EASLICK v. STATE
Annotate this Case
EASLICK v. STATE
2004 OK CR 21
90 P.3d 556
Case Number: F-2003-70
Decided: 05/03/2004
Rodney Eugene Easlick, Appellant -vs- STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee
SUMMARY OPINION
LILE, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:
¶1 Appellant, Rodney Eugene Easlick, was
convicted, after a jury trial, of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs (Cocaine Base),
after former conviction of one felony, in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2001-1430, before the Honorable Susan P.
Caswell, District Judge. Judge Caswell sentenced Appellant to
forty-five years imprisonment after the jury failed to agree on a sentence. Appellant has
perfected his appeal of the Judgment and Sentence to this Court.
¶2 Appellant raises the following propositions of error in support of his appeal:
1. Mr. Easlick's conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs must be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss because the State presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of knowledge and possession.
2. Mr. Easlick's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, article II, §§ 7 & 20 of the Oklahoma constitution, and Okla. Stat. Tit. 22, §§ 583, 912 (2001), were violated when, prior to the impaneling and swearing of the jury, the trial court held his trial in abstentia over objection.
3.
Mr. Easlick's 45-year sentence was based on irrelevant
and/or improper factors thus requiring a sentence modification.
¶3 After thorough consideration of the
entire record before us on appeal, we have determined that Appellant's
convictions should be AFFIRMED.
¶4 In reaching our decision, we find, in
proposition one, that there was sufficient evidence to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis but guilt.
Jackson v. State, 1998 OK CR 39, 964 P.2d 875.
We also take this opportunity to reexamine our antiquated dual testing
procedure on the sufficiency of the evidence depending on the type of evidence
relied on; circumstantial or direct. We find it is time that we abolish the
"reasonable hypothesis" test and adopt a unified approach in examining
sufficiency issues.
¶5 Thirty-two
states and all of the federal circuits utilize a unified approach when examining
the sufficiency of the evidence.1 These tests are based on the test found in
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1970):
Whether after
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶6 The reasonable hypothesis test was
formed at a time when circumstantial evidence was universally distrusted. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59
Mass. 295, 296 (1850) (first reference to a reasonable hypothesis
test).
However, given the current instructions defining direct and
circumstantial evidence, the equal footing on which both types of evidence
stand, along with the strength of the reasonable doubt standard, the fear of
circumstantial evidence becomes unfounded.
¶7 In Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40, 75 S. Ct. 127, 137-38, 99 L.Ed.2d 150 (1954), the Supreme Court held, if a proper
reasonable doubt instruction is given, a jury need not be instructed that
circumstantial evidence must be so strong as to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt.
¶8 The Supreme Court reasoned that:
[I]n both
instances the jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly
points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous
inference. In
both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing
probabilities.
If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no
more.
Holland, 384 U.S. at 140, 75 S. Ct. at 137.
The Court admits that circumstantial evidence may point to a wholly
incorrect result, but they point out that the same could be said of testimonial
evidence.
Id. Direct evidence,
whether in the form of eye witness testimony, or exhibits may point to an
incorrect result.
¶9 However, in both cases a jury is asked
to consider the evidence, "draw such reasonable inferences from the testimony
and exhibits as you feel are justified when considered with the aid of the
knowledge which you each possess in common with other persons . . . make
deductions and reach conclusions which reason and common sense lead you to draw
from the fact which you find to have been established by the testimony and
evidence in the case."
OUJI-CR 2d 9-1 (1996), see Holland, 384 U.S. at 140, 75 S. Ct. at 137-38.2
¶10 The earliest case in Oklahoma utilizing the
"reasonable hypothesis" test is Sies v. State, 6
Okl.Cr. 142, 117 P. 504
(1911).
This Court set forth the test as follows:
If the facts
and circumstances are of such a character as to fairly permit an inference
consistent with innocence, they cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence to
support a conviction.
The general rule in criminal cases is that, where the evidence is
circumstantial, the facts shown must not only be consistent with and point to
the guilt of the defendant, but must be inconsistent with his innocence.
Id. 117 P. at
505.
In Sies, the defendant was found with a
marked one-dollar bill which agents gave a witness to purchase whisky. However, the
witness testified that he did not directly purchase whisky from Sies. These facts only
raised a mere suspicion regarding the guilt of the defendant. The same result
would have been reached had this Court utilized the test found in Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, 709 P.2d 202,
203-04.
