.) Weaver was then placed in a different room in the RHU with a toilet. (Complaint ¶ 25.) Weaver was released from the RHU on June 3, 2005, but was not allowed to retrieve his personal property from the property room until June 4. (Complaint ¶¶ 30-32.) Weaver alleges that he was ordered to sign a receipt for his personal property without first being allowed to verify that all of the property listed on the receipt was present. (Complaint ¶¶ 33-34.) Weaver alleges that when he unpacked his belongings he discovered that various court records, unspecified legal documents and notes, a Spanish Lesson Book, and commissary items were missing. (Complaint ¶ 35.) Weaver alleges that he filed a number of grievances regarding the disappearance of these items, exhausting his administrative remedies within the Department of Corrections. (Complaint ¶¶ 36-37.) Having received no relief from his grievances, Weaver alleges he filed eight (8) private criminal complaints against Rohrer, Turner, Mishler and Santorella with 3 the District Attorney for Somerset County, Jerry L. Spangler (Spangler), on or around December 27, 2005. (Complaint ¶ 38-39.) A letter attached to Weaver s complaint, from the Somerset County District Attorney s Office, Bureau of Investigation, states [p]lease be advised that this office is not the Primary Law Enforcement Agency for either SCI Laurel Highlands or SCI Somerset. Your complaints will be forward [sic] to the proper authorities for investigation. Once a disposition is given to this office, you will be notified. (Complaint, Ex. J.) The letter is signed by Detective Jason Hunter (Hunter). (Complaint, Ex. J.) Weaver alleges that this letter shows that his complaints were received by Spangler. (Complaint ¶ 39.) Having heard no reply from Spangler, on April 19, 2007, Weaver filed a petition with the Trial Court attempting to have Spangler arrested, prosecuted, and removed from office for failing to approve or disapprove Weaver s eight (8) private criminal complaints. (Complaint ¶ 45.) Weaver alleges that he also served Spangler with four (4) private criminal complaints against Spangler. (Complaint ¶ 46.) Weaver states that, on May 14, 2007, he received disapproval notices from Hunter regarding his original eight (8) private criminal complaints. (Complaint ¶ 47.) Weaver alleges that because he received the disapproval notices mere weeks before the statute of limitations expired, the defendants named in those complaints will forever escape prosecution for their crimes. (Complaint ¶¶ 47-48.) Weaver alleges that this constitutes a denial of his access to the courts and a dereliction of Spangler s duty. (Complaint ¶¶ 49-50.) Weaver states that defendant Sharon M. Burks (Burks) erroneously denied eight (8) grievances Weaver filed on unspecified dates. (Complaint ¶ 43.) Weaver alleges that Burks and defendant Elizabeth Nightingale (Nightingale) use their 4 positions for the sole purpose [of] suppress[ing] meritorious claims against prison staff. (Complaint ¶ 44.) Additionally, Weaver alleges that: the Defendant Department of Corrections employees have an obsession which results in thoughts that some kind of harm or damage will occur to people or objects in their neurotic personal environment if they do not oppress the prisoners like Plaintiff that they believe have the intelligence to legally challenge their authority which appears to compel them to fight against these thoughts while reacting emotionally with considerable anxiety. (Complaint ¶ 52.) Weaver also alleges that the state prisons have become concentration camps, that he, although innocent, is being tortured for asserting his rights, and that Department employees and medical personnel have been exterminating prisoners under the guise of listing the causes of death as from natural causes. (Complaint ¶ 53.) The following paragraphs of the complaint are likewise either cumulative of the allegations already made or impertinently impute mental disorders to the defendants.1,2 (Complaint ¶¶ 54-58.) 1 For example, Weaver avers: that he is a victim of gender bias by women Defendants who became neurotic because they have envied men s superior social positions over the past years and want to retaliate due to irrational or illogical thinking while some female Defendants have taken on the roles of men to have sexual relations with other women. (Complaint ¶ 58.) 2 We consider the allegations described in this paragraph to be unsupported. In Weaver s complaint, he avers no specific facts to support these allegations, and from his Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, it appears he bases them on unspecified articles he read: [The Trial Court] took it upon itself to defend the named defendants by: . . . . (4) Declaring that Plaintiff is ranting when he avers that prisoners have been 5 Finally, Weaver alleges that the Defendants have utilized terror tactics in an attempt to force him to falsely confess to unspecified crimes by forcing him to sleep in an undersized bed and with constant light. (Complaint ¶ 59.) Weaver filed a civil complaint against Defendants contemporaneously with a petition to proceed in forma pauperis with the Trial Court. Pursuant to Rule 240(j) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,3 