Knepper v. Ohio State Univ.
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[Cite as Knepper v. Ohio State Univ., 2008-Ohio-4796.]
Court of Claims of Ohio
The Ohio Judicial Center
65 South Front Street, Third Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
www.cco.state.oh.us
BENJAMIN KNEPPER
Plaintiff
v.
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Defendant
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
Case No. 2007-01851
Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr.
DECISION
{¶ 1} On May 19, 2008, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Civ.R. 56. On May 30, 2008, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment and a memorandum contra to defendant’s motion.
On June 13, 2008,
defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. On July 2, 2008,
the motions came before the court for oral hearing.1
{¶ 2} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:
{¶ 3} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as
stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from
the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to
have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also
Gilbert v. Summit County, 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, citing Temple v. Wean
United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317.
1
On August 15, 2008, plaintiff filed additional authority, which this court has considered, in
support of his motion.
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
{¶ 4} Plaintiff filed this action alleging age discrimination in violation of R.C.
4112.99 and retaliation in violation of R.C. 4112.02(I). The facts that gave rise to his
claims are as follows.
{¶ 5} Plaintiff was employed as an exhibition designer/preparator with
defendant, The Ohio State University (OSU) Wexner Center for the Arts, from July 1980
through October 2004. Prior to obtaining that position, plaintiff earned both a bachelor's
and a master’s degree in Fine Arts from OSU. On April 15, 2004, Gretchen Metzelaars,
Director of Administration, notified plaintiff that his position had been abolished, effective
October 17, 2004, due to “a reduction in workforce under section 9.15 of the University
Operating Manual.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.) David Bamber, another exhibition designer,
was also notified that his position had been abolished. Both plaintiff and Bamber were
over age 50 at the time.
{¶ 6} On April 26, 2004, Spencer Youell, plaintiff’s legal counsel, sent a letter to
Metzelaars in which he suggested that plaintiff be granted a new position that had been
created, that of exhibition preparator, or any equivalent position consistent with his
experience. Youell noted that plaintiff was 52 years old and had worked for OSU for 23
years. He requested that plaintiff be assisted in his efforts to retain state employment
until he had accumulated 25 years of service, and reached the age of 55, thereby
maximizing his retirement benefits. The letter also stated that “[i]t is Mr. Knepper’s
belief that he and Mr. Bamber were terminated by Wexner Center for the Arts because
of their age and sex. Based upon recent events, it is Mr. Knepper’s belief that the Chief
Curato, Helen Molesworth, has the desire and intent to hire less qualified, younger
females for the open position and other possible available jobs within the Wexner
center.” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2.)
{¶ 7} On May 10, 2004, Metzelaars replied to Youell's letter, stating that
“[s]hould Mr. Knepper still be interested in the preparatory position at the time the
position is posted, we would welcome his application for that job or for any positions that
may open in the Wexner Center for the Arts that match his qualifications.” (Plaintiff’s
Case No. 2007-01851
Exhibit 3.)
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DECISION
No further action was taken by either plaintiff or OSU regarding the
allegations of age and gender discrimination.
{¶ 8} On October 21 and November 1, 2005, OSU posted job openings for the
positions of assistant exhibition designer. Plaintiff applied and, on November 17, 2005,
was interviewed for both positions.
The interview panel consisted of Jill Davis,
Exhibitions Manager, Peg Fochtman, Human Resources Manager, and Larry Heller,
Chief Exhibition Designer. The panel also interviewed two other individuals, William
Fugman and Patrick Weber. On November 17, 2005, plaintiff was notified that he had
not been selected for either position.
{¶ 9} On January 3, 2006, plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission alleging that OSU’s Wexner Center had refused to rehire him
because of his age and in retaliation for his attorney’s April 26, 2004 letter expressing
plaintiff’s complaints concerning age and gender discrimination. (Defendant’s Exhibit
F.) The Ohio Civil Rights Commission found no probable cause for either allegation.
(Defendant’s Exhibits G and I.) On February 1, 2007, plaintiff filed the instant action in
this court.
{¶ 10} Defendant contends that plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is barred by
his election to seek remedies set forth in R.C.4112.08; that it is time-barred; and that
OSU had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for declining to rehire plaintiff.
Defendant further contends that plaintiff cannot establish the necessary elements of a
retaliation claim under R.C. 4112.02(I).
{¶ 11} With regard to the age discrimination claim, plaintiff contends that OSU
hired Fugman and Weber instead of him because they were younger and despite the
fact that they were less qualified. He also contends that the interviewers based their
decision on criteria that were not listed as requirements in the job postings.
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
{¶ 12} “‘Under Ohio law, a plaintiff may file a civil action alleging age-based
employment discrimination under one of three statutory provisions: R.C.4112.02(N),2
4112.14,3 and 4112.99.4 Alternatively, a plaintiff may file a charge administratively with
the OCRC [Ohio Civil Rights Commission] under R.C. 4112.05. R.C. 4112.08 provides
that ‘any person filing a charge under division (B)(1) of section 4112.05 of the Revised
Code, with respect to the unlawful discriminatory practices complained of, is barred from
instituting a civil action under section 4112.14 or division (N) of section 4112.02 of the
Revised Code.’” McNeely v. Ross Corr. Inst., Franklin App. No. 06AP-280, 2006-Ohio5414, ¶14.