¶11 There is no difference in the weight
given circumstantial evidence or direct evidence. See OUJI-CR 2d 9-4 (1996)("the law makes no distinction between the weight
to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence"); also see Gilbert v. State, 1997 OK CR 71, 951 P.2d 98, 120 (where the
prosecutor told the jury that circumstantial evidence should not be considered
inferior to direct evidence, this Court held that the comment was a correct
statement of the law). Despite this view, this Court still utilizes
two separate tests for the weighing of circumstantial evidence versus direct
evidence when it comes to the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case.
¶12 In a more recent
case, White v. State, 1995 OK CR 15, 900 P.2d 982, 994, the
special concurrence points out that the "dichotomy stems from an antiquated
notion" that direct evidence is more valuable than circumstantial evidence. A more uniform
standard is necessary to reduce jury confusion and to underscore the belief that
there is no difference in the weight to be given circumstantial evidence and
direct evidence.
¶13 In New Jersey
v. Mayberry, 245 A.2d. 481, 493 (N.J. 1968), citing
People v. Sullivan, 174 N.E. 2d. 860, 861 (Ill. 1962), the Court made an
astute observation when it stated that it is clear that the standard of the "reasonable
hypothesis" test excluding all theories of innocence, "was never applied
literally, for if it had been it would have unreasonably defeated many
legitimate prosecutions based on circumstantial evidence where it was possible
to devise speculative hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence."
¶14 The Court
went on to say that:
[T]he proper issue is simply whether the evidence, viewed
in its entirety including the legitimate inferences there from, is sufficient to
enable a jury to find that the state's charge has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. The Supreme Court of Vermont stated:
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
convince a reasonable trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, trial and appellate courts face a difficult task. Judicial scrutiny
of evidentiary sufficiency requires courts to make complex, subjective
decisions.
This enterprise is ill served by reliance upon the discredited suspicion
of circumstantial evidence. The proper focus of judicial review should be
the quality and strength of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial.
Vermont v. Derouchie, 440 A.2d 146, 150
(Vt.
1981).
¶15 Because the "reasonable hypothesis" test is
based on antiquated ideas concerning the value of circumstantial evidence and
because we have a test that can be utilized in a universal manner, the
"reasonable hypothesis" test should meet its demise in this State in accord with
the vast majority of jurisdictions. The Spuehler test
for insufficiency is broad enough to utilize when weighing evidence, both
circumstantial and direct. Therefore, in the future, we will review
sufficiency of evidence issues under the Spuehler
standard, regardless of whether the evidence is wholly circumstantial or
whether it is based in whole or in part on direct evidence.3
¶16 In
proposition two, we find that Appellant voluntarily waived his right to be
present during trial by failing to appear on the second day of trial. Gregg v. State, 1992 OK CR 82, 844 P.2d 867, 876-77; Bowie v. State, 1991 OK CR 78, 816 P.2d 1143, 1147.
¶17 In proposition three we find that the
sentence does not shock the conscience of this court, and there is no evidence
that the trial court abused its authority in determining punishment. Rea v. State, 2001 OK CR 28, ¶ 5, 34 P.3d 148, 149; Riley v. State, 1997 OK CR 51, 947 P.2d 530, 535; Freeman v. State, 1994 OK CR 37, 876 P.2d 283, 291.
DECISION
¶18 The Judgment and Sentence of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
APPEARANCES AT TRIAL
APPEARANCES ON APPEAL
ANTHONY MCKESSON
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
611
COUNTY OFFICE BUILDING
320 ROBERT S. KERR
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
WENDELL
B. SUTTON
ASSISTANT
PUBLIC DEFENDER
OKLAHOMA
COUNTY
611
COUNTY OFFICE BUILDING
320 ROBERT S. KERR
OKLAHOMA CITY,
OK 73102
ATTORNEY
FOR APPELLANT
ASHLEY ALTSHULER
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
505 COUNTY OFFICE BUILDING
320 ROBERT S. KERR
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
W. A.
DREW EDMONDSON
OKLAHOMA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JENNIFER
J. DICKSON
ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL
112 STATE
CAPITOL
2300 N. LINCOLN
BLVD.
OKLAHOMA CITY,
OK
73105
ATTORNEYS
FOR APPELLEE
OPINION BY: LILE, V.P.J.
