People v Martinez

The EDDS user manual also provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f your documents are accepted by the court, you will receive a second email, which will include important information about your submission and directions regarding how to proceed with your case" (see Step 10-A: Email Confirming Acceptance and/or Filing of Documents, EDDS user manual, https://iappscontent.courts.state.ny.us/NYSCEF/live/edds.htm at 14).

The prosecution's opposition demonstrates abject avoidance of that portion of defendant's motion which contends that the Court overlooked or misapprehended the AO/331/21 proviso that documents submitted to EDDS are not considered filed until the system generates a second email which acknowledges filing. Indeed, there is nothing in the court file to suggest that a second EDDS email was even generated.

However, a review of the People's submission indicates that each page of the document bares, in bold face, a header which states "FILED: BRONX CRIMINAL COURT (EDDS) 02/17/2023 05:57 PM." That is, irrespective of when the clerk actually downloaded, reviewed and placed them in the court file, the prosecution's documents were time stamped according to their submission time (see People v Palma-Amaya, 2023 NY Slip Op 23271, *3 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2023][(T)he filing of the COC and SOR was effectuated on the court clerk by electronically filing in EDDS and digitally time stamped when filed"]).

This Court finds that it was reasonable for the People to rely upon an email from EDDS confirming that their documents were not only received but also marked as filed on February 17, 2023 at 5:57 p.m. Moreover, as this Court noted in Martinez, notwithstanding the parties' ability to file documents via EDDS at any hour, "we recognize that for the disposition of business the court shall commence not later than 9:30 a.m. and conclude not earlier than 5 p.m." (see Martinez at 881). Accordingly, if the ministerial act of reviewing the documents before sending a second email to confirm acceptance for filing were determinative, the People's CoC and SoR should have been time stamped as filed, at the earliest, on the next business day, Monday, February 20, 2023, yet they are not.

It is respectfully submitted that while AO/331/21 is entirely unambiguous, EDDS declarations are not. As discussed in People v Mclean, EDDS system managers had previously rectified a contradictory note at the bottom of the secondary emails which advised filers that documents filed through EDDS did not constitute filing of those documents with the court or County Clerk (see Mclean, 77 Misc 3d 492, 502 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2022]). Even assuming, arguendo, that a second email was not generated by EDDS, the People should be able to rely upon a notation from EDDS which indicates that their documents were marked "filed" contemporaneously with their submission (see Mclean at 502 ["(I)t is not for the court to speculate when the physical copy of the SOR was placed in the court file, nor should the People be penalized for the length of time it may take for the clerk to review and place the SOR in the court file"]).

The Court did not overlook or misapprehend any issues of fact or law but rather declined to penalize the prosecution because of contradictory EDDS notations where the same system email that states "Notification of Receipt" also states "EDDS DOCUMENT(S) FILED," and where the documents in question are annotated as "FILED: BRONX CRIMINAL COURT [*3](EDDS) 02/17/2023 05:57 PM." These contradictory notations have markedly different implications for compliance with AO/331/21 (see Mclean at 502). Accordingly, the People's SoR was and remains marked as filed on February 17, 2023, the ninetieth day following defendant's arraignment.

Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (4) (a) provides that when computing the timeliness of the People's declaration of readiness for trial, certain periods of time must be excluded for a "reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is incompetent to stand trial; demand to produce; request for bill of particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court" (see CPL § 30.30 [4] [a] [emphasis added]; see also People v Reid, 245 AD2d 44 [App Div 1st Dept 1997]; People v Simpkins, 193 Misc 2d 148, 151 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2001]; People v Commack, 194 AD2d 619, 620 [App Div 2nd Dept 1993]; People v Gonzalez, 266 AD2d 562, 563 [App Div 2nd Dept 1999]; People v Azcona, 180 AD2d 690, 691 [App Div 2nd Dept 1992]; People v Beshiri, 75 Misc 3d 1206 [A] [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]; People v Vidal, 180 AD2d 447 [App Div 2nd Dept 1992]).

The Court concedes that its holding that the People's CoC and SoR had been filed within their statutorily prescribed time did not render as moot defendant's argument that the prosecution's five-day delay in opposing the prior motion, if charged, would exceed their speedy trial time (see Martinez at 882). However, upon consideration of the rearguments, the Court finds that the People's actions were neither unreasonable nor outrageous such that the five-day delay should not be excluded pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (4) (a).

As a threshold matter, defendant blithely asserts that "[b]y requesting an extension five days after the deadline set by the Court, the People accrued an additional five days of chargeable time" while ignoring the fact that defendant did not ask the Court for leave to file the instant motion. Defendant then cites several cases for the proposition that the People's delay should be chargeable which are in the Court's estimation completely inapposite to the facts at bar.

