In re J.M.D.R

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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA12-1235 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 19 February 2013 IN THE MATTER OF: Iredell County No. 10 JT 31 J.M.D.R. Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 22 June 2012 by Judge Court. Edward L. Hedrick, IV, in Iredell County District Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 January 2013. Lauren Vaughan for petitioner-appellee Department of Social Services. Iredell County Melanie Stewart Cranford for Guardian ad Litem. David A. Perez for respondent-appellant mother. ELMORE, Judge. Respondent-mother appeals from parental rights to J.M.D.R. (Julie). an order terminating her For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Background -2Respondent and K.R. are the parents of Julie, born in April 2009.1 On 1 March 2010, the Iredell County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging Julie was an abused and neglected juvenile. The petition alleged that Julie was found on 22 February 2010 in a crib with a urine-soaked diaper and her hands and feet were blue from being so cold[;] that respondent was found asleep; that Julie appeared to be developmentally delayed; that respondent admitted she had used heroin within the past two days; that the parents admitted they each have a history of mental illness; and that respondent admitted to a history of domestic violence between the parents. DSS took non-secure custody of Julie. On 29 April 2010, the trial court adjudicated Julie a neglected juvenile based upon the consent of the parents to the facts set out in the petition. By disposition order filed 20 August found 2010, the trial court that the parents had voluntarily placed Julie with a paternal relative and that they had entered into a case plan with DSS. The trial court ordered visitation between the parents and Julie. The trial court also ordered the parents to comply with their case plan. 1 K.R. relinquished his parental rights to Julie in March 2012 and is not a party to this appeal. -3The trial court held a permanency planning hearing on 15 December 2010. The trial court found respondent had been incarcerated for a probation violation and ordered a concurrent plan of reunification with Julie s father and guardianship. After a 9 August 2011 permanency planning hearing, the trial court ordered a permanent plan of adoption. On 26 October respondent s 1111(a)(1) 2011, parental (2011) DSS rights (neglect); filed a under N.C. N.C. petition Gen. to Gen. Stat. terminate Stat. § § 7B- 7B-1111(a)(2) (2011) (failure to make reasonable progress); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2011) (failure to pay reasonable portion of the cost of care); (dependency). April and and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2011) The trial court held a hearing on the petition in May 2012, and entered an order terminating respondent s parental rights based upon neglect, failure to make reasonable progress, and failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care. The trial court found that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate respondent s parental rights. Respondent appeals. II. Argument Respondent that sufficient contends grounds the trial existed court to erred terminate by her concluding parental -4rights. Preliminarily we note that although the trial court concluded that 1111(a)(1), (2) grounds and existed (3), we pursuant find it to sections dispositive that 7Bthe evidence is sufficient to support termination of respondent s parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(1). See In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. 257, 261, 312 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1984) (a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights). The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law. We then consider, based on the grounds found for termination, whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding termination to be in the best interest of the child. In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221- 22, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2004) (citation and quotations omitted). A [n]eglected juvenile is statutorily defined as: [a] juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile s welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law. -5N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2011). [A] prior adjudication of neglect may be admitted and considered by the trial court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of neglect. In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713-14, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1984). Where a trial court considers a prior adjudication of neglect, [t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect. S.E.2d at 232 (citation omitted). In Id. at 715, 319 assessing changed conditions, the trial court may consider whether the parents have made any meaningful progress in eliminating the conditions that led to the removal of [the] children. N.C. App. 67, 72, 518 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1999). In re Leftwich, 135 A trial court may terminate parental rights based upon a prior adjudication of neglect if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to her parents. In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000). Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact which support its conclusion that grounds exist to terminate -6respondent s parental rights because she neglected Julie that the neglect was likely to continue into the future: [10]c. That both Respondent Parents admitted to having a history of mental illness. [10]d. That there is some history domestic violence between the parents. of [10]e. That on at least one occasion, the Respondent Father hit the Respondent Mother in the presence of the Minor Child. [10]f. That Respondent Mother used impairing substances February 22, 2010, and that on at least one other occasion used heroin while caring for the Minor Child. . . . . [10]h. That a Disposition Hearing was held April 28, 2010, and that Respondent Mother was ordered to comply with recommendations from her substance abuse assessments, submit to random drug screens, and refrain from the use of illegal substances and/or prescribed medications not specifically prescribed to her, as well as alcohol, complete domestic violence assessments and refrain from physical altercations, complete parenting classes, complete psychological evaluations and follow through with recommendations, as well as provide a release to Iredell DSS for previously completed evaluations. The Court further ordered the Respondent Mother to take medications as prescribed by her psychiatrist. . . . . [10]j. That the Respondent Mother has never attended any substance abuse treatment since her child came into care. and -7[10]k. That Respondent Mother missed visits allowed to her by Iredell DSS. [10]l. That Respondent Mother has completed a psychological assessment. some never . . . . [10]n. That while the Respondent Mother is receiving social security disability payments, she has been able to purchase drugs and pay rent. [10]o. That the Respondent Mother has sent only two letters, both in August, 2011 since this action was pending. . . . . [10]r. That the Respondent Mother had a mental health assessment scheduled July 10, 2010 and missed the appointment. . . . . [10]u. That in January, 2012, the Respondent Mother resided with [K.R.] and that during that brief period, the Respondent Mother and [K.R.] argued and fought a lot in the home. Respondent does not challenge any of the above findings of fact and they are therefore binding on appeal. See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) ( Findings of fact to which a respondent did not object are conclusive on appeal. ). Rather, respondent asserts the trial court erred in finding there was a probability of repetition of neglect at the time of the termination hearing. To support her -8assertion, respondent points out that she was not involved with K.R., but married to J.M.; that she had not used drugs in almost a year and one half, and that she was taking her medication. The trial court, however, found that respondent had failed to address issues that have been pervasive in respondent s life. Respondent attend failed substance respondent s to obtain abuse a psychological treatment, reunification with which evaluation were Julie. essential Further, and to although respondent was married to J.M. at the time of the April 2012 termination hearing, the trial court found respondent was living with K.R. in January 2012, not three months before the termination hearing. We, therefore, conclude the trial court had clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to determine that Julie has been subjected to a history of neglect and was likely to be similarly neglected in the future and that the findings are sufficient to show neglect. We further conclude that these findings of fact support the trial court s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B 1111(a)(1). See, e.g., In re Davis, 116 N.C. App. 409, 414, 448 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1994) (the parents failure to obtain[] continued counseling, a stable home, stable employment, and -9[attend] parenting classes was sufficient to show a probability that neglect would be repeated if the child were returned to the care of the parents). III. Conclusion Accordingly, we affirm the trial court s conclusion that grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent s parental rights to Julie. Affirmed. Judges MCGEE and HUNTER, Robert C. concur. Report per Rule 30(e).

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