People v Ejimadu

[*1] People v Ejimadu 2023 NY Slip Op 51148(U) Decided on October 21, 2023 City Court Of Rochester, Monroe County Sciortino, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 21, 2023
City Court of Rochester, Monroe County

The People of the State of New York,

against

Catherine Ejimadu, Defendant.



Index No. XXXXX

Michael A. Sciortino, J.

The defendant, Catherine Ejimadu ("defendant"), has filed a motion seeking various relief in this Court. Specifically, the defendant is seeking relief for various Hearings, Dismissal Of Information in the Interest of Justice, Bill Of Particulars, Suppression Or Preclusion Of Evidence, Discovery And Inspection, and Brady Material. By way of background, the defendant is charged with three Class A Misdemeanors; one count of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree and two counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, together with two Violation level offenses of Harassment in the Second Degree, all relating to alleged conduct occurring during a session of Rochester City Court on November 5, 2021. The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to said charges.

Hearings

Initially, the defendant requests that should the Court not grant any of the relief requested by the motions set forth in defendant's papers, that the Court schedule various hearings so that the defendant may have an opportunity to produce evidence in support of the relief requested under Sandoval and Clayton. This request for relief is GRANTED. Consistent with People v. Sanders, 31 NY2d 463 (1973), any hearing ordered, except a Sandoval hearing, will be held at least twenty (20) days prior to the commencement of trial in order to allow sufficient time for the transcription of the minutes of such hearings.

Dismissal of Information

Second, defendant moves to dismiss the charges in the furtherance of justice pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §170.40(1). Defendant alleges that prosecution of the defendant would constitute or result in injustice. The People oppose the defendant's application for dismissal in the interest of justice. Generally, the remedy of dismissal in the interest of justice should only be granted "where there is some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant would constitute or result in injustice." People v. Banks, 100 AD3d 1190, 1191 (2012). While the Court possesses the discretion under the Criminal Procedure Law to dismiss charges in the interest of justice, said discretion "should be exercised sparingly and only in that rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations." [*2]People v. Scott, 284 AD2d 899 (4th Dept. 2001); see, also, People v. Wright, 278 AD2d 820 (2000); People v. May, 100 AD3d 1411 (4th Dept. 2012).

The People submit that an assessment of the required statutory factors, which must be considered both "individually and collectively," do not support the defendant's application. See, People v. Jenkins, 11 NY3d 282, 287 (2008). The defendant however submits that an assessment of the relevant factors from within the subsections of CPL §170.40(1) do support the application for a dismissal in the interests of justice. This Court will review each of the relevant factors below:

(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense

The defendant argues that she is a former Assistant Public Defender with the Monroe County Public Defender's Office when she was forcibly restrained. As a result, defendant sustained serious physical injury as she was arrested by Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies. This verbal disagreement was with a Rochester City Court Judge concerning whether the defendant could enter the Rochester City Court Holding Area ("Holding Area") to explain an order of protection to a client of the Monroe Couty Public Defender's Office who became agitated when presented with that order of the Court.

Defendant argues that she was the only person physically injured in the course of this incident and that the incident became far more serious than the verbal argument between the defendant, the Court, and the Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies. As defendant notes, the injuries to the defendant, the multiple charges in this case, the investment of court resources, and law enforcement time, all relating to the investigation and prosecution of these charges, and the other collateral consequences of this prosecution subsequently ensued. Each of the misdemeanor offenses carries a penalty of up to 364 days incarceration or three years' probation supervision. The People also argue that the duly sworn allegations allege that the defendant not only conducted herself in a manner so disorderly as to prevent ongoing court proceedings but also repeatedly physically resisted attempts by the Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies to first remove the defendant from a restricted area and deescalate the situation, and later attempts to restore order to the Court by her physical removal. Beyond the seriousness of the charges, the alleged conduct falls squarely within the provisions of the applicable statutes; this case does not present a situation where the defendant can claim to have been over-charged. The defendant's motion addressing this portion of the Court's statutory inquiry misplaces blame for her conduct on the actions of Deputy Walter McDonald ("Deputy McDonald") of the Monroe County Sheriff's Office calling for a supervisor's assistance. The additional supporting depositions indicate that Deputy McDonald charged with maintaining order and safety in Rochester City Court, with other deputies, engaged with the defendant who had attempted to enter the Holding Area, against the presiding judge's direction. When the call for a supervisor went out Deputy McDonald's attention was being diverted to preventing the defendant from entering the holding area near the bench. The call for a supervisor, an additional Monroe County Sheriff's Deputy, to assist in a courtroom where Deputy McDonald is now handling an active situation as the security personnel present, is a completely reasonable and appropriate act, as the People have alleged.

