In The Matter Of: J.D

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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA11-733 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 6 December 2011 IN THE MATTER OF: Wake County No. 07 JT 705 J.D. Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 28 2011 by Judge Eric Chasse in Wake County District Court. March Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 November 2011. Deputy Wake County Attorney Roger A. Askew, for Wake County Human Services, petitioner-appellee. Pamela Newell for Guardian ad Litem. Duncan B. McCormick for respondent-mother appellant. McCULLOUGH, Judge. Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court s order on remand terminating her parental rights to her daughter, J.D. We reverse the order of the trial court. Wake County Human Services ( petitioner ) filed a juvenile petition juvenile. on 3 On October 9 May 2007, 2008, alleging J.D. was J.D. was adjudicated a neglected neglected. Thereafter, the trial court held a permanency planning review -2hearing. adopted In an order entered 9 January 2009, the trial court the permanent plan reunification efforts. of adoption for J.D. and ceased Petitioner filed a motion to terminate respondent-mother s parental rights on 30 March 2009. On 1 September 2009, the trial court terminated respondent-mother s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), (9) (2009). Respondent-mother reunification efforts parental rights. appealed and from from the the order order ceasing terminating her In an opinion filed 5 October 2010 this Court affirmed the order ceasing reunification efforts, but reversed the order terminating respondent-mother s parental rights concluding neither ground found by the trial court was supported by the findings of fact. court to make We remanded the matter to the trial appropriate findings related to Respondent- Mother s ability or willingness to obtain a home for J.D. in which J.D. would not be at substantial risk of physical or emotional abuse or neglect. In re J.D., No. COA10-422, slip op. at 18-19 (N.C. App. filed October 5, 2010), (unpublished), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 193, 707 S.E.2d 245 (2011). On remand, the trial court held a hearing to discuss the proposed orders and findings of fact submitted by the parties. On 28 March 2011, the trial court entered an order terminating -3respondent-mother s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Respondent-mother appeals. Respondent-mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) because this Court did not remand the case for additional findings with respect to this ground. mother argues this Court remanded the matter Respondent- for additional findings with respect to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9) and the trial court was precluded from entering an order terminating her rights on the basis of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). We agree. When a case has been remanded from this Court, [t]he general rule is that an inferior court must follow the mandate of an appellate court in a case without variation or departure. In re R.A.H., 182 N.C. App. 52, 57, 641 S.E.2d 404, 407 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). by the No judgment other than that directed or permitted appellate court may be entered. D & W, Inc. Charlotte, 268 N.C. 720, 722, 152 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1966). v. In this case, we found the trial court failed to address whether respondent-mother was unwilling or unable to establish a home in which J.D. would not be at substantial risk of physical or -4emotional abuse or neglect. We remanded the matter to the trial court to make proper findings as to Respondent-Mother s ability or willingness to provide J.D. with a safe home. It is clear the trial court was required to make findings of fact in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9). Moreover, [t]he law of the case doctrine applies to cases in which a question before an appellate court has previously been answered on an earlier appeal in the same case[.] S.R.G., 200 N.C. App. 594, 597, 684 S.E.2d 902, 904 In re (2009) (quoting Wrenn v. Maria Parham Hosp., Inc., 135 N.C. App. 672, 678, 522 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1999)), disc. review and cert. denied, 363 N.C. 804, 691 S.E.2d 19 (2010). In such a case, the answer to the question given in the former appeal becomes the law of the case for purposes of later appeals. prior appeal, we respondent-mother established by found the attempted petitioner. trial to We court s comply with concluded Id. In the findings showed every the condition trial court s findings of fact did not support its conclusion of law, and held that the trial court erred in terminating respondent-mother s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). We did not remand the case for findings of fact with respect to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Accordingly, on remand, it was -5error for the trial court to terminate respondent-mother s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The order remanded of for the trial further court is reversed and findings as to Gen. N.C. 1111(a)(9). Reversed and remanded. Judges HUNTER (Robert C.) and THIGPEN concur. Report per Rule 30(e). this case Stat. § is 7B-

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