JOHNSON, P.J.: CONCURS
LUMPKIN, J.: CONCURS
CHAPEL, J.: DISSENTS
STRUBHAR, J.: DISSENTS
FOOTNOTES
1 State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627 (Alaska App. 1994); State v. Nash, 694 P.2d 222 (Ariz. 1985); People v. Miller, 790 P.2d 1289 (Cal. 1990); People v. Wyles, 873 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1994); State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2003); Hoey v. State, 689 A.2d 1177 (Del. 1997); State v. Bright, 638 P.2d 330 (Hawaii 1981); State v. Ponthier, 449 P.2d 364 (Idaho 1969); People v. Shevock, 782 N.E.2d 949 (Ill. App. 2003); People v. Pollock, 780 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. 2002); Loyd v. State, 787 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. App. 2003); State v. Morton, 638 P.2d 928 (Kan. 1982); Bussell v. Com., 882 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1994); Bryant v. State, 791 A.2d 161 (Md. App. 2002); Com. v. Gendraw, 774 N.E.2d 167 (Mass. App. 2002); People v. Hardiman, 646 N.W.2d 158 (Mich. 2002); Cox v. State, 849 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 2003); State v. Williams, 66 S.W.3d 143 (Mo. App. 2001); State v. Landis, 43 P.3d 298 (Mont. 2002); State v. Jacob, 574 N.W.2d 117 (Neb. 1998); State v. Swint, 745 A.2d 570 (N.J. Super. App. 2000); State v. Bankert, 875 P.2d 370 (N.M. 1994); State v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594 (N.C. 2003); State v. Treis, 597 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1999); State v. McCarthy, 714 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio. Misc. 1999); State v. Carson, 640 P.2d 586 (Or. 1982); Com. v. Robertson-Dewar, 829 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. 2003); Com. v. Newsome, 787 A.2d 1045 (Pa. Super. 2001); State v. Kaba, 798 A.2d 383 (R.I. 2002); State v. Guthrie, 627 N.W.2d 401 (S.D. 2001); Hayward v. State, 117 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App. 2003); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991); State v. Couture, 734 A.2d 524 (Vt. 1999); State v. Israel, 54 P.3d 1218 (Wash. App. 2002).
2 Universally, throughout all jurisdictions, the "reasonable hypothesis" test is viewed as an attempt to define reasonable doubt in a circumstantial evidence case.
3 This holding requires the modification of Uniform Jury Instructions; therefore, OUJI-CR 2d 9-5 (1996) shall be modified by removing the third and fourth sentence. The modified Instruction shall read:
The State relies [in part] for a conviction upon circumstantial evidence. In order to warrant conviction of a crime upon circumstantial evidence, each fact necessary to prove the guilt of the defendant must be established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the facts and circumstances, taken together, must establish to your satisfaction the guilty of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
This
instruction should be given in any case where the State relies in whole or in
part on circumstantial evidence.
CHAPEL, J.,
DISSENTING:
¶1 The majority here finally has
jettisoned the protection afforded by this Court's long adherence to differing
standards of review for direct and circumstantial evidence. Since shortly after
statehood, this Court has consistently required that a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence alone requires exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis
other than guilt.1 This is more stringent than the standard for
direct evidence, which reviews whether, taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the essential
elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority
suggests this distinction is "antiquated". However, nothing about the basic nature of
this evidence has changed. The different standards of review are
justified by the essential difference in the nature of each type of evidence.
¶2 The majority appears to believe our
distinction in standard of review of direct and circumstantial evidence is
pointless. The
majority emphasizes that juries are properly told to give the same weight to
both types of evidence. This does not mean that there is no
difference between the two types of evidence. Of course there is. Direct evidence may
be an eyewitness account or physical object is, in fact, anything which
"proves the existence of the fact in issue without inference or presumption."2 Circumstantial evidence consists of a series
of facts or occurrences from which one may infer a particular thing has
happened. "The
distinction to be made is that direct evidence/testimony requires no inference
to be made:
the particular piece of evidence or testimony is the proof. Circumstantial
evidence requires that a reasonable inference be drawn. . . ."3
¶3 While the two types of evidence are
equally probative, one requires a leap in reasoning that the other does
not. They are
fundamentally different. The majority recognizes this, noting that
historically circumstantial evidence was "universally distrusted". There is a reason
for this distrust.
