State v House
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. NO. COA11-479 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS Filed: 15 November 2011 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. Mecklenburg County Nos. 09 CRS 248059-60 JAMES RONCHEZ HOUSE Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 9 July 2010 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 November 2011. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy General Sharon Patrick-Wilson, for the State. Attorney Charlotte Gail Blake for Defendant-Appellant. McGEE, Judge. James Ronchez house (Defendant) appeals from his conviction for first-degree burglary. Defendant larceny after was We find no error. indicted breaking and for first-degree entering. burglary Evidence established the following factual background. at and trial The home of John Chapman (Mr. Chapman) was broken into on 17 September 2009. Mr. Chapman was awakened around midnight by a banging on his front -2door. He retrieved a handgun, yelled "freeze" from the top of his stairs, and then heard footsteps rushing out of his home. Mr. Chapman's wife called 911, and Mr. Chapman's family waited upstairs until police arrived. Mr. Chapman never saw the intruder. Upon arriving at the Chapman home, officers saw that the front door appeared to have been kicked in. Mr. Chapman discovered that his laptop had been stolen and that a mounted television had been pulled away from the wall. investigator lifted fingerprints from the A crime scene television. The recovered fingerprints were compared to a fingerprint database. One of the recovered fingerprints matched Defendant's fingerprints, which were in the database. A jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree burglary and not guilty of larceny after breaking and entering on 9 July 2010. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a mitigated-range term of fifty to sixty-nine months in prison. At trial, Defendant filed a motion for sanctions against the State. disclose Defendant alleged that the State failed to timely all fingerprints. discovery, namely a reprint of Defendant's Defendant requested that the trial court dismiss the charges against him or exclude all evidence relating to a -3search warrant used to obtain his reprint. April 2010 pretrial readiness At the time of a 13 conference, that all discovery had been completed. Defendant believed Defendant specifically inquired as to whether there were any additional fingerprints, and the State indicated that there were not. Based on this information, Defendant requested, and was granted, a peremptory setting and trial was scheduled for the 6 July 2010 session. Despite the State's indication that discovery was complete, the State requested that Defendant's fingerprints be retaken on or about 15 June State's request. 2010. The police originally refused the However, the police obtained a search warrant for Defendant's fingerprints on 29 June 2010, and executed it on 30 June 2010. The State notified Defendant on 1 July 2010 by e- mailing defense counsel a copy of the search warrant and related documentation. The State later served Defendant with a copy of the fingerprints. Following a hearing on Defendant's motion for sanctions, the trial court ruled that the State was not diligent in taking additional fingerprints period. The trial discovery violation of court and Defendant found that the that State Defendant of its intent to reprint within this the was should Defendant. discovery a technical have notified However, the -4trial court found that the reprints were not different from the original fingerprints, which were taken in 2007, and that there was no unfair surprise to Defendant. Therefore, the trial court in its discretion allowed use of the fingerprints at trial. As a sanction for the State's failure to comply with discovery, the trial court denied the State the opportunity to present the last argument to the jury. Defendant's court's sanction inadequate. sole for argument the on State's appeal is discovery that the violation trial was He contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charges against him or to exclude the fingerprint card as a sanction for the State's discovery violation. disagree. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-910 provides the following: If at any time during the course of the proceedings the court determines that a party has failed to comply with [discovery rules], the court in addition to exercising its contempt powers may (1) Order the party to permit the discovery or inspection, or (2) Grant a continuance or recess, or (3) Prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or (3a) Declare a mistrial, or (3b) Dismiss the charge, with or without prejudice, or (4) Enter other appropriate orders. We -5N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-910(a) (2009). This statute further requires a trial court to "consider both the materiality of the subject matter and the totality of the circumstances surrounding an alleged failure to comply with [discovery rules]." Stat. § 15A-910(b) (2009). "We review the N.C. Gen. trial court's selection of a remedy for a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A 910 for abuse of discretion." 146, 150, 686 omitted). S.E.2d 160, State v. Remley, 201 N.C. App. 162 (2009) (internal citation "An abuse of discretion results from a ruling so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision or from a showing of bad faith by the State in its noncompliance." State v. McClary, 157 N.C. App. 70, 75, 577 S.E.2d 690, 693 (2003) (citations omitted). After reviewing the record and transcript, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's choice of sanction. In making its ruling, the trial court found that the fingerprints at issue were no different than the ones taken in 2007; they only served Therefore, subjected to the to provide trial any confirmation court unfair found surprise. of that the original Defendant Indeed, prints. was not Defendant was provided with the discovery at issue and declined a continuance. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court properly -6considered totality the of sanction. materiality the of circumstances the in subject matter crafting See N.C.G.S. § 15A-910(b). its and the discovery Given these factors, we further find that the trial court's decision not to impose a more punitive sanction upon the State, such as dismissal of the charges or exclusion reasoned decision. of the evidence, was the product of a See Remley, 201 N.C. App. at 150-51, 686 S.E.2d at 162-63. No error. Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur. Report per Rule 30(e).
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