the Trial Court denied Weaver s petition to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his complaint on the grounds that the complaint was frivolous. (Memorandum, June 11, 2007; Statement of Reasons Pursuant to Pa.R.CIV.P. 1925(a), August 2, 2007.) Weaver appealed the Trial Court s decision to this Court. exterminated for using the grievance system and the female inferiority complex. First, Appellant averred that prison employees and medical staff have been accused of exterminating prisoners under the guise of listing the causes of death as from natural causes. Paragraph 53 of the Complaint. There is no mention of the grievance system! Appellant has viewed articles that support the averments. The averments that female employees have an inferiority complex resulted from psychiatrist findings and prove to be true at S.C.I. at Laurel Highlands which was raised as gender bias in paragraph 58 of the Complaint. (Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal at 2.) 3 Rule 240(j) states: [i]f, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous. Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j). 6 Weaver s first argument on appeal4 is that the trial court s denial of his petition to proceed in forma pauperis denied him access to the courts, thereby violating Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution5 and Section 5101 of the Judicial Code.6 Weaver also cites Bronson v. Horn, 830 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), for the proposition that access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right accorded even to Commonwealth inmates. We do not believe that Rule 240(j) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure violates the right of access to the courts guaranteed by Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Section 5101 of the Judicial Code. The right to access to the courts is an important fundamental right. In Boyle v. O Bannon, 500 Pa. 495, 458 A.2d 183 (1983), a two-justice plurality of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that it was improper for this Court to summarily dismiss, prior to service, even a patently frivolous suit, stating: 4 In reviewing a trial court s decision to deny a petition to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court is limited to determining whether the plaintiff s constitutional rights were violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion, and whether the trial court committed an error of law. Williams v. Syed, 782 A.2d 1090, 1093 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). 5 Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct. Pa. Const. art. I, § 11. 6 Section 5101 of the Judicial Code states, [e]very person for a legal injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5101. 7 If a court could decide summarily which lawsuits are worthy of service and which are not, we would be on the threshold of judicial tyranny. The law cannot sanction a court ignoring procedural rules and arbitrarily dismissing a plaintiff s complaint absent service of process and an opportunity for the plaintiff to be heard. Id. at 498-99, 458 A.2d at 185. Boyle was decided prior to Rule 240(j) (originally Rule 240(i)), which the Supreme Court promulgated in 1992. See Gay v. McFetridge, 530 Pa. 182, 188 n.3, 607 A.2d 738, 741 n.3 (1992) (Papadakos, J., dissenting).7 Part of the two-justice plurality s objection in the Supreme Court s decision in Boyle was that there was no rule of civil procedure which allowed a court to dismiss a lawsuit on the basis that it was frivolous. Boyle, 500 Pa. at 49798, 458 A.2d at 185. After the promulgation of Rule 240(j), such a rule does now exist. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, and this Court has acknowledged, [d]epriving someone of a frivolous claim . . . deprives him of nothing at all, except the punishment of . . . sanctions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996) (quoted in Brown v. Department of Corrections, 913 A.2d 301, 306 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 705, 918 A.2d 748 (2007)). When patently flawed suits are dismissed as soon as they can be identified as such, the burden of frivolous lawsuits on the judiciary is alleviated, and those persons presenting meritorious suits to the courts are afforded greater access. We see no conflict between Rule 240(j) and the right of access to the courts guaranteed by Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 42 Pa. C.S. § 5101. 7 For a discussion of the right of access to the courts as it relates to Boyle and the amendment of Rule 240, see generally Gay, 530 Pa at 183-189, 607 A.2d at 738-741 (Papadakos, J., dissenting). 