LIDDELL v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CLEVELAND COUNTY

LIDDELL v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CLEVELAND COUNTY
2002 OK CIV APP 56
46 P.3d 715
Case Number: 96642
Decided: 01/28/2002
Mandate Issued: 04/26/2002
DIVISION I
THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION I

HAROLD LIDDELL, Plaintiff/Appellant
v.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF CLEVELAND ex rel. THE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE COUNTY OF CLEVELAND, a Political Subdivision of the State of Oklahoma, and DENISE HEAVNER, Cleveland County Assessor, in her official capacity, Defendants/Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CLEVELAND COUNTY, OKLAHOMA

HONORABLE TOM A. LUCAS, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Fred Gipson, Norman, Oklahoma, and Charles L. Broadway, Norman, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant
Mike McDanel, Assistant District Attorney, Norman, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees

[46 P.3d 716]

OPINION

Carl B. Jones, Judge:

¶1 On July 15, 1994, Plaintiff/Appellant filed the instant action against Defendants/Appellees for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and refund of excessive ad valorem taxes. Plaintiff is a long-time developer of commercial and residential property in Cleveland County. In early 1991, Plaintiff had some ownership interest in, among other properties, ten parcels of land which were the subjects of ad valorem tax protests in proceedings before the Cleveland County Assessor and/or the Cleveland County Equalization Board. Both before and during 1991, Plaintiff lodged several protests or complaints to the assessor (a predecessor of Defendant Heavner) that his properties were overvalued when compared to comparable properties of other taxpayers. The assessor promised that she would investigate Plaintiff's claims and either explain them or correct the over-valuations, but failed to do so. Of the numerous complaints made by Plaintiff to the assessor, Plaintiff filed protests or appeals to the Equalization Board in nine or ten instances.

¶2 In his proceedings before the assessor and/or the Equalization Board, Plaintiff was granted relief in some cases - including a reduction of approximately $1,000,000.00 in the valuation of one commercial property and a reduction of about $500,000.00 in the valuation of another property - and he was denied relief in others. From adverse decisions of the Board, Plaintiff filed appeals of three decisions to the District Court of Cleveland County in June of 1991. All three of those appeals were dismissed - at Plaintiff's request - on or about the date they were set for trial; two on February 20, 1992, and the third on July 6, 1992. Plaintiff never refiled those claims. By the end of 1994, Plaintiff had disposed of all the properties which were the subject of these complaints, protests and/or appeals.

¶3 In the instant proceeding, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that would define the proper methods of valuation to be used by the assessor and an injunction prohibiting the assessor from applying a different method when valuing Plaintiff's current properties. Plaintiff also sought a refund of the overpayment of ad valorem taxes paid on his previously owned properties. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff appealed. The matter stands submitted without appellate briefs on the trial court record. See Rule 13(h), Rules for District Courts, 12 O.S. Supp.1993, Ch. 2, App. 1, and Rule 1.36, Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, 12 O.S. Supp.1997, Ch. 15, App.1

¶5 Section 2871 et seq. provides, and provided in 1991, a speedy, adequate and exclusive remedy at law for Plaintiff to seek relief in each of the instances of overvaluation [46 P.3d 717] herein cited. Section 2876(D) plainly prescribes the method for which an aggrieved taxpayer may seek property valuation relief from the county assessor. Sections 2876(F) and 2877 provide for appeals from an assessor's decision to the county board of equalization. Section 2880.1 provides for appeals from the board of equalization to the district court in a trial de novo, and provides for appeals from the latter tribunal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Of particular import here,

¶6 In Muskogee Fair Haven Manor Phase I, Inc. v. Scott,

Indeed, Oklahoma's statutory procedure for seeking judicial relief from an illegal tax has, since its initial enactment in 1915, been upheld as a plain, speedy, adequate, and exclusive remedy within the legislative power to prescribe.

Muskogee Fair Haven Manor Phase I, Inc.

In determining whether Congress has authorized state courts to issue injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases, we must interpret § 1983 in light of the strong background principle against federal interference with state taxation. Given this principle, we hold that § 1983 does not call for either federal or state courts to award injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases when an adequate remedy exists.

Id

¶8 Even were we to find that Plaintiff could pursue his § 1983 claim in an action separate from his original tax protests, we would declare this action untimely. For limitations purposes, § 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions and are governed by state statutes of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia,

¶9 In summary, Plaintiff had available to him, in 1991 and before, a plain and adequate remedy for each of the complaints made by him. His failure to avail himself of those remedies serves as a jurisdictional bar to the present action.

¶10 AFFIRMED.

¶11 JOPLIN, V.C.J., and BUETTNER, J., concur.

FOOTNOTES

1Plaintiff's Application for Leave to File Record on Accelerated Appeal and for Leave to Supplement Record, consideration of which was previously deferred by an August 24, 2001 order of the Supreme Court, is hereby granted. Defendant Heavner's deposition is included in the appellate record and was considered in this appeal.

2Section 2885(A) also provides, "Equitable remedies shall be resorted to only where the aggrieved party has no taxable property within the tax district of which complaint is made." As previously stated, Plaintiff had sold all of the property at issue by 1994. However, this provision is inapplicable here - in a suit initiated in 1994 - because "a judge's powers in equity are not invocable when clear and adequate statutory remedies are available." Muskogee Fair Haven Manor Phase I, Inc., at ¶ 12, 957 P.2d at 111. A clear and adequate remedy was available to Plaintiff each year his properties were assessed up to and including 1991.