People v Aguiar

Annotate this Case
[*1] People v Aguiar 2022 NY Slip Op 22280 Decided on September 8, 2022 District Court Of Nassau County, First District Wright, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on September 8, 2022
District Court of Nassau County, First District

People of the State of New York,

against

Jessica Aguiar, Defendant.



Docket No. CR-016357-21NA


Anne T. Donnelly, District Attorney

Jeffrey Tyler, Esq., Nassau County Legal Aid Society David W. Wright, J.

PAPERS CONSIDERED NUMBERED Notice of Motion to Dismiss 1
Affirmation in Opposition 2
Affirmation in Reply 3

The defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument based upon violation of her speedy trial rights pursuant to CPL 30.30(1)(b).

Initially, the People concede that they are properly charged with 89 days of pre-readiness delay. The only time period in dispute is a 12 day period between the defendant's arraignment and her next appearance in the assigned Criminal Part.

On October 16, 2021, the defendant appeared for arraignment and was represented by The Legal Aid Society of Nassau County. After a not guilty plea was entered on the defendant's behalf, Legal Aid counsel requested that the defendant be screened for the assignment of Legal Aid as her counsel going forward. The arraignment court questioned the defendant regarding her financial situation. When the defendant stated that she was not employed, the court inquired how she supported herself. The defendant indicated that her husband was employed and that he earned approximately $800-$1000 per week as a painter/carpenter. The court also inquired about the defendant's living arrangements to which the defendant indicated that she and her husband lived at her father-in-law's house. Based on this information, the arraignment court declined to appoint Legal Aid counsel stating that the defendant would have to retain private counsel prior to her next court date.

On October 28, 2021, the defendant appeared for her next court date in Criminal Part 1 [*2]without counsel and informed the court that she could not afford to hire an attorney because her husband had lost his job. The judge presiding in that Part assigned Legal Aid to represent the defendant.

The defendant contends on this motion that the 12 days where she was without counsel are not excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30(4)(f) which provides that the People are not charged for "the period during which the defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court..." The defendant asserts that she was without counsel due to the fault of the arraignment court who erroneously declined to assign Legal Aid. She bases this contention upon "Standards for Determining Financial Eligibility for Assigned Counsel (Standards)" promulgated by the NYS Office of Indigent Legal Services. Counsel for the defendant contends that the arraignment court should not have considered the defendant's husband's income and their housing situation in determining eligibility for the appointment of assigned counsel because those factors are specifically not to be considered pursuant to the Standards.

In People v Cortes (80 NY2d 201[1992], the Court of Appeals charged the People with delay based upon the unavailability of an attorney from the 18-B Assigned Defender Plan. The Court went to great lengths to demonstrate how intertwined the court system and the 18-B program were, and that unavailability of a qualified defense attorney from 18-B had to be the fault of the court (Id. at 210; see also People v Danise, 59 Misc 3d 829, 831 [City Ct 2018]["Since it remains the court's responsibility to supervise the assignment of counsel to eligible indigent defendants, the pre-readiness delay caused by the unavailability of a public defender at arraignment, is considered a fault of the court, and therefore, the People will be charged with this delay"]).

Here, the issue is not the unavailability of assigned counsel, but rather the arraignment court's discretionary determination that the defendant was ineligible for assigned counsel. The Standards relied upon by the defendant have not been codified as law or court rules. They are merely guidelines for courts to use in determining a defendant's eligibility for assigned counsel. They are not mandatory or binding in any way. The arraignment court exercised its discretion in determining that the defendant was not eligible, and the Criminal Part 1 judge also exercised discretion in determining, 12 days later, that she was eligible for assigned counsel.

Based upon this record, I cannot say that the defendant was without counsel due to some fault of the court. In fact, it would be inappropriate for a judge to rule on the discretionary decision of another judge of coordinate jurisdiction (see generally People v Maslowski, 187 AD3d 1211 [2d Dept. 2020]). If Legal Aid counsel at the arraignment wished to challenge the arraignment court's determination, the proper procedure would be to seek emergency appellate relief, make an application for reargument or renewal, or seek a shorter date before the assigned Part Judge to address any changed circumstances or to provide documentary proof of the defendant's financial situation.

Accordingly, the disputed 12 days are not chargeable to the People and the defendant's motion is denied.

All applications not specifically addressed have been considered and are Denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

/s/[*3]
HON. DAVID W. WRIGHT, J.D.C.
Dated: September 8, 2022

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.