In re D.H
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NO. COA13-1055 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 4 February 2014 IN THE MATTER OF: D.H., D.H., K.H. Mecklenburg County Nos. 09 JT 53-54, 09 JT 56 Appeal by respondent from order entered 27 June 2013 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 2014. Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth & Family Services. Poyner Spruill LLP, by Shannon E. Hoff, for guardian ad litem. Peter Wood for respondent-mother. DILLON, Judge. Respondent parental rights mother as appeals to the ( David ), and K.H ( Kim ).1 from an order terminating her juveniles D.H. ( Dora ), D.H. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. In February of 2009, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services ( DSS ) obtained non-secure custody of eleven1 Pseudonyms are used throughout this opinion to protect the identity of the juveniles. See N.C.R. App. P. 3.1(b). -2year-old Kim, five-year-old David, and four-year-old Dora and filed a petition alleging that they were neglected and dependent juveniles. The petition s allegations described respondent s inadequate supervision of the juveniles and substance abuse, as well as her lack of appropriate alternative placement for the children. The district court entered dependency on 16 April 2009. ceased reunification adjudications of neglect and On 8 February 2012, the court efforts and changed the juveniles permanent plan to adoption. DSS filed a petition for termination parental rights on 16 October 2012. the petition on 15 May 2013. the district parental court rights found based on of respondent s The district court heard In its order entered 27 June 2013, grounds (1) to neglect, terminate (2) respondent s failure to make reasonable progress, (3) failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care, and (4) abandonment. 1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (7) (2011). found and concluded that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B- At disposition, the court terminating respondent s rights was in the best interests of each child. § 7B-1110(a) (2011). parental N.C. Gen. Stat. Respondent filed timely notice of appeal -3from the termination order.2 The termination of parental rights statutes provide for a two-stage termination proceeding: disposition stage. an adjudication stage and a In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). In the adjudication stage, the trial court must determine whether there exists one or more grounds for termination of parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1111(a). ground Id. for If the trial court determines that at least one termination exists, it then proceeds to the disposition stage where it must determine whether terminating the rights of the parent is in the best interest of the child, in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). We review the trial court s decision to terminate parental rights [(made at the disposition stage)] for abuse of discretion. In re J.L.H., (2012) __ N.C. App. (citation omitted). __, __, 741 S.E.2d 333, 337 The trial court is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only upon a showing . . . that the challenged actions are manifestly unsupported by reason. Id. (citation omitted). In this case, respondent does not challenge the adjudicatory portion of the trial court s order in which the 2 The order also terminated the parental rights of the juveniles fathers, none of whom has pursued an appeal. -4court determined that grounds existed to support termination of respondent s parental rights. Rather, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the disposition portion of its order in which the court determined that termination of her parental rights was in the children s best interests. Specifically, respondent argues that the trial court failed to made adequate findings of fact on the dispositional factors set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2011); and, further, that the court erred in determining that termination of her parental rights was in the juveniles best interests, given that two of the children are unlikely to be adopted. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) provides that in determining whether interest, terminating [t]he parental court may rights consider is in a child s any evidence, best including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds relevant, reliable and necessary to determine the best interests of the juvenile. Id. This statute further provides the following: In each case, the court shall consider the following criteria and make written findings regarding the following that are relevant: (1) The age of the juvenile. (2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. -5- (3) (4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. (5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement. (6) Id. Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. Any relevant consideration. We believe that the language of this stature requires the trial court to consider all six of the listed factors, and that any failure discretion. to do so would constitute an abuse of The statute, as amended in 2011, also requires that the trial court make certain written findings. N.C. App. at __, 741 S.E.2d at 338-39. In re J.L.H., __ We do not believe, however, that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) requires the trial court to make written findings with respect to all six factors; rather, as the plain language of the statute indicates, the court must enter written findings in its order concerning only those factors that are relevant. (holding that [t]he amended Id. at __, 741 S.E.2d at 339 statute now explicitly requires that the trial court to make written findings of fact on all -6relevant factors from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) ). Respondent argues that the trial court erred by not making any written findings in connection with the factors set forth in subparts (1), (2), (3) and (5) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). Regarding subpart (1), which concerns the age of the children, we agree with respondent that the trial court did not make any findings as to this factor. each child is adoptability. a relevant Respondent argues that the age of factor because it bears on their However, respondent fails to cite any evidence in the