In Beshiri, the court held that the People had been derelict in not responding to the defendant's motion nor requesting additional time to file (see Id.). In fact, the prosecution was "silent until contacted by the Court, almost one month later" (Id.). Here, the assigned ADA emailed the Court on April 17, 2023, to advise that after misreading the file notes she mistakenly believed that her response was due on April 20, 2023. These facts are in no way suggestive of the neglectfulness exhibited by the People in Beshiri, whom the court chastised for following a "self-created schedule" (see Id.).

In Vidal, the court held that the prosecution's 12-day delay in responding to the defendant's omnibus motion resulted in chargeable time to the People (Id. at 447). However, the Vidal decision does not indicate whether the prosecution endeavored to explain the delay or request an extension of time (Id.). Neither does the holding in Azcona, where a period of the People's 111-day pre-indictment delay was excluded as an "exceptional circumstance pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (g)" (see Azcona at 691). The facts at bar are wholly different insofar as the assigned explained her delay in responding to the motion and requested permission, unlike the defendant in the motion at bar, to file before doing so.

In Simpkins, defendant argued that the prosecution's 43-day delay in responding to the [*4]motion "warrant[ed] an assessment of time" against the People (Id. at 150). However, the court held that the prosecution had not simply ignored the deadline but appeared in court to explain that their response was still with the typist (Id.). This Court declines to extrapolate from this holding where the People's delay was considerably shorter and where the prosecution acted promptly to explain their delay, ask for an extension and file the opposition after realizing their mistake.

Defendant further cites to the Commack decision for the premise that filing delays should be chargeable to the People. However, the prosecution in Commack did not respond to the pending motion until 10 days after their deadline and the court held that their failure "to appear on the deadline date to request a further adjournment of the motion" was further evidence of a dilatory pattern by the People (Id. at 620). The same dilatoriness was observed by the Reid court, which held that the prosecution's delay in responding to the defendant's motion, coupled with their delays in preparing for hearings and producing the defendant for said hearings, had stalled resolution of defendant's motion for many months (see Reid at 44). Here, no such pattern was evinced by the People, who requested an extension, albeit belatedly, before presuming to file their opposition. The Commack and Reid holdings have no bearing on the facts presented.

This Court finds that the People's explanation for their tardiness in filing an opposition was credible, and their five-day delay before seeking and obtaining permission to file their response does not demonstrate a disregard for the Court's motion schedule.

Accordingly, the five-day delay is excludable pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (4) (a).

The prosecution's CPL § 30.30 time commenced the day following defendant's arraignment on November 20, 2022. When the People filed a valid CoC on February 17, 2023, they declared their readiness for trial and stopped their speedy-trial clock, within ninety days after arraignment, within the time prescribed by law (see CPL § 30.30 [1] [b]; see Martinez, supra at 882).

Defendant moves alternatively for an order suppressing evidence pursuant to CPL §§ 710.20 (1), (3) and (4), § 710.60 and an order precluding evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.30 or, alternatively granting pre-trial Mapp/Dunaway, Atkins/Capraella and Victory, Huntley/Dunaway and voluntariness of statements hearings, and a Sandoval hearing.

The Court denies defendant's request for an order suppressing evidence. However, the Court grants defendant's request for Mapp/Dunaway, Atkins/Capraella and Victory, Huntley/Dunaway and voluntariness of statements pre-trial hearings, and respectfully refers the issue of preclusion pursuant to CPL § 710.30 and Sandoval to the trial court.

Defendant further seeks an order directing the People to comply with his request for a Bill of Particulars pursuant to CPL §§ 200.95(2) and (5) and disclosures pursuant to CPL §§ [*5]245.55 (2) and (3), CPL § 245.20 (1) and CPL § 245.35 (3). Additionally, defendant moves this Court for an order directing compliance with Brady/Vilardi demands and requiring the People to file a further CoC. Lastly, defendant seeks to reserve his right to file additional motions.

The Court grants defendant's application to make further motions to the extent provided by CPL § 255.20 (3) and directs the People to comply with their continuing discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245, including Brady/Vilardi disclosures.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court:

GRANTED defendant's motion to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 (d) (2), addressed herein;

DENIES defendant's motion for dismissal pursuant to CPL § 30.30;

DENIES defendant's request for an order suppressing evidence pursuant to CPL §§ 710.20 (1), (3) and (4), and CPL § 710.60;

REFERS the issue of preclusion pursuant to CPL § 710.30 and Sandoval to the trial court;

GRANTS defendant's request for Mapp/Dunaway, Atkins/Capraella and Victory, Huntley/Dunaway and voluntariness of statements pre-trial hearings;

GRANTS defendant's application to make further motions to the extent provided by CPL § 255.20 (3);

DIRECTS the People to file a Bill of Particulars; and

DIRECTS the People to comply with their continuing discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245, including Brady/Vilardi disclosures.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and the order of the Court. [FN4]