(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense

The defendant further states that as a result of this incident the courtroom was cleared, court proceedings were temporarily disrupted, and the calling of the remainder of the Court's docket was delayed. Defendant points out that the presiding judge returned to the bench and was able to call and dispose of the remaining cases on the docket that day. Defendant argues that [*3]most of the harm was caused to herself when there was a use of physical force by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office that was far beyond any force necessary to address or control any perceived disruption or temporary interference with court proceedings. Following the incident, the defendant needed to be removed from the courtroom on a medical gurney and was immediately transported to Strong Memorial Hospital to be evaluated and treated for a fracture to her left wrist that she suffered during this incident. As alleged by the defendant, the deputies involved in the physical altercation suffered minor abrasions (rug-burn) or soreness as a result of taking the defendant to the ground. See, Attorney Affirmation of Donald M. Thompson, Exhibit G.

By contrast, the People argue that the extent of harm caused by the offense is not insignificant, as the defendant's disruption of Court proceedings necessitated clearing the courtroom and required a number of Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies to leave their posts to bring the situation under control. The Deputies who were forced to physically restrain the defendant when she escalated the encounter suffered abrasions and soreness. The People submit that while the defendant downplays the extent of harm noting that the Deputies injuries fell short of the legal definition of physical injury or serious physical injury, that fact is irrelevant to the charges pending.

(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial

Both parties argue that there are multiple individuals who were able to see what had occurred in this matter. The People have submitted that the eyewitness testimony of a number of attorneys, Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies, and court staff who were present is substantial. The defendant argues that there is consistent description of what exactly occurred and in what order, albeit everyone's recitation and reliability shows evidence that it may have been affected by various affiliations. The various statements of all parties who were actually in a position to view the interaction between the defendant and Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies are subject to further inquiry at the time of a potential trial. Contrary to the defendant's position, the inconsistencies of some eyewitness testimony as it relates to specific details of the incident are the proper purview of the trier of fact, not a basis for the dismissal of the charges in the interest of justice. See, e.g., People v. Mills, 20 AD3d 779 (3d Dept. 2005).

(d) the history, character, and condition of the defendant

The parties are aligned in that defendant has no criminal history. The People submits it has no further information on the defendant's character generally. The defendant argues that at the time of this incident, the defendant was a 35 year-old Assistant Public Defender with the Monroe County Public Defender's Office where she argued motions, prepared and conducted hearings and trials and maintained a full caseload. The defendant states that she knew she wanted to be a public defender and provide zealous representation to the indigent criminally accused. As dedication to public interest and human service, this has been the defendant's life passion. The defendant argues that this prosecution has placed her livelihood and ability to continue in her chosen profession in jeopardy. Whatever the outcome of this criminal prosecution the defendant will be required to respond to the New York State Attorney Grievance Committee on her arrest and the eventual disposition of the charges in this case.

(e) any misconduct of law enforcement officers

The defendant alleges that the Monroe County Sheriff's Deputies involved in this incident used greater physical force against the defendant than that is authorized or necessary, in violation of Monroe County Sheriff's Office General Order 033-19, which directs that: [*4]"Members of the MCSO will only that level of force and weaponry that is reasonable to overcome resistance and/or aggression, or gain compliance." See, Attorney Affirmation of Donald M. Thompson, Exhibit J. The People argue that there is no evidence of any misconduct of law enforcement personnel and that although the defendant characterizes the Monroe County Sheriff's Office response as excessive, it was in reality appropriate and measured to the circumstances presented by defendant's conduct.

The defendant submits that she is five feet two inches tall and weighs 112 pounds. The defendant also submits that the deputies and sergeants involved in this incident who had used force are Deputy Kyle Sandle (6' 00", 200 pounds), Sergeant Jeffrey Ingham (6'1", 240 pounds), Sergeant Jonathan Shults (5'11", 200 pounds), and Deputy Christopher Argento (5'7", 175 pounds). See, Attorney Affirmation of Donald M. Thompson, Exhibits M, N, O, and P. Defendant argues based on these variances that there can be no reasonable view that could support law enforcement's post-incident determination following their internal investigation that the amount of force employed was appropriately responsive to the alleged threat presented and which resulted in serious and unnecessary injury to defendant.

