Cranston v. Kent State Univ.
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[Cite as Cranston v. Kent State Univ., 2004-Ohio-2752.]
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
JAY CRANSTON, M.D.
:
Plaintiff
:
v.
:
CASE NO. 2000-13099
Judge Fred J. Shoemaker
DECISION
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY
Defendant
:
:
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
{¶1} In Jay Cranston, M.D. v. Kent State Univ., Court of Claims
Case No. 98-09427 (Cranston I), Judge Bettis on March 14, 2000,
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability.
The decision was based upon stipulated facts.
Thereafter, the case
was scheduled for trial on August 10-11, 2000, on the issue of
damages.
On August 9, 2000, the parties filed a stipulation of
dismissal.
{¶2} Plaintiff, Jay Cranston, M.D., refiled this action on
December 26, 2000.
He made fewer claims on the damages issue than
in his previous lawsuit.
{¶3} On July 11, 2001, the court issued an order bifurcating the
trial
and
on
February
21,
2002,
a
trial
date
was
set
for
September 3, 2002, on the issue of liability.
{¶4} The parties filed modified joint stipulations on September
11, 2002.
Plaintiff filed his merit brief on October 21, 2002, and
defendant filed its brief on October 18, 2002.
{¶5} Plaintiff brought this action to recover the value of unpaid sick time and
compensatory time that he accrued prior to resigning from his position as a physician with
defendant in lieu of termination. The case was submitted to the court upon stipulated facts
and trial briefs.
{¶6} The facts of this case are contained in the following “modified joint stipulations”
filed by the parties:
{¶7} “1. Dr. Jay Cranston was employed as a physician by Kent State University for
23 years- from August 1972 until July 1995.
{¶8} “2. He served in several capacities as a university physician, including Director
of Health Services, Coordinator of Medical Services, and Chief of Staff in the University
Health Services. In each of those positions, he was a member of the University’s
Administrative and Professional Staff.
{¶9} “3. In September 1994, after an investigation into various prescription
practices at the University, he resigned in lieu of termination. He did not retire from the
University.
{¶10}“4. During the final year of his employment, he was paid the annual salary of
$69,861.00. All payments made to Dr. Cranston were made through the University’s own
payroll account and not by warrant of the Auditor of State.
{¶11}“5. If computed on an hourly basis based on a 40-hour week, Dr. Cranston’s
final annual salary would translate to $33.59 per hour ($69,861.00 divided by 2080 hours
equals $33.59 per hour).
{¶12}“6. At the time of the termination of his employment by Kent State University,
Dr. Cranston had accumulated unpaid sick leave totaling 2,262.05 hours. The University
did not have a procedure to allow annual payment of unused sick leave.
{¶13}“7. Dr. Cranston was not paid for any accumulated and unused sick leave.
{¶14}“8. Dr. Cranston and Dr. Grezgorek and Dr. Rynearson - two former University
psychologists - would testify that between 1972 and 1988, the University’s health services
department maintained an unwritten policy of granting compensatory time to its physicians
under a system in which (a) three hours of accumulated compensatory time equaled one
hour of ‘real time’ and (b) unused compensatory time accumulated. Dr. Cranston would
testify that he maintained personal records in which he documented 3,968 hours of
compensatory time between 1972 and 1988.
{¶15}“9. The University has no record of this unwritten policy and can neither
confirm nor deny that it existed in the health services department between 1972 and 1988.
In any event, though, no such policy was ever approved by the University’s board of
trustees; University physicians do not currently accumulate compensatory time; the
University has never had a written compensatory time policy for physicians; and the
University maintained no records of any compensatory time accumulated by Dr. Cranston.
{¶16}“10. Dr. Cranston was not paid for any accumulated and unused compensatory
time.”
{¶17}Plaintiff claims that defendant was required to pay him his accrued and unpaid
compensatory time and unused sick time.
{¶18}An unclassified employee is appointed at the discretion of the appointing
authority and serves at the pleasure of such authority. See Lee v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of
Common Pleas (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 620, 622-623, (court employees who serve at the
pleasure of the court are unclassified employees who have no vested property interest in
continued employment); Peters v. Jackson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 302, 311, quoting
Schack v. Geneva Civ. Serv. Comm. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 689, 694, (unclassified
employees serve at the pleasure of the appointing power and are not entitled to civil service
protection).
{¶19}Generally, a classified employee in the civil service can be removed only for
good cause and only after the procedures set forth in R.C. 124.34 have been followed.
Yarosh v. Becane (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 5, 9. An unclassified employee, on the other hand,
is an “at-will” employee who is subject to discharge for any reason. Lawrence v. Edwin
Shaw Hosp. (1988), 57 Ohio App.3d 93, 94. However, an employment-at-will relationship
may be altered by express or implied contract. Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19
Ohio St.3d 100, 103. It is the employee’s responsibility to produce evidence of contractual
intent on the part of both parties to show that the at-will employment relationship has been
modified. Ekunsumi v. Cincinnati Restoration, Inc. (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d 557, 562;
DeKoning v. Flower Mem. Hosp. (1996),82 Ohio Misc.2d 20.
{¶20}R.C. 124.11(A) lists the positions which are in the unclassified service, and R.C.
124.11(B) defines the classified service as all positions “not specifically included in the
unclassified service.”
{¶21}In Judge Bettis’ March 14, 2000, decision he made the following determination:
{¶22}“Based upon the documents in evidence, the court finds that
the
letters
plaintiff
from
knew
plaintiff
that
and
defendant
his
would
attorney
not
acknowledge
renew
his
that
employment
contract for the 1995-96 academic year.
{¶23}“However, the parties have stipulated that, at the time of
plaintiff’s separation, he had positive balances in his compensatory
time and sick leave accounts.
The court finds that pursuant to R.C.
124.18, 124.38, and defendant’s policy manual, defendant is liable
to plaintiff for any accrued compensatory time and sick leave
benefits.”
{¶24}This branch of the court has always followed an opinion of another branch of
the court unless the other branch’s opinion has been reversed.
Therefore, judgment
shall be granted in favor of plaintiff and against defendant.
Because the issues of liability and damages have been bifurcated,
this case shall be set for trial in the normal course on the issue
of damages.
{¶25}This case was submitted to the court on joint stipulations
of fact and briefs on the issue of liability.
The court has
considered the evidence and, for the reasons set forth in the
decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor
of plaintiff in an amount to be determined after the damages phase
of the trial.
The court shall issue an entry in the near future
scheduling a date for the trial on the issue of damages.
________________________________
FRED J. SHOEMAKER
Judge
Entry cc:
L. James Martin
536 Watson Street
P.O. Box 9300
Akron, Ohio 44305
Attorney for Plaintiff
Randall W. Knutti
Assistant Attorney General
150 East Gay Street, 23rd Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130
FJS/LP/cmd/Filed
Attorney for Defendant
May 18, 2004/To S.C. reporter May 28, 2004
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