Wade v. Wade
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[Cite as Wade v. Wade, 2003-Ohio-686.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT FULTON COUNTY Tracy L. Wade Court of Appeals No. F-02-014 Appellee Trial Court No. 00-DV-000189 v. Timothy L. Wade DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Appellant Decided: February 14, 2003 * * * * * Eric A. Mertz for appellee. Gary L. Smith for appellant. * * * * * GLASSER, J. {¶1} Fulton This appeal comes to us from a judgment issued by the County agreement action. as Court to the of Common marital Pleas property regarding a division in settlement a divorce Because we conclude that appellant waived his objections by entering into the subsequent settlement agreement, we affirm. {¶2} In July 2000, appellee, Tracy L. Wade, filed a divorce complaint against appellant, Timothy Wade, in Defiance County. The case was ultimately transferred to appellant filed a counterclaim for divorce. Fulton County where Over one year later, in October 2001, the parties met in open court and verbally submitted a settlement agreement. The court adopted that agreement which was to be incorporated into the final divorce decree. At some point, the parties realized that this settlement agreement failed to address appellant's Campbell Soup Company pension. Appellant refused, however, to agree to the addition of the pension division in appellee's proposed judgment entry. {¶3} In February 2002, appellant moved the court for a final judgment entry in the case, requesting that the court adopt a judgment entry which provided that appellant retain sole interest in any pension funds in his name. Appellant requested, in the alternative that the entire divorce be reopened and that certain assets and debts be reassigned to the parties. Appellee responded that the division of the pension account, which was omitted from the prior October 2001 agreement, should be determined without vacating the previous settlement agreement. {¶4} On May 6, 2002, the court conducted a hearing and indicated that since the parties disagreed as to the intent of the exclusion of the pension in the October 2001 agreement, it would set aside that agreement and reopen the entire divorce proceedings. Attorneys for the parties indicated that a second agreement had been reached to submit a QDRO awarding appellee one-half of the value accumulated surviving spouse benefits. during the marriage, with Appellant's attorney indicated that "through conversation in Chambers and also with my client, the Judgment Entry was signed under the premise that [it] was the Court's belief that if the parties could not come to an agreement that there was no meeting of the minds and therefore the agreement which was read into the record on, I believe, October 4th, of 2001, would be null and void. reopened in "exception its or entirety." your The objection," And the divorce would be court, adopted the noted appellant's second settlement agreement, and incorporated it into the final decree. {¶5} Appellant now appeals, setting forth the following sole assignment of error: {¶6} "Whether the trial court committed reversible error to the prejudice of defendant/appellant by refusing to limit postagreement testimony solely to the division of the Campbell Soup pension plan without vacating a previously approved property settlement." {¶7} Where parties enter into a settlement agreement in the presence of the trial court, such an agreement constitutes a binding contract. Walther v. Walther (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 378, 383, citing to Spercel v. Sterling Industries, Inc. (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 36, paragraph one of the syllabus. of fraud, duress, overreaching or undue "In the absence influence, or of a factual dispute over the existence of terms in the agreement, the court has judgment." the discretion to Walther, supra. adopt the settlement as its The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than a mere error of judgment or of law; rather, it implies that the court's ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. {¶8} "To avoid a contract on the basis of duress, a party must prove coercion by the other party to the contract. It is not enough to show that one assented merely because of difficult circumstances that are not the fault of the other party." Blodgett v. Blodgett (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 246; see, also, Johnsen v. (affirming decree Johnsen trial (Feb. court's incorporating 28, 1996), denial of parties' Summit motion settlement App. to No. vacate agreement, 17345 divorce where the appellant alleged "duress" imposed by her own attorney). An allegedly improper ruling by a lower court will not constitute grounds for breaking a binding contract. 29, 1998), Medina App. No. Yatsko v. Yatsko (July 2681-M. Where parties have voluntarily entered into an agreement, they cannot later attack it "merely because they were personally motivated by a ruling they believed to be in error." Id. Likewise, where parties enter into a settlement agreement in the presence of a court, "neither a change of heart nor poor legal advice is a ground to set aside a settlement agreement." Vasilakis v. Vasilakis (June 20, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 68763. {¶9} original In the instant case, the court determined that the agreement should be set aside because of a factual dispute between the parties as to the exclusion of appellant's Campbell Soup pension from that agreement. agreement even referred to that pension. Nothing in the first Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that it would set aside the October 2001 settlement agreement based upon a lack of a "meeting of the minds" of the parties. {¶10} Despite his alternative request to the trial court to vacate the original agreement, appellant now contends on appeal that the trial court should have upheld the original agreement and then considered the division of the pension by itself. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the court essentially provided the parties with two choices: reopen the entire divorce proceedings for renegotiation or submit their own agreement. Despite his "objection" to the court's initial ruling, appellant chose to agree to the second settlement, presumably to avoid both the expense and delay of reopening the entire case. If appellant wanted to challenge the court's ruling, he could have simply refused to decision, enter if into desired. a settlement In our and view, then appellant appealed waived the any objections to the trial court's ruling by voluntarily entering into the second settlement agreement incorporating a QDRO. {¶11} Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is not well-taken. {¶12} The judgment of the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Court costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Peter M. Handwork, P.J. ____________________________ JUDGE Richard W. Knepper, J. ____________________________ George M. Glasser, J. CONCUR. JUDGE ____________________________ JUDGE Judge George M. Glasser, retired, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
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