8 Weaver s next contention is that the trial court violated Article I, Sections 1,8 11 and 269 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by dismissing his complaint without a hearing and without first serving it on the defendants. Weaver does not articulate in his Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal how exactly this violated his constitutional rights. Likewise, in his brief, he states in his Summary of Argument that his complaint invoked the protection provided to Appellant by Article I, Sections 11 and 26 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. (Weaver Br. at 7.) However, Weaver does not explain or expand on this in his Argument section of his brief. Because Weaver does not develop this issue in his brief sufficiently for us to review it, it is waived. Ruiz v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 911 A.2d 600, 605 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Specifically, Weaver does not explain how exactly the dismissal prior to trial violated the constitutional provisions specified. It is not this Court s function to imagine what his arguments on this point might be and to make these arguments for him. 8 All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness. Pa. Const. art I, § 1. 9 Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right. Pa. Const. art I, § 26. 9 Weaver s next argument is that his claims are not frivolous and that he has, in fact, stated valid claims for retaliation, tortious concert of action, and prosecutorial malpractice or misfeasance in office. Rule 240(j) permits a court to dismiss a frivolous action initiated simultaneously with a petition to proceed in forma pauperis. An action is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Note to Pa. R.C.P. No. 240(j) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1990)). An action is frivolous where it fails to state a valid cause of action on its face. McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). An action is without legal basis when it states a claim against persons who are immune from such a claim. Bronson v. Lechward, 624 A.2d 799, 801-02 (Pa Cmwlth. 1993) (affirming denial of petition to proceed in forma pauperis where plaintiff failed to aver that defendant Commonwealth employees were acting outside the scope of their authority). As we shall discuss, each of the claims stated in Weaver s complaint either fails to state a valid claim or is barred by sovereign or prosecutorial immunity. Weaver s chief argument, which permeates his complaint, is that the defendants have conspired to retaliate against him for refusing to confess to unspecified crimes and for using the prison grievance system. An inmate states a claim under Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code10 when he alleges 10 Section 1983 states: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 10 that he has suffered some adverse action at the hands of prison officials in retaliation for engaging in [constitutionally] protected conduct. Yount v. Department of Corrections, 886 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (3rd Cir. 2001)). Adverse action is action which is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. Id. Pennsylvania s Rules of Civil Procedure require that [t]he material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1019(a). Rule 1019(a) requires a plaintiff to plead all the facts that must be proved in order to achieve recovery on the alleged cause of action. Moreover, the pleading must be sufficiently specific so that the defending party will know how to prepare his defense. Commonwealth v. Peoples Benefit Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 683, 689 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). A number of times in his complaint, Weaver states that actions taken by the defendants were in retaliation for proclaiming his innocence and refusing to falsely confess to unspecified crimes (Complaint ¶ 14) or for using the prison grievance system (Complaint ¶ 18.) Nowhere in the complaint does Weaver describe how, when, or why he professed his innocence. He does not describe any occasion on which he was asked to falsely confess to any crime. While Weaver does describe grievances he filed (Complaint ¶ 43(a)-(h)), he does not give the dates of any of these grievances or aver that these are the grievances for the filing of which he is being retaliated against. While Weaver states that some of the actions of the Defendants were taken with the purpose of defeat[ing] Weaver s officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 11 pending court actions, Weaver does not specify what these pending court actions might be. And while actions taken by the Defendants might somehow interfere with these unspecified pending cases, Weaver does not allege that these cases are the constitutionally-protected conduct which stimulated Defendants to their retaliation. It is a necessary element of the 1983 claim Weaver seeks to prosecute that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, and that it is for this conduct he is being retaliated against. In his complaint, Weaver does not plead facts sufficient to establish that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct in any specific instance; therefore, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For this reason his retaliation claim is without merit. Weaver s next argument is that he has stated a viable claim for tortious concert of action. We find this argument to be without merit. This Court has recognized a cause for tortious concert of action as described in Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: [O]ne is subject to liability for harm to a third person arising from the tortious conduct of another if he