In re: M.T

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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA14-385 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 7 October 2014 IN THE MATTER OF: M.T. and G.T. Robeson County Nos. 12 JT 17-18 Appeal by respondent mother from order entered 16 December 2013 by Judge Herbert L. Richardson in Robeson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2014. J. Hal Kinlaw, Jr. for Robeson County Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellee. Poyner Spruill LLP, by Daniel G. Cahill and Caroline P. Mackie, for guardian ad litem. Assistant Appellate Defender Joyce L. Terres for mother, respondent-appellant. McCULLOUGH, Judge. Respondent mother appeals from the trial terminating her parental rights to M.T. and G.T. court s order We conclude that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings and vacate the trial court s order. On 12 January 2012, Robeson County Department of Social Services ( DSS ) filed juvenile petitions alleging M.T. and G.T. -2were neglected. On that custody of the children. same date, DSS obtained nonsecure The trial court conducted a hearing on 23 May 2012 and the juveniles were adjudicated neglected. permanency planning hearing held on At a 6 March 2013, the trial court changed the permanent plan to adoption and termination of parental terminate rights. On respondent s 7 May 2013, parental DSS filed rights, a petition alleging as to grounds: (1) failure to make reasonable progress, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1111(a)(2) (2013); and (2) failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2013). After a hearing, the trial court found the existence of both grounds alleged by DSS. termination interests of of The trial court further determined that respondent s the parental children, and respondent s parental rights. Respondent jurisdiction contends juvenile DSS argues to the terminate did not petitions rights entered an was in order the best terminating Respondent appeals. trial her lacked parental properly alleging court sign the and subject rights. Respondent verify children matter the were initial neglected; therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction and all of its orders contends the are void initial ab initio. nonsecure Specifically, custody order respondent granting DSS -3custody is void and DSS did not have standing to petition to terminate respondent s parental rights. file the We agree. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be considered by the court at any time, and may be raised for the first time on appeal. In re T.B., 177 N.C. App. 790, 791, 629 S.E.2d 895, 896-97 (2006). A trial court s subject matter jurisdiction over of all action stages is initiated petition. (2006). a juvenile with the case is filing established of a when properly the verified In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787, 792 [T]he petition shall be drawn by the director, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths, and filed by the clerk, recording the date of filing. Stat. § 7B-403(a) [d]irector department is of (2013). defined social Under as [t]he services in the Juvenile director the N.C. Gen. of county Code, the in a county which the juvenile resides or is found, or the director s representative as authorized in G.S. 108A-14. (2013). Section 108A-14 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(10) provides that [t]he director may delegate to one or more members of his staff the authority to act as (2013). his representative. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-14(b) -4This Court has held that a petition is properly verified by an authorized representative of the director if the petition contained sufficient information from which the trial court could determine that [the signatory] had standing to initiate an action under section 7B-403(a). In re Dj.L., 184 N.C. App. 76, 80, 646 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2007). However, when a person signing the juvenile petition purports to sign as the director, but the signature is the director s name signed by another, this Court has held the petitions were improperly verified and insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. See In re A.J.H-R., 184 N.C. App. 177, 179-80, 645 S.E.2d 791, 79293 (2007) director (where with the petitions signatures of at issue [director s were signed name] by as the MH and [director s name] by MHenderson ). In In re S.E.P., 184 N.C. App. 481, 646 S.E.2d 617 (2007), the petition at issue was signed as the director signature of [director s name] by Pam Frazier. with a This Court held: [T]he trial court never obtained jurisdiction in this action, and the orders awarding DSS custody of [the children] were void ab initio. Thus, DSS was not an agency awarded custody of the minor children by a court of competent jurisdiction, DSS did not have standing to file the termination petitions, and the trial court did not have -5subject matter jurisdiction to enter the orders terminating Respondents parental rights. Id. at 487-88, 646 S.E.2d at 622. In the case sub judice, the petitions were brought before the magistrate and in the verification section of the petitions, the director s name is printed in block letters followed by a slash mark and illegible initials. checked under the signature line. signed by the director. The Director box is The petitions are clearly not Moreover, contrary to DSS s argument, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-404(a) (2013) does not grant a magistrate independent authority apart from the director of DSS to draw and verify the petition. (a) Section 7B-404 provides: When the office of the clerk is closed, a magistrate may be authorized by the chief district court judge to draw, verify, and issue petitions as follows: (1) When the director of the department of social services requests a petition alleging a juvenile to be abused, neglected, or dependent, or (2) When the director of the department of social services requests a petition alleging the obstruction of or interference with an assessment required by G.S. 7B-302. -6We therefore hold DSS failed to properly verify the juvenile petitions. As in S.E.P., the trial court never obtained jurisdiction and the order granting DSS nonsecure custody was void ab initio. Thus, DSS was not a proper party with standing to file the petition to terminate parental rights. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2013) (A petition to terminate parental rights may be filed by [a]ny county department of social services . . . to whom custody of the juvenile has been given by a court of competent jurisdiction. ). Accordingly, we order terminating respondent s parental rights. Vacated. Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur. Report per Rule 30(e). must vacate the

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