We have required a different standard of proof for circumstantial
evidence precisely because, as the majority again recognizes, it may "point to a
wholly incorrect result." Circumstantial evidence presents the very
real danger that an innocent defendant will be convicted purely on jurors' wrong
impressions or inferences from competing circumstances.4 This is vitally
important because, as commentators have noted, circumstantial evidence is both
the most common type of evidence and, often, the most critical evidence in a
case.5 I agree with Justice Boslaugh, of the
Nebraska Supreme Court, who noted: "If the inferences to be drawn from
particular facts are equally consistent with guilt or innocence, then it should
be clear that those facts alone are not sufficient to support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt."6
¶4 Judge Furman, writing for this Court in 1912, presented an excellent analysis of the necessity for the reasonable hypothesis standard:
"All evidence is largely circumstantial, and even when most direct it depends upon circumstances for its credibility, weight, and effect. . . . In cases depending upon circumstantial evidence, witnesses may swear falsely as to the circumstances relied upon; but experience shows that it is impossible to fabricate consistency in the circumstances themselves, where many facts are involved. As the law requires, in cases of circumstantial evidence, that the facts or circumstances proven to be true must not only be consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but must also be inconsistent with his innocence, the impossibility of fabricating consistency in the circumstances makes this class of evidence as safe and reliable as human testimony can become."7
¶5 The majority takes as its starting
point Holland v. United
States.8 Closer examination of this case does not
suggest it either requires or supports a change in Oklahoma law. Holland does not announce a constitutional rule and is not binding
on this Court.
It merely interprets a federal evidentiary rule. Holland parsed the
narrow issue of determination of net worth for a tax evasion prosecution, but
included the sweeping language cited by the majority.9 However, the
Supreme Court did not simply conclude a reasonable hypothesis instruction was
unnecessary.
Rather, it explicitly stated that the instruction was not necessary
"where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt."10 Holland did not
suggest what a proper instruction on reasonable doubt might be. In other cases, the
Supreme Court has indicated that reasonable doubt is "one based on reason which
arises from the evidence or lack of evidence,"11 an abiding
conviction of guilt and a moral certainty, and not a mere possible doubt.12 The Supreme Court has stated that the
Constitution does not require trial courts to give any particular instruction on
the meaning of reasonable doubt, as long as the instructions taken as a whole
correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.13
¶6 This Court, of course, has
consistently refused to allow judges or attorneys to attempt to define
reasonable doubt for jurors. I am not suggesting we should require, or
allow, an explicit definition of that term. However, in the absence of some definition of
reasonable doubt, our jury instructions do not seem to me to be sufficiently
precise to ensure that a jury is "properly instructed" for Holland purposes. Other courts have
addressed this problem. When Texas adopted a
unified standard of review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the
Holland emphasis
proper instruction on reasonable doubt, and simultaneously adopted an
instruction defining reasonable doubt.14 The
Missouri Supreme Court,
adopting a unified standard, commented, "We have honed our reasonable doubt
instruction with legal analysis brought on by decades of defendants' attacks
coming from every point of the compass. We believe the reasonable doubt instruction
fully and accurately instructs the jury on the risk of non-persuasion."15
¶7 The majority also cites cases from
several other jurisdictions as a basis for its decision.16 The cases cited for
Mississippi and
South
Dakota each actually
reaffirm those states' continued use of the reasonable hypothesis test for
circumstantial evidence.17 Oregon also uses the
reasonable hypothesis test.18 Several states use a unified test for both
circumstantial and direct evidence because they require "substantial evidence",
and do not further distinguish the two types of evidence.19 However, in
Montana, "substantial
evidence" requires that "the facts and circumstances must not only be entirely
consistent with the theory of guilt, but must be inconsistent with any other
rational (i.e. reasonable) conclusion."20 Similarly,
Connecticut requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, but notes that circumstantial evidence must exclude
any reasonable supposition of innocence.21 Several states
relied on Holland,
Jackson v Virginia,22 or a
combination of the two in adopting a unified test.23 Utah, while
adopting a unified standard, allows but does not require a jury instruction on
the reasonable hypothesis test in circumstantial evidence cases.24 Even if this Court were to be swayed by the
practice of other jurisdictions, this history hardly appears to either justify
or require a change in Oklahoma law.
¶8 The majority offers no reason to suddenly change course. Holland was decided in 1954 and is not new to this Court. We have also known for some time of the federal courts' standard of review, and that of other states.25 Despite numerous opportunities to adopt a "unified", lesser standard of review, Oklahoma has consistently chosen to impose a higher standard of review, requiring more stringent appellate analysis, in cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Neither the nature of the evidence nor the law has changed; only the makeup of this Court is different. It appears that the majority is once again disregarding years of precedent and unnecessarily changing Oklahoma law in order to impose a particular view of the law.26 I dissent.