The People argue that the fact that the defendant is smaller in stature than the deputies present from the Monroe County Sheriff's Office, and was outnumbered by those deputies, does not make their response to her disruption of court proceedings or restraint of defendant in response to her physical escalation of the disturbance law enforcement misconduct. Furthermore, the People note that no eyewitness testimony establishes that Deputy McDonald or any other responding officer struck or kicked the defendant, employed any kind of specialized martial arts tactics, or in any way took offensive action against her beyond what was necessary to gain control of the dangerous situation created by her actions.

(f) the purpose and effect of imposing a sentence authorized for the offense

The defendant submits that there would be no valid purpose in sentencing her. As defendant's counsel submits in his Affirmation, "Because the defendant is an attorney, the allegations giving rise to this case will be fully addressed and any sanctions deemed appropriate will be determined by the Attorney Grievance Committee, 7th Judicial District for the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. The sanctions in that matter could include a "temporary" suspension from the practice of law (for months or years) or possibly, the revocation of her license to practice in New York (which would be followed by revocation of her license to practice in New Jersey as well, based only on New York's determination). The sanctions in that disciplinary proceeding could well exceed any expected post-conviction sanctions in this prosecution." See, Attorney Affirmation of Donald M. Thompson.

Notwithstanding, the People argue that there exist valid and appropriate effects to imposing a sentence authorized by law on the defendant. Specifically, such a sentence is appropriate to punish the defendant's criminal conduct and deter others from the disorderly interruption of court proceedings and obstruction of legitimate governmental action. The fact that the defendant's criminal conduct occasioned media coverage and may occasion professional reprimand are irrelevant to the penal ends of criminal prosecution generally, as noted by the People.

(g) Impact of dismissal on the public's confidence in the criminal justice system

Dismissal of the charges specifically because of the defendant's status as a licensed attorney, as urged by this portion of her motion, would give the public impression that attorneys are not subject to the same standards of conduct as other members of the community. In reality [*5]our system places officers of the court under a higher standard, as provided in Rule 3.3 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, which states in relevant part that in appearing before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not engage in undignified or discourteous conduct, or engage in conduct intended to disrupt the tribunal. Defendant argues that the entire incident was handled terribly by all involved. Dismissal of these charges would have a favorable impact on the public's confidence in the criminal justice system. This statutory factor must be weighed against dismissal in the interest of justice.

(h) Impact of dismissal on the safety and welfare of the community

The defendant argues that there is no impact of dismissal as defendant has no prior convictions or arrests. There was nothing about her role in this case that would suggest any proclivity or propensity to engage in violence and nothing in her prior 35 years that would support any such concern. People argue that dismissal would negatively impact the safety and welfare of the community by implicitly encouraging, or at the very least countenancing, disorderly behavior in courtrooms and disregard of the authority of the Monroe County Sheriff's Office to maintain order in Rochester City Court.

Attorneys are expected to engage in argument with the court and advocate for their clients. However, attorneys should and do realize the bounds of zealous advocacy (as generally provided in the Rules of Professional Conduct) and by in large respect those bounds when practicing in courtrooms throughout the state. The balance this Court must engage in is whether a dismissal of the charges here, which would inform Monroe County Sheriff's Office and the multiple other court security staff around the state, that they cannot respond to a physical confrontation with appropriate and reasonable force to maintain order of court proceedings.

(i) Attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the offense

Defendant submits that it would be inappropriate for the court to consider the attitudes of the complainants individually or the Monroe County Sheriff's Office as an institution when deciding this motion based on bias in justifying the legitimacy of their actions. The People note that there is no complainant or victim in the present matter as the charges arise from the defendant's disruption of court proceedings and obstruction of governmental administration.

(j) Any other relevant fact indicating that conviction would serve no useful purpose

The defendant moves that the information's be dismissed in the furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL § 170.40. In the alternative, defendant requests that the Court order a hearing on the issue of dismissal in the furtherance of justice so that she might further develop the factual basis for this motion. See, People v Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 (2d Dept 1973). The People argue that there are no facts indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose. Principally, a judgment of conviction will serve the end of general deterrence from criminal conduct, and would positively impact the orderly administration of justice in New York State courtrooms.

CPL § 210.40 allows dismissal in the interest of justice where "some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such indictment or count would constitute or result in injustice." The Court may only order a hearing if the defendant meets their burden of presenting compelling facts that individually or collectively warrant dismissal, or where those facts are uncontested, grant dismissal on the papers. See, People v. Clayton, 41 AD2d 204 (2d Dept. 1973). The defendant's interest of judgment motion contains no sworn allegations of fact beyond witness statements which recount the events leading up to the defendant's alleged conduct from witnesses who were [*6]not in a position to observe her physical resistance. At best, the facts cited by the defendant raise credibility issues to be appropriately considered by the trier of fact, but are neither uncontested facts which warrant dismissal in the interest of justice nor raise issues which warrant a hearing on this portion of defendant's motion.