{¶ 13} In McNeely, the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that, because plaintiff
had elected to pursue a charge with the OCRC, he was barred from bringing a civil
action under R.C. 4112.02(N) or 4112.14. Id. at ¶16. (Citations omitted.) The court
2
R.C. 4112.02(N) states: “An aggrieved individual may enforce the individual's rights relative to
discrimination on the basis of age as provided for in this section by instituting a civil action, within one
hundred eighty days after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice occurred, in any court with
jurisdiction for any legal or equitable relief that will effectuate the individual's rights.”
3
R.C.
4112.14
states
in
part:
“(A) No employer shall discriminate in any job opening against any applicant or discharge without
just cause any employee aged forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise
meets the established requirements of the job and laws pertaining to the relationship between employer
and
employee.
“(B) Any person aged forty or older who is discriminated against in any job opening or discharged
without just cause by an employer in violation of division (A) of this section may institute a civil action
against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction. * * * The remedies available under this section
are coexistent with remedies available pursuant to sections 4112.01 to 4112.11 of the Revised Code;
except that any person instituting a civil action under this section is, with respect to the practices
complained of, thereby barred from instituting a civil action under division (N) of section 4112.02 of the
Revised Code or from filing a charge with the Ohio civil rights commission under section 4112.05 of the
Revised
Code.”
4
R.C. 4112.99 states: “Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages,
injunctive
relief,
or
any
other
appropriate
relief.”
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
went on to infer that the election doctrine also applied to claims brought under R.C.
4112.99, based upon its previous decision and interpretation of the statutes in Balent v.
Natl. Revenue Corp. (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 419. Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 14} However, subsequent to McNeely, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed
the issue whether the election doctrine applies to claims brought under R.C. 4112.99.
In Leininger v. Pioneer National Latex, 115 Ohio St.3d 311, 318, 2007-Ohio-4921, the
court explained that: “R.C. 4112.08 requires a liberal construction of R.C. Chapter
4112. Although R.C. 4112.02(N), 4112.08, and 4112.14(B) all require a plaintiff to elect
under which statute (R.C. 4112.02, 4112.05, or 4112.14) a claim for age discrimination
will be pursued, when an age discrimination claim accrues, a plaintiff may choose from
the full spectrum of remedies available. * * * In Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank (1991), 60
Ohio St.3d 135, we stated that R.C. 4112.99 provides an independent civil action to
seek redress for any form of discrimination identified in the chapter. Id. at 136. A
violation of R.C. 4112.14, (formerly R.C. 4101.17) therefore, can also support a claim
for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief under R.C. 4112.99. This
fourth avenue of relief is not subject to the election of remedies.” This court concludes
that Leininger is controlling and that plaintiff’s R.C. 4112.99 age-based discrimination
claim is not barred by the R.C. 4112.08 election of remedies.
(Internal citations
omitted.)
{¶ 15} Defendant has also asserted that plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is
time-barred because it was not filed in this court within 180 days after he was notified
that he would not be rehired. Defendant again relies upon McNeely for that proposition.
{¶ 16} With respect to that issue, the McNeely court relied upon the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bellian v. Bicron Corp. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 517, at the syllabus,
wherein it is stated that: “[a]ny age discrimination claim, premised on a violation
described in R.C. Chapter 4112, must comply with the one-hundred-eighty-day statute
of limitations period set forth in former R.C. 4112.02(N).”
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
{¶ 17} However, Bellian has since been superceded by statute. Specifically, as
noted in Compton v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39526 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 29, 2008), “shortly after Bellian, the Ohio General Assembly created [R.C.]
4112.14, the only provision in the Revised Code dedicated exclusively to age
discrimination claims. See S.B. No. 162, 121st Gen. Ass. File 37 (Ohio 1995). Although
[R.C.] 4112.14 does not set forth a statute of limitations, Ohio courts have consistently
held it to be six years.” (Citations omitted.) Additionally, only months after Bellian was
decided the Supreme Court revisited the statute of limitations issue for cases filed under
R.C. 4112.99. In Cosgrove v. Williamsburg of Cincinnati Management Co. (1994), 70
Ohio St.3d 281, the court held that “[s]ince R.C. 4112.99 does not contain its own
statute of limitations, we must look to other sections of the Revised Code for the
appropriate limitations period. R.C. 2305.07 states, in relevant part, that ‘an action upon
* * * a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty * * * shall be brought
within six years after the cause thereof accrued.’”
{¶ 18} While the six-year statute of limitations may be applicable to cases
brought against private parties in courts of common pleas, cases against state entities
in this court are governed by the statute of limitations set forth under R.C. 2743.16
which provides in pertinent part that:
“civil actions against the state permitted by
sections 2743.01 to 2743.20 of the Revised Code shall be commenced no later than
two years after the date of accrual of the cause of action or within any shorter period
that is applicable to similar suits between private parties.” Since plaintiff’s cause of
action accrued on November 17, 2005, when he was notified that he would not be
rehired, and he filed his complaint on February 1, 2007, his complaint is well within the
applicable two-year statute of limitations.