FOOTNOTES
1 Sies v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 142, 117 P. 504 (1911).
2 Mayes v. State, 1994 OK CR 44, 887 P.2d 1288, 1301, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1194, 115 S. Ct. 1260, 131 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1995).
3 Cheatham v. State, 1995 OK CR 32, 900 P.2d 414, 422.
4 One legal scholar has traced the universal distrust of circumstantial evidence back to the Talmudic prohibition against testimony based on conjecture. Irene Merker Rosenberg, "Perhaps What You Say Is Based Only On Conjecture" Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 Hou. L.Rev. 1371 (1995) (Rosenberg). For a discussion on jurors' interpretation of circumstantial evidence to fit particular narrative explanations of events, see Robert P. Burns, Some Realism and Idealism About the Trial, 31 Ga. L.Rev. 715, 762 (1997).
5 L. Timothy Perrin, From O.J. to McVeigh: The Use of Argument in Opening Statement, 48 Emory L.J. 107, 130 (1999), and citations at n. 146. For recent examples of Oklahoma criminal cases relying significantly on circumstantial evidence, see, e.g., Patterson v. State, 2002 OK CR 18, 45 P.3d 925; Abshier v. State, 2001 OK CR 13, 28 P.3d 579, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 991, 122 S. Ct. 1548, 152 L. Ed. 2d 472 (2002); Glossip v. State, 2001 OK CR 21, 29 P.3d 597; Hooks v. State, 2001 OK CR 1, 19 P.3d 294, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 963, 122 S. Ct. 371, 151 L. Ed. 2d 282; Young v. State, 2000 OK CR 17, 12 P.3d 20, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1055, 121 S. Ct. 2200, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (2001); Powell v. State, 2000 OK CR 5, 995 P.2d 510, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 935, 121 S. Ct. 321, 148 L. Ed. 2d 258; Dodd v. State, 2000 OK CR 2, 993 P.2d 778; Miller v. State, 1998 OK CR 59, 977 P.2d 1099, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 897, 120 S. Ct. 228, 145 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1999); Matthews v. State, 1998 OK CR 3, 953 P.2d 336; Slaughter v. State, 1997 OK CR 78, 950 P.2d 839, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 886, 119 S. Ct. 199, 142 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1998); Hooper v. State, 1997 OK CR 64, 947 P.2d 1090, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943, 118 S. Ct. 2353, 141 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1998); Mollett v. State, 1997 OK CR 28, 939 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079, 118 S. Ct. 859, 139 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1998); Bryan v. State, 1997 OK CR 15, 935 P.2d 338, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 957, 118 S. Ct. 383, 139 L.Ed.2d. 299 (1997). In Oklahoma capital cases too numerous to cite, circumstantial evidence has supported aggravating circumstances or been used to prove intent to kill..
6 State v. Buchanan, 312 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Neb. 1981) (Boslaugh, J., dissenting). Justice Boslaugh also correctly commented that using the unified standard is misleading unless jurors are told that their inference of guilt from circumstantial evidence must be stronger than any inference of innocence.
7 Ex Parte Jefferies, 7 Okl.Cr. 544, 124 P. 924, 924, 926 (1912).
8 348 U.S. 121, 75 S. Ct. 127, 99 L. Ed. 150 (1954). Interestingly, Holland protects defendants from unjust prosecution by requiring proof for sufficiency, where net worth is proved by circumstantial evidence, that the Government has investigated leads which support a taxpayer's claims of innocence. 348 U.S. at 135-36, 75 S. Ct. at 135-36.
9 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S. Ct. at 137. One case on which Holland relies rejected a requirement that the jury be instructed to find the evidence "to a moral certainty." United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863, 49 S. Ct. 479, 73 L. Ed. 1002 (1929). That standard was neither at issue in Holland nor adopted by Oklahoma courts.
10 348 U.S. at 139, 75 S. Ct. at 137.
11 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n. 9, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788 n. 9, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1970).
12 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 14-15, 17, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1247, 1249, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1994) (distinguishing Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct. 328, 112 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1990) (per curiam ).
13 Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S. Ct. at 1243. For a fuller discussion of Holland and reasonable doubt, see Rosenberg, supra n. 4, at 1408-1413.