a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him; b) knows that the other s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself; or c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d 723, 731 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Weaver s claim for concert of action cannot be sustained against defendants John Doe One and John Doe Two. [A] claim of concerted action cannot be established if the plaintiff is unable to identify the wrongdoer or the person who acted in concert with the wrongdoer. Skipworth by Williams v. Lead Industries Ass n, 547 Pa. 224, 236, 12 690 A.2d 169, 174 (1997). This limitation also undermines the rest of Weaver s concert of action claim, as the actions alleged to have been committed by John Doe One and John Doe Two may not be attributed to the other defendants. Weaver s concert of action claims against the remaining defendants (with the exception of Spangler) must still fail due to the principle of sovereign immunity. Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides in part that [s]uits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct. Pa. Const. art 1, § 11. Pursuant to Section 11, the Legislature has directed that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity. 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310. While the General Assembly has waived sovereign immunity for certain tortious causes of action, these causes do not include intentional torts. See Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522.11 The tortious actions Weaver alleges, which underlie his concert of action claim, are all intentional; Weaver alleges that the Defendants deliberately engaged in these actions in order to retaliate against him, embarrass him, torture him, or otherwise persecute him. 11 Section 8522(a) provides: The General Assembly, pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, does hereby waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) only and only to the extent set forth in this subchapter and within the limits set forth in section 8528 (relating to limitations on damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(a) (emphasis added). 13 Therefore, Weaver s concert of action claim can not fall into the exception to sovereign immunity set forth in Section 8522. See La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992); Faust v. Department of Revenue, 592 A.2d 835, 839-40 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). So long as the defendants were acting within the scope of their duties, they are immune from Weaver s claim and the claim is, therefore, without merit. While Weaver makes the bald assertion that Defendants were acting outside the scope of their duties (Complaint ¶ 12,) the facts specifically pleaded in the complaint do not support this assertion. Weaver seeks to hold Santorella, whom he alleges to be a sergeant at SCI-Laurel Highlands, liable for the concealment or destruction of certain of Weaver s legal documents. (Complaint ¶¶ 8, 63(a).) Weaver alleges that Santorella oversees the property room at SCI-Laurel Highlands. (Complaint ¶ 16.) Weaver alleges that after he was placed in the RHU his personal property was committed to the care of Santorella. (Complaint ¶ 22.) These facts support only the conclusion that any contact Santorella had with Weaver s personal property was in the course of his duties. Likewise, Weaver alleges that Lieutenant Rohrer, Captain Turner, and Vocational Coordinator Mishler, at SCI-Laurel Highlands, schemed to assign Weaver to a position which Weaver alleges he could not do and, indeed, might have killed him. (Complaint ¶¶ 3-5, 63(b).) Weaver s factual allegations against Rohrer and Turner basically fault them for issuing and approving a misconduct against Weaver for refusing to perform the job in dietary. (Complaint ¶¶ 21, 23, 26.) Essentially, Weaver alleges that these two officers misused authority which they could not exercise if it were not in the scope of their duties to exercise such 14 authority. Similarly, Weaver alleges nothing to support the assertion that Mishler was acting outside the scope of his duties as an employment vocational coordinator when he allegedly assigned Weaver to a job. Weaver alleges that Nightingale is the Grievance Coordinator at SCI-Laurel Highlands and that Burks is the Chief of Grievances at the Secretary s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals under the Department of Corrections. (Complaint ¶¶ 9-10.) Weaver essentially faults Nightingale and Burks for denying his numerous grievances. (Complaint ¶¶ 42-44.) Weaver alleges nothing to support the assertion that Nightingale and Burks were not acting within the scope of their duties as grievance officials when they denied Weaver s grievances. Because the alleged actions of each of these Defendants, Santorella, Rohrer, Turner, Mishler, Nightingale and Burks, was within the scope of his or her duties, each is protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and Weaver s eight (8) claims against these defendants for monetary damages12 are, therefore, without merit. 