Bayada Nurses v. WCAB (Gallagher) (Majority Opinion)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Bayada Nurses, Petitioner v. Workers Compensation Appeal Board (Gallagher), Respondent BEFORE: : : : : : : : : : : No. 123 C.D. 2008 Submitted: May 23, 2008 HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge HONORABLE RENÃ E COHN JUBELIRER, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: July 29, 2008 Bayada Nurses (Employer) petitions for review of an order of the Workers Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed the decision and order of a Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) granting the Claim Petition filed by Jeanne Gallagher (Claimant). On appeal, Employer argues that the WCJ erred in concluding that benefits were not barred by Section 301(a) of the Workers Compensation Act (Act)1 because the evidence that was accepted as credible by the WCJ established that 1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 431. Claimant s injuries were a direct result of her violation of law. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the order of the Board. Claimant was employed by Employer as a medical assistant. On July 28, 2005, Claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident while in the course and scope of her employment. Following the accident, Employer issued a Temporary Notice of Compensation Payable acknowledging that Claimant sustained fractured ribs, a fractured elbow, and an injury to her spleen. Benefits were paid to Claimant at the weekly rate of $387.10, which was based on an average weekly wage of $590.65, beginning on July 29, 2005. On September 21, 2005, Employer issued a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation and a Notice of Compensation Denial. Employer filed these notices on the grounds that Claimant s injuries were not work-related. Claimant subsequently filed a Claim Petition with the Workers Compensation Bureau (Bureau).2 The matter was assigned to a WCJ, who held a hearing on May 10, 2006. In support of her Claim Petition, Claimant testified that, on July 28, 2005, she had traveled to a store for one of Employer s clients and that, during her return, she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. (WCJ Hr g Tr. at 18-19, May 10, 2006.) 2 Claimant electronically filed a Claim Petition on September 23, 2005. Claimant also conventionally filed a Claim Petition on September 29, 2005. These Claim Petitions were consolidated by the Bureau. 2 When asked about the injuries that she sustained as a result of the accident, Claimant indicated that she sustained fractured ribs, a fractured left elbow, a ruptured spleen, a broken nose, and an injury to her breast. (WCJ Hr g Tr. at 22.)3 Claimant also testified that she had undergone surgeries to repair her ruptured spleen and her fractured elbow. (WCJ Hr g Tr. at 22-23.) Claimant further testified that she continues to have problems as a result of her injuries and that she is not capable of returning to her job at this time. (WCJ Hr g Tr. at 26-28.) In opposition to the Claim Petition, Employer presented the deposition testimony of Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Patrick S. Ruddy (Trooper Ruddy). Trooper Ruddy testified that he had been called to the scene of the accident on July 28, 2005, to conduct an investigation. (Ruddy Dep. at 8, 11.) Trooper Ruddy testified that, through his investigation, he determined that Claimant was driving 50 mph in a 20 mph zone and that Claimant had crossed into oncoming traffic. (Ruddy Dep. at 16, 19.) Trooper Ruddy, therefore, concluded that Claimant was responsible for the accident because she was driving too fast for conditions and on the wrong side of the road. (Ruddy Dep. at 25; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Police Crash Reporting Form at 6, 8-9.) Trooper Ruddy further testified that he issued three citations to Claimant for: (1) driving at an unsafe speed; (2) not wearing a seatbelt; and (3) driving while her operating privileges were suspended. (Ruddy Dep. at 1415.) 3 Claimant also submitted medical records to establish the extent of her injuries. (Medical Packet, Claimant s Ex. No. 2.) 