record indicating that age was raised as a relevant factor in this case. Respondent instead focuses on the testimony of the DSS worker: . . . I m aware that there are families or there is at least one family that has expressed an interest in [Dora]. [David], with the right supports in place, I believe that we could find an adoptive home for [David]. It will be a little bit more difficult just given the . . . behavioral issues that he s exhibiting in placement and in school. And I don t think that it would be a problem to find [Kim] is a very engageable, very sweet young woman. I don t think there would be any problem in finding an adoptive home for her. That does get a little bit more difficult with age, but I think that she could certainly engage with a family if the right family was found for her. following -7(Emphasis added). We construe this testimony as indicative of the DSS worker s belief that a child s age can be a relevant factor in considering a child s adoptability, but not as indicative of any belief on her part that the children s age was a relevant or influential factor in the present case. respondent fails to point to any evidence in the Since record demonstrating that age was placed in issue as a relevant factor, such that it had an impact on the trial court s decision, we do not believe that the trial court erred in not making specific findings concerning the children s ages in its order.3 Next, making no respondent findings argues with that respect the to trial the court likelihood erred by that the children would be adopted, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B1110(a)(2). 3 However, we believe that the trial court made the In J.L.H., supra, the trial court did not to make findings regarding the factors listed in subparts (3) and (4) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). In re J.L.H., __ N.C. App. at __, 741 S.E.2d at 337. We determined that those factors were relevant and, accordingly, remanded to the trial court to make findings as to those factors. Id. at __, 741 S.E.2d at 338. In determining that those factors were relevant, we noted that they had been placed in issue by virtue of the evidence presented before the trial court; and we specifically recounted the conflicting evidence concerning one of the factors. Id. at __, 741 S.E.2d at 337-38. However, unlike in J.L.H., in the case sub judice, though the ages of the children were properly considered, respondent does not point to any evidence indicating that the age of any child was placed in issue such that this factor was relevant. -8requisite findings concerning this factor. Specifically, the trial court made findings with respect to each child s current emotional state, that each child s emotional state would likely improve once the uncertainty about their status was lifted, and that [w]ith continued therapeutic support[,] these children are likely to be adoptable. We believe that these findings are supported by the evidence, including the testimonies of the DSS worker and Dr. Kamillah McKissick. Accordingly, this argument is overruled. Respondent failing 1110(3), to make next argues findings concerning that pursuant whether the to trial N.C. termination court Gen. would erred Stat. aid § in by 7Bthe accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juveniles, which in this case is adoption. We believe, however, that the trial court made sufficient findings concerning this factor in its order. Specifically, the trial court found as fact that the children have experienced significant emotional turmoil over the last four years as a result of their impermanent status in foster care ; that they would significantly improve once they are free and able to engage in a relationship with a permanent care provider; that with therapeutic support[,] these children are likely to be adoptable ; and that any attempts to encourage -9contact with their mother would be inconsistent with the children s health, safety, and need for a safe permanent home within a reasonable time. Accordingly, this argument is overruled. Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by making no findings between the concerning [t]he juvenile[s] and quality the of the proposed relationship adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement[,] pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(5). Respondent contends that there was no evidence concerning a potential adoptive parent for any of the children. Family Services Indeed, the trial court found that Youth and is yet to find a single relative who has cooperated with efforts to assess their home for placement and maintained a willingness to provide a home for these children. However, we have held that the absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights. See In re Norris, 65 N.C. App. 269, 275, 310 S.E.2d 25, 29 (1983) ( It suffices to say that such a finding [of adoptability] is not required in order to terminate parental rights. ). Therefore, where there is currently no proposed candidate to provide permanent placement, a trial court would not be able to make any findings with regard -10to subpart (5), since there would be no relationship bond to assess in its decision-making process. court did possible identify permanent the children s placement In any event, the trial maternal provider if grandmother she were as able a to qualify; and the trial court made a number of findings regarding the relationship between her and the children. Accordingly, this argument is overruled. Finally, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights because, she contends, it was unlikely that two of the children would be adopted. However, trial court found as fact that [w]ith continued therapeutic support[,] these children are likely to be adoptable. evidence, We believe that this finding is supported by the including Dr. McKissick s testimony of the DSS worker, supra. expert opinion and the We have carefully reviewed the trial court s order and do not believe that its decision to terminate respondent s unsupported by reason[,] 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 parental rights was manifestly Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, (1980). Accordingly, this argument overruled; and we affirm the order of the trial court. AFFIRMED. Judges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur. is
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
