In re J.C
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA14-268 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 7 October 2014 IN THE MATTER OF: J.C., J.C. Johnston County Nos. 13 JA 101-02 Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 12 December 2013 by Court. Judge Resson Faircloth in Johnston County District Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2014. No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Department of Social Services. Johnston County No brief filed for guardian ad litem. Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant mother. CALABRIA, Judge. Respondent-mother court s permanency ( respondent ) planning order appeals which, reunification efforts with respondent. vacate and remand in part. I. Background from inter the alia, trial ceased We affirm in part and -2On 27 June 2013, the Johnston County Department of Social Services ( DSS ) filed petitions alleging that respondent s minor children ( the juveniles ) were neglected and dependent, based upon unresolved conflicts between respondent and the juveniles father, which included false reports of sexual abuse of the juveniles by the fabricated by respondent. juveniles father that had been After a hearing, the trial court entered an order which adjudicated the juveniles as neglected and dependent. In its subsequent disposition order, the trial court placed the juveniles in the custody of their grandmother and ordered respondent to have paternal supervised visits with the juveniles every other week at a supervised visitation center at her expense. Respondent appealed the adjudication and disposition orders to this Court, which affirmed both orders. In re J.C., J.C., ___ N.C. App. ___, 760 S.E.2d 778 (2014). On 23 September 2013, respondent filed a motion for review in the trial court seeking, inter alia, reconsideration of the visitation plan. a permanency On 13 November 2013, the trial court conducted planning hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally concluded that it was in the juveniles best interests to return to their father s custody, changed the permanent plan to reunification with the father, -3ordered DSS to cease reunification efforts with respondent, and ordered that visitation with respondent would be supervised by DSS until they could find a suitable replacement supervisor. 12 December consistent 2013, with exception that the its the trial court statements court entered from ordered the a written bench, respondent s On order with the visitation to continue to be supervised at a visitation center at her expense. Respondent appeals. II. As an initial Appellate Jurisdiction matter, we note that on 31 March 2014, respondent filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court in which she asserted that her appeal from the order ceasing reunification efforts was interlocutory pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(5) (2013), which limits the circumstances under which a respondent may appeal from an order ceasing reunification instant case. efforts which were not present in However, [a]ny order, other than a nonsecure custody order, that changes legal custody of a juvenile appealable (2013). to In the this the Court. instant N.C. case, Gen. the Stat. trial § is 7B-1001(a)(4) court s permanency planning order returned the juveniles to their father s custody. Thus, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(4), the trial -4court s order was appealable as an order changing custody, and respondent s petition for writ of certiorari is dismissed as moot. See In re J.V. & M.V., 198 N.C. App. 108, 111, 679 S.E.2d 843, 844-45 (2009). III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Respondent first argues that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings in its permanency planning order to establish its subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case. Specifically, respondent contends that because the juveniles and their parents Kentucky, the were trial involved court in was a previous required neglect to make case in specific jurisdictional findings pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. We disagree. Respondent previously made this same argument in her appeal of the prior neglect and dependency adjudication and disposition order entered in this case. In J.C., we rejected the argument: Although this Court has recognized that making specific findings of fact related to a trial court s jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a)(1) would be the better practice, the statute states only that certain circumstances must exist, not that the court specifically make findings to that effect. Therefore, so long as the trial court asserts its jurisdiction and there is evidence to satisfy the statutory requirements, the trial court has properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction. -5___ N.C. App. at ___, 760 S.E.2d at 780 (internal quotations and citations omitted). acknowledges that the In the evidence instant from the case, respondent permanency planning hearing demonstrates that neither the parents nor the children continue to live in Kentucky[.] appeal, this is sufficient to As in respondent s previous establish the trial court s jurisdiction to enter the permanency planning order. See id. (Holding that jurisdiction was established when the evidence shows that the juveniles have continuously resided with a parent in North Carolina since December of 2011 ). This argument is overruled. IV. Respondent Cessation of Reunification Efforts contends the evidence and the trial court s findings of fact do not support its order changing the permanent plan to reunification with the juveniles father and ceasing reunification efforts with respondent. We disagree. A court may order DSS to cease reunification efforts if it makes a written finding of fact that [s]uch efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.] (2013). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1) This Court reviews an order that ceases reunification -6efforts to determine whether the trial court made appropriate findings, whether the findings are based upon credible evidence, whether the findings of fact support the trial court s conclusions, and whether the trial court abused its discretion with respect to disposition. In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court s ruling is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737, 567 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In the instant case, the trial court found that further efforts toward reunification with respondent would be futile and inconsistent with the juveniles health, safety and need for a permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.] court then verification further she found had that completed respondent a failed psychological to The provide evaluation; failed to visit the juveniles; failed to recognize her role in the juveniles placement; failed to cooperate with DSS s attempts to provide services; and failed to make progress on her case plan since May 2013. by the testimony respondent s case of at Each of these findings is supported the the social time of worker the who permanency supervised planning -7hearing. Specifically, the social worker described respondent s history of resisting DSS involvement and lack of progress on her case plan, her conflicting statements about her responsibility in contributing to the juveniles current situation, and her failure to attend visitation. Although, as respondent contends on appeal, her own testimony contradicted some of the social worker s testimony, it was the trial court s responsibility to weigh the conflicting testimony and make appropriate findings of fact. In re Whisnant, 71 N.C. App. 439, 441, 322 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1984). supported decision by to Ultimately, the trial court s findings, which were competent cease evidence, reunification supported efforts. the trial This court s argument is overruled. V. Visitation Respondent argues that the visitation portion of the trial court s order was erroneous for two reasons. First, respondent contends that the trial court lacked the authority to order her to pay the costs of supervised visitation. However, that argument has already been rejected by this Court in respondent s previous appeal. See J.C., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 760 S.E.2d at 782 ( [I]n the best interests of the juvenile, the trial court has the authority to set conditions for visitation, as the trial -8court did in this case by requiring respondent to pay the costs of visitation. ). In addition, respondent contends that the written visitation order conflicts with the trial court s oral pronouncement vacated. regarding visitation and therefore must be We agree with this contention. [A] judgment is entered when it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 58 (2013). judgment in open court merely Thus, [a]nnouncement of constitutes judgment, not entry of judgment. N.C. rendering of Abels v. Renfro Corp., 126 N.C. App. 800, 803, 486 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1997). If the written judgment conforms generally with the oral judgment, the judgment is valid. S.E.2d 51, Edwards v. Taylor, 182 N.C. App. 722, 727, 643 54 (2007). However, if there is a discrepancy between the written order and the oral rendering of the order in open court as reflected by the transcript, the transcript is considered dispositive. See State v. Sellers, 155 N.C. App. 51, 59, 574 S.E.2d 101, 106-07 (2002). In the instant case, the trial court heard arguments regarding respondent s ability to pay for supervised visitation and her objections specifically to recommended the imposition that of respondent those costs. continue her DSS visits -9with the juveniles expense. at a visitation center at respondent s At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made two statements which constituted its order regarding visitation: I m going to adopt the recommendations put for[th] by the Department with the exception that DSS will supervise until they can find a replacement[,] and I m adopting every recommendation [by DSS] with the exception of the visitation will be at Social Services every other week. Nonetheless, in its written order, the trial court directly contradicted the order it rendered from the bench, instead adopting DSS s recommendation by ordering that respondent s visitation would continue to be at a visitation center at respondent s expense. The difference between the trial court s pronouncement in open court and its written order is substantive and the change in the written order cannot be said to generally conform to the court s oral statement. The written judgment directly contradicts the trial court s statements from the bench, and as a result, the portion of the trial court s order regarding visitation must be vacated and remanded for entry of an amended order which disposition. accurately See id. [i]t is the ensure that reflects the trial court s We note that duty of the trial judge to a written order accurately oral -10reflects his or her rulings before it is signed, and to modify the order if it is not correct. It is also the duty of counsel preparing the order to ensure that it accurately reflects the trial court's findings and rulings. State v. Veazey, 191 N.C. App. 181, 196, 662 S.E.2d 683, 692 (2008) (Steelman, J., concurring in the result). VI. Conclusion The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the permanency planning order. the necessary reunification The trial court properly found facts which supported efforts with respondent, its and decision to cease accordingly, that portion of the trial court s order is affirmed. The court was authorized in to order respondent to participate supervised visits at a visitation center at respondent s expense. However, the trial court instead ordered, in open court, that respondent would have supervised visits at DSS. Since the trial court s written order contradicted its oral disposition, the portion of the trial court s order regarding visitation is vacated and remanded for a new order which is consistent with the court s oral pronouncement. Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur. Report per Rule 30(e).
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