12 In addition to monetary damages, Weaver also seeks declaratory judgment to the effect that Defendants conduct violated unspecified sections of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C. S. §§ 1019352. (Complaint at 16.) While sovereign immunity does not apply to bar actions for declaratory judgment, Legal Capital, LLC v. Medical Prof l Liability Catastrophic Loss Fund, 561 Pa. 336, 342-43, 750 A.2d 299, 302 (2000), the relief Weaver seeks is essentially a criminal adjudication, which is not within the scope of relief which may be sought by declaratory judgment. See Section 7532 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 7532. Weaver also seeks declaratory judgment to the effect that [Weaver] suffered some adverse action by the Defendants in retaliation for [Weaver] engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. (Complaint at 16.) This is essentially a reiteration of Weaver s 1983 claim, which, as we discuss above, he did not sufficiently plead. 15 The remainder of Weaver s concert of action claim generally faults Spangler for failing to prosecute the other Defendants on the basis of Weaver s private criminal complaints. (Complaint ¶ 63(e)-(g).) This claim is also without merit. Prosecutors are absolutely immunized in their decisions of whether to initiate or move forward with a criminal prosecution. In re Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 593, 406 A.2d 1355, 1359 (1979). See also Miller v. Nelson, 768 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. 2001) (approving award of counsel fees against plaintiff who sued defendant district attorney for failing to prosecute plaintiff s private criminal complaint, as the suit was clearly frivolous due to district attorney s prosecutorial immunity). Due to Spangler s prosecutorial immunity, any attempt13 by Weaver to hold Spangler liable for failing to prosecute Weaver s private criminal complaint is without merit. Because we have determined that Weaver has either failed to state valid claims upon which relief may be granted, or such claims are barred by sovereign or prosecutorial immunity, we must agree with the trial court that Weaver s complaint is frivolous.14,15 Therefore, we affirm the order of the Trial Court denying 13 In addition to including Spangler in his concert of action claim, the second count of Weaver s complaint attempts to state a cause of action against Spangler, which essentially consists of Spangler s failure to prosecute the other defendants. Due to Spangler s prosecutorial immunity, this count, too, is without merit. 14 In addition to the claims already discussed, Weaver argues in his brief to this Court that he articulated in his complaint a claim for denial of medical care. (Weaver Br. at 8 (citing Complaint ¶¶ 21, 43(a), 54.) Insofar as Weaver s complaint could be perceived to articulate such a claim, it would allege an intentional, rather than a negligent tort, and such claim is therefore barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 15 Due to our findings on the issues discussed in this case, we do not reach Defendants alternative argument that the Trial Court could have denied Weaver s Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis pursuant to Section 6602(f)(1) of the Pennsylvania Prison Litigation Reform 16 Weaver s petition to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing his complaint without prejudice. Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(f)(1), which is designed to limit inmates from repeatedly filing frivolous suits. (See Defendants Br. at 13-15.) However, while they do not affect our evaluation of his claims in this case, we do note that Weaver appears to have filed a number of other suits against prison employees, companies, public officials, courts, other government entities, and judges. Defendants provide three examples of such cases in their Brief as Exhibits A-C. See Weaver v. Varner, No. 3:CV-02-865 (M.D.Pa. 2003); Weaver v. Maskylyak, No. 3:CV-02-0483, slip op. at 1-2 n.1 (M.D.Pa. June 20, 2002) (describing Weaver as a frequent litigant in the court and listing ten other cases filed by Weaver in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania); Weaver v. Pharnchem Laboratories, Inc., No. 1:CV-99-352 (M.D.Pa. 2000), aff d 33 F.App x 649 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court recently disposed of another of Weaver s cases, Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 931 A.2d 660 (2007). These suits have been found procedurally defective or otherwise frivolous. Even though these cases were filed against different persons at different institutions, the same themes prevail: that Weaver has been persecuted for refusing to confess to various crimes, that his life is in danger, that his property has been unjustly confiscated or stolen, and that various officials are retaliating against him. We note that credibility is a currency which may be squandered and, finally, exhausted. 17 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Ronald D. Weaver, Appellant v. P. J. Rohrer, Michael J. Turner, William Mishler, John Doe One, John Doe Two, Eugene Santorella, Elizabeth Nightingale, Sharon M. Burks, and Jerry L. Spangler : : : : : : : : : : : No. 1286 C.D. 2007 PER CURIAM ORDER NOW, February 25, 2008, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.

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