Accordingly, based upon the analysis conducted above and assessment of the required statutory factors within the subsections of CPL §170.40(1), which must be considered both individually and collectively, this Court DENIES this portion of the defendant's motion as the assessment of the relevant factors do support the application for a dismissal in the interests of justice. See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, 11 NY3d 282, 287 (2008).

Bill of Particulars

Defendant argues that she cannot adequately prepare or conduct a defense without being supplied with particular factual information pursuant to CPL § 100.45(4) and that the People be directed to provide a Bill of Particulars. The People oppose a Court Ordered Bill of Particulars as the Defendant has failed to serve a written request for same upon the People, and accordingly has failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for seeking a Court Ordered Bill of Particulars pursuant to CPL §§ 100.45(4) and 200.95(5). Further, the People allege that any written request for a Bill of Particulars at this time would be untimely, as more than thirty days have elapsed since the defendant's arraignment with counsel, pursuant to CPL § 200.95(3). People also allege it has provided the defendant a certificate of compliance pursuant to CPL § 245 and attached compliance reports detailing the materials provided. The date, location, and the conduct alleged in each count is clearly spelled out on the face of the information and the contents of the People's file, which has been fully provided pursuant to the terms of CPL § 245 et. seq. Notwithstanding the People's opposition, this portion of the motion is GRANTED and the defendant shall receive a proper Bill of Particulars consistent with her request.

Suppression or Preclusion of Evidence

Motion to preclude statements

The defendant moves to preclude the People from introducing, directly or indirectly, as evidence at trial all statements, whether verbal or not, attributed to the defendant which are not set forth in a CPL § 710.30 Notice served on the accused within fifteen (15) days of the arraignment on the accusatory instrument herein, on the grounds that there is no good cause for the late service of notice. See, People v O'Doherty, 70 NY2d 479 (1987).

The People submit it has timely filed a notice of intent to offer evidence of the defendant's statements to law enforcement pursuant to CPL § 710.30 at the time of her arraignment on March 1, 2022. The People note that they are presently unaware of any statements made by the defendant to law enforcement which are not included in the CPL § 710.30 notice, but reserve the right to serve additional notice should additional statements be discovered, upon a showing of good cause pursuant to § 710.30(2). Because the People have complied with the notice requirements of CPL § 710.30, the defendant's motion to preclude is DENIED as to any statements properly noticed in the CPL § 710.30 Notice.

Discovery and Inspection

Pursuant to CPL § 245.20 the defendant requests that the Court direct the People to provide the defendant with the following property which is, or with the exercise of due diligence could, come within the possession or control of the prosecutor. Based on this request, the Court does GRANT this portion of the motion and to the extent not already provided, orders the following to be produced, including the reciprocal discovery requested by the People in its [*7]papers:

1. Video of the Rochester City Courtroom and waiting area where this incident occurred, as well as copies of any radio broadcasts, dispatches, or other communications of any kind received, sent, or monitored by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office during or relating to the incident giving rise to this case.2. All specific instances of defendant's prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct which the People intend to introduce as direct evidence at trial, or upon cross examination to impeach the credibility of the defendant, should he choose to testify at trial. See, People v Betts, 70 NY2d 289 (1987); see also, People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). This is to be provided at least three (3) business days before commencement of jury selection if defendant elects to proceed with a trial jury of her peers.3. Any discovery to which the defendant is entitled pursuant to People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 (1961) at least three (3) business days before the commencement of any hearing or trial.4. Defendant requests disclosure of any other information required to be disclosed by the People pursuant to the Constitution of the United States of American or the Constitution of the State of New York.5. The defendant is also ordered to provide to the People any reciprocal discovery materials from the defendant pursuant to CPL § 245.20(4).
Brady Material

The Court GRANTS defendant's request that the prosecution provide all information favorable to the defendant in that it supports the position that the defendant did not commit the crimes charged, or that might be used to impeach the credibility of any of the People's witnesses, United States v Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); see also, Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or which may be, or may tend to be favorable or exculpatory to the defendant and which is or may be material to the issue of guilt or punishment.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Rochester City Court in the County of Monroe, State of New York.

DATED: October 21, 2023
Rochester, New York
HON. MICHAEL A. SCIORTINO
Acting Rochester City Court Judge