3 After reviewing the evidence, the WCJ issued a decision and order in which he credited Claimant s testimony to the extent that it did not conflict with Trooper Ruddy s testimony. (WCJ Decision, Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶ 9.) The WCJ found Claimant particularly credible that she: was performing her duties for Employer at the time of the accident; suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident; received medical treatment for her injuries; and is unable to perform her time-of-injury duties for Employer. (FOF ¶ 9.) The WCJ accepted Trooper Ruddy s testimony as credible in its entirety and found Trooper Ruddy specifically credible as to the vehicle speeds, location of the vehicles, and at fault analysis. (FOF ¶ 10.) Based on these credibility determinations, the WCJ concluded that Claimant had met her burden of proving that she is temporarily, totally disabled as a result of the obvious injuries that she sustained while in the course and scope of her employment. (WCJ Decision, Conclusions of Law (COL) ¶¶ 1, 3.) The WCJ further concluded that Claimant s conduct on July 28, 2005, did not constitute a violation of law barring recovery of compensation benefits under Section 301(a) of the Act. (COL ¶ 2.) Accordingly, the WCJ granted Claimant s Claim Petition. Employer appealed the WCJ s decision and order to the Board, which ultimately affirmed. Employer now petitions this Court for review.4 5 4 Employer filed an Application for Supersedeas Pending Appeal (Application) with this Court on March 10, 2008. This Court denied Employer s Application by order dated March 20, 2008. Bayada Nurses v. Workers Compensation Appeal Board (Gallagher) (No. 123 C.D. 2008, filed March 20, 2008). 5 This Court s review in a workers compensation case is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether constitutional rights were violated. Sysco Food Servs. of Phila. v. Workers Compensation Appeal Board (Sebastiano), 940 A.2d 1270, 1273 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). 4 On appeal, Employer argues that the evidence that was accepted as credible by the WCJ confirmed that Claimant s injuries were a direct result of her violation of law and, therefore, that benefits should have been denied pursuant to Section 301(a) of the Act. We disagree. Section 301(a) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that no compensation shall be paid when the injury or death is intentionally self inflicted, or is caused by the employe's violation of law, including, but not limited to, the illegal use of drugs, but the burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer. 77 P.S. § 431 (emphasis added). This Court has generally interpreted the language violation of law, as used in Section 301(a) of the Act, to mean the commission of a felony or misdemeanor. Lomax v. Workmen s Compensation Appeal Board (Mitchell), 550 A.2d 866, 867 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988); Hemer v. Workmen s Compensation Appeal Board (Phillis and Miller Express, Inc.), 454 A.2d 225, 227 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983); Abbot Dairies v. Workmen s Compensation Appeal Board (Yates), 393 A.2d 517, 518 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). We have recognized that a summary offense may constitute a violation of the law where it is a necessary element of a felony or misdemeanor conviction. Burger King v. Workmen s Compensation Appeal Board (Boyd), 579 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). However, this exception is a very narrow one and does not render all summary offenses sufficient to constitute a violation of law under Section 301(a) of the Act. Rox Coal Co. v. Workers Compensation Appeal Board (Snizaski), 768 A.2d 384, 391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), aff d on other grounds, 570 Pa. 60, 807 A.2d 906 (2002). 5 Employer asks this Court to focus on the facts involved in Ogden v. Workmen s Compensation Appeal Board (Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.), 561 A.2d 837 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) and Burger King, which Employer argues are analogous to the facts of the present case and support a denial of benefits. In Ogden, the claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a tractor-trailer for the employer. The claimant failed to negotiate a curve, and his tractor-trailer careened off an embankment. The claimant s tractor-trailer had crossed the center line two times prior to the accident. After the accident, the claimant was observed exhibiting clear signs of intoxication; chemical testing revealed that he had a blood alcohol content of .18%. As a result, the Claimant was charged with driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor offense. Ogden, 561 A.2d at 838-40. The claimant sought workers compensation benefits, arguing that the accident was caused by a brake failure, and the employer responded by arguing that the accident was caused by the claimant s driving while intoxicated. Id. at 840. The WCJ determined that the claimant s injury was caused by the claimant driving while intoxicated, which was a violation of law, and denied benefits. Id. at 839. The WCJ s decision was subsequently affirmed by the Board and by this Court. Id. at 839-40. In Burger King, the claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident while working for the employer. The claimant s vehicle crossed over into the opposite lane of traffic and collided with another vehicle. As a result of the accident, all three occupants in the other vehicle were killed. The claimant pleaded guilty to the summary offense of meeting a vehicle proceeding in the opposite direction and three 6 counts of involuntary manslaughter, each of which were misdemeanor offenses. Burger King, 579 A.2d at 1014. The WCJ determined that the collision and resulting injuries to the claimant were not caused by the claimant s violation of the law and awarded benefits. The Board affirmed the decision of the Referee. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed. This Court found that it was the claimant s summary offense, his vehicle meeting a vehicle proceeding in the opposite direction, which caused his injury. This Court further found that although it was only a summary offense that had caused the claimant s injury, that summary offense was a necessary element in the claimant s misdemeanor convictions and, thus, was a violation of law.6 Id. at 1016. The Court reasoned that, when a summary offense conviction is a necessary element of a felony or misdemeanor conviction, the summary conviction is to be given the same level of legal significance as the more serious crime. Id. While Claimant s underlying conduct may be somewhat analogous to the conduct of the claimants in Ogden and Burger King, we find those cases to be distinguishable from the present case because the offenses for which the claimants were charged in those cases included more than summary offenses. Unlike the claimant in Ogden, Claimant here was not charged with a misdemeanor offense, and unlike the claimant in Burger King, Claimant here was not charged with a summary offense that was a necessary element of a conviction for a misdemeanor offense. In the cases interpreting Section 301(a) of the Act, we have focused on the nature of the offense which caused the claimant s injuries to determine whether the 6 We note that, pursuant to Section 301 of the Act, intoxication may bar the recovery of benefits, even in the absence of a violation of law. 77 P.S. § 431. 7 claimant s conduct constitutes a violation of law. Thus, similar conduct by a claimant may not always result in a determination that the conduct constituted a violation of law under Section 301(a). Here, Trooper Ruddy testified that he cited Claimant for driving at an unsafe speed, not wearing a seatbelt, and driving while her operating privileges were suspended.7 (Ruddy Dep. at 14-15.) Although the WCJ accepted Trooper Ruddy s testimony as credible, such testimony was not sufficient to satisfy Employer s burden of proving that Claimant s injuries were the result of a violation of law under Section 301(a) of the Act. The offenses for which Trooper Ruddy testified he cited Claimant were only summary offenses. They were not misdemeanors or felonies, nor were they necessary elements of a misdemeanor or felony conviction. Thus, while Trooper Ruddy s testimony established that Claimant was cited for several summary offenses, his testimony did not establish that Claimant committed a violation of law under Section 301(a) of the Act. Therefore, the WCJ properly concluded that benefits are not barred by Section 301(a) of the Act.8 7 Claimant testified that it was later determined that she was not driving with a suspended license. (WCJ Hr g Tr. at 35.) Trooper Ruddy did not provide any testimony that would contradict Claimant s testimony in this regard. 8 Employer, in its Statement of Questions Involved, also questions whether the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision under Section 422 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834, because his credibility determinations were inconsistent with his ultimate factual finding and legal conclusion. (Employer s Br. at 4.) We note that Employer fails to address this issue in a separate part of the Argument section of its brief, which is not in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(a). We also note that, because Trooper Ruddy s testimony was not sufficient to establish a violation of law under Section 301(a) of the Act, there was no inconsistency between the WCJ s credibility determinations and his ultimate factual finding and legal conclusion. Thus, we reject Employer s contention that the WCJ s decision was not well-reasoned. 8 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the order of the Board is affirmed. _______________________________ RENÃ E COHN JUBELIRER, Judge 9 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Bayada Nurses, Petitioner v. Workers Compensation Appeal Board (Gallagher), Respondent : : : : : : : : : : No. 123 C.D. 2008 ORDER NOW, July 29, 2008, the order of the Workers Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed. _______________________________ RENÃ E COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.