{¶ 19} Alternatively, defendant argues that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for declining to rehire plaintiff. Specifically, defendant contends that Fugman
and Weber were better qualified than plaintiff in various respects, including computer
expertise and communication skills. Ultimately, plaintiff is required to prove that the
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
justifications offered by defendant were a mere pretext for discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792; Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine
(1981), 450 U.S. 248, 252-253, quoting McDonnell Douglas at 802, 804. The court
must determine either: “‘(1) that the proffered reason had no basis in fact, (2) that the
proffered reason did not actually motivate the [refusal to hire], or (3) that the proffered
reason was insufficient to motivate the [refusal to hire].’” Owens v. Boulevard Motel
Corp. (Nov. 5, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APE12-1728, quoting Frantz v. Beechmont
Pet Hosp. (1996), 117 Ohio App.3d 351. The court finds that genuine issues of material
fact exist with regard to the question of pretext, and that neither party is entitled to
judgment on the age discrimination claim as a matter of law.
{¶ 20} Defendant next argues that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under R.C. 4112.02(I). That code section provides that it is unlawful “[f]or
any person to discriminate in any manner against any other person because that person
has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice defined in this section or because that
person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under sections 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised
Code.”
{¶ 21} Plaintiff claims that he was not rehired in retaliation for the letter his
attorney wrote in April 2004, wherein plaintiff’s beliefs about discrimination were
expressed subsequent to the abolishment of his job. In order to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, pursuant to R.C. 4112.02(I), a plaintiff is required to prove that: “‘(1)
plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer knew of plaintiff’s participation
in the protected activity; (3) the employer engaged in retaliatory conduct; and (4) a
causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.’” Motley v.
Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Franklin App. No. 07AP-923, 2008-Ohio-2306, ¶11;
quoting Zacchaeus v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., Franklin App. No. 01AP-683, 2002-Ohio444. (Additional citations omitted.) “If the evidence indicates that an employer ‘would
have made the same employment decision regardless of the employee’s participation in
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
the protected activity, the employee cannot prevail.’” Id. quoting Pulver v. Rookwood
Highland Tower Investments (Mar. 26, 1997), Hamilton App. No. C-950361.
{¶ 22} The first element of a prima facie case of retaliation is that plaintiff must
have engaged in a “protected activity.” Generally, “[a]nyone who participates in bringing
a claim of unlawful discriminatory practice is engaging in a protected activity.” HLS
Bonding v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n., Franklin App. No. 07AP-1071, 2008-Ohio- 4107,
¶21, citing Thatcher v. Goodwill Industries of Akron (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 525, 535.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 23} In the present case, the court finds that the April 2004 letter expressing
plaintiff’s beliefs that he and Bamber had been discriminated against, without more,
does not rise to the level of protected activity as contemplated under statutory or case
law. However, even if the letter were considered as such, plaintiff is also required to
show that “the alleged retaliatory action followed [the employee’s] participation in the
protected activity sufficiently close in time to warrant an inference of retaliatory
motivation.” Neal v. Hamilton County (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670, 678. Here, plaintiff
alleges that he was not rehired in November 2005 in retaliation for the letter that was
sent in April 2004. That amount of time is simply far too long to infer a retaliatory motive
on the part of defendant. See Reeves v. Digital Equipment Corp. (N.D. Ohio, 1989),
710 F.Supp. 675, 677. (“[A]s a matter of law, three months is too long to support an
inference of retaliation.”) In sum, the court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff cannot
prove either that he engaged in protected activity or that there was a causal connection
between expression of his beliefs and defendant’s decision not to rehire him.
Therefore, defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor on plaintiff’s claim of retaliation.
{¶ 24} In conclusion, the court finds that neither party is entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination, but that defendant is entitled to
judgment in its favor on the retaliation claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment shall be denied in its entirety, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment
shall be granted, in part.
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
Case No. 2007-01851
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DECISION
[Cite as Knepper v. Ohio State Univ., 2008-Ohio-4796.]
Court of Claims of Ohio
The Ohio Judicial Center
65 South Front Street, Third Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263
www.cco.state.oh.us
BENJAMIN KNEPPER
Case No. 2007-01851
Plaintiff
Judge Clark B. Weaver Sr.
v.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
Defendant
[Cite as Knepper v. Ohio State Univ., 2008-Ohio-4796.]
[Cite as Knepper v. Ohio State Univ., 2008-Ohio-4796.]
An oral hearing was conducted in this case upon the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment.
For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently
herewith, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s claim of retaliation, and DENIED as to
the claim of age discrimination.
_____________________________________
CLARK B. WEAVER SR.
Judge
cc:
Amy S. Brown
Randall W. Knutti
Assistant Attorneys General
150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
LH/cmd
Filed August 27, 2008
To S.C. reporter September 18, 2008
Merl H. Wayman
Spencer M. Youell
425 Metro Place North, Suite 420
Dublin, Ohio 43017
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