14 Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 124 (Tx. Crim. App. 1991). In reaching this decision the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that, in 1983, it had abolished the use of a special instruction on circumstantial evidence after Holland and Jackson v. Virginia. Without the instruction, the Court reasoned, its practice of conducting a separate appellate analysis of circumstantial evidence served no purpose.
15 State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Mo. 1993). See also State v. Jackson, 331 A.2d 361, 365 (Me. 1975) (opinion noted reasonable doubt standard was made abundantly clear to jurors); State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W.Va. 1995) (emphasizing importance of jury instruction on the State's heavy burden of reasonable doubt).
16 Responding to a similar argument, the Missouri Supreme Court, in adopting the unified test, stated, "Of course, we do not decide our cases based upon which rule wins favor in the most states." State v. Grim, 852 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Mo. 1993).
17 Cox v State, 894 So. 2d 1257, 1263 (Miss. 2003); State v. Guthrie, 627 N.W.2d 401, 421 (S.D. 2001).
18 State v. Zauner, 441 P.2d 85, 109 (Or. 1968) (explicitly states reasonable hypothesis test is used in circumstantial evidence cases). Zauner is cited in State v. Carson, 640 P.2d 586, 591 (Or. 1982) for the proposition that test is "whether a reasonable person, based upon all the evidence adduced in the case, would be warranted in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense charged."
19 Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Alaska 1973); State v. Fitzpatrick 516 P.2d 605, 609 (Mont. 1973); State v. Stephens, 993 S.E.2d 431, 433 (N.C. 1956). North Dakota and Pennsylvania also adopted a unified test, relying on forum precedent regarding the lack of probative difference between the types of evidence. State v. Emmil 172 N.W.2d 589, 591 (N.D.1969); Commonwealth v. Marino, 16 A.2d 314, 334 (Pa. 1940) ("the circumstances proved should be such as reasonably and naturally to justify an inference of the guilt of the accused, and should be of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
20 Fitzpatrick, 516 P.2d at 609.
21 State v. Medina, 636 A.2d 351, 364 (Conn. 1994); State v. Smith, 82 A.2d 816, 819 (Conn. 1951) ("proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such proof as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support and is consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion").
22 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1970).
23 State v. Harville, 476 P.2d 841 (Ariz. 1970); People v. Bennett, 514 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1973); Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164 (Del. 1988); People v. Pintos, 549 N.E.2d 384 (Ill. 1989); Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) (restating previous "not clearly unreasonable" standard as "If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty"); State v. Jackson, 331 A.2d 361, 365 (Me. 1975); Commonwealth v. Nardone, 546 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1989) (noting use of unified standard); Wiggins v. State, (Md. 1997), overruled on other grounds Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629 (C.A.4th 2002) (affirms previous decisions that adopt the unified standard, but cites the trial court's findings that the facts did not demonstrate a reasonable hypothesis of innocence) [Subsequent cases confirm the use of the unified standard.]; People v. Konrad, 536 N.W.2d 517, 522 n. 6 (Mich. 1995); State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1993); State v. Buchanan, 312 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Neb. 1981); State v Fiorello, 174 A.2d 900, 904 (N.J. 1961); State v. Sutphin, 753 P.2d 1314, 1318-19. (N.M. 1988); State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio 1991) [The Ohio State Bar Association, responding to concerns about unfairness in death penalty cases, has recommended that the former standard be restored.]; State v. Romano, 456 A.2d 746 (R.I. 1983) citing State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23, 34-35 (R.I. 1979) (rejecting reasonable hypothesis instruction based on Holland); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 124 (Tx. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Derouchie, 440 A.2d 146, (Vt. 1981); State v. Green 616 P.2d 628, 632 (Wash. 1980); State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W.Va. 1995).
24 State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 724 (Utah 1982); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (circumstantial evidence must be of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
25 See, e.g., White v. State, 1995 OK CR 15, 900 P.2d 982, 993-94. The White dissent, which closely resembles the majority opinion here, also thoroughly discusses Holland and urges this Court to adopt the federal standard.
26 See., e.g., Long v. State, 2003 OK CR 14, 74 P.3d 105 (overruling precedent to find that duress is not a defense to malice murder).
Strubhar, J., Dissenting
¶1 I dissent. There is no reason for this Court to adopt a new procedure on the questions presented to us on sufficiency of the evidence. The different standards of review now utilized are indeed justified.
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