Winter v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
Annotate this CaseDecided on June 14, 2021
Supreme Court, Bronx County
Carl Winter, Plaintiff,
against
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, et al., Defendants.
Index No. 28306/2018E
Adrian Armstrong, J.
Upon the foregoing papers, the motion by second third-party defendant, SP Plus Corporation ("SP Plus") is decided as follows.
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff who was working for SP Plus at a parking garage located at 154 East 53rd Street, New York, New York ("subject location"), managed by Central Parking of New York Inc./SP Plus when he was injured when the elevator he was operating, fell from the 5th floor to the bottom floor on July 20, 2015. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of the elevator mishap he sustained personal injuries. Plaintiff thereafter filed and received workers compensation benefits as a result of the incident.
Plaintiff commenced this action in 2018 against several defendants for Labor Law violations and common law negligence. In 2019, a third-party summons and third-party complaint against Centennial Elevator Industries, Inc. ("Centennial") was flied and served. Thereafter, Centennial filed a second third-party action against second third-party defendant and plaintiff's employer, SP Plus.
SP Plus now moves to dismiss the second third-party complaint because it claims said pleading fails to state a cause of action in that SP Plus was plaintiff's employer, therefore the second third-party action is barred by §11 of the Workers' Compensation Law, and the work agreement between Centennial and SP Plus does not include indemnification language to the extent required by §11 of the Workers' Compensation Law.
In support of its motion, SP Plus submits and relies on a June 12, 2015 work agreement between Centennial and Central Parking of New York Inc. ("Central Parking"), a direct defendant in this action, to provide elevator maintenance at the parking garage in question. SP Plus maintains that the June 12, 2015 contract's indemnity provision only required Centennial to indemnify Central Parking. Consequently, SP Plus argues that there was no indemnification [*2]provision that ran in the direction of Centennial that could arguably present a question of fact regarding whether Centennial was entitled to the Workers' Compensation exemption that might allow a third-party action against the employer.
In opposition, Centennial requests that this court deny SP Plus's motion on the ground that the documentary evidence produced by SP Plus cannot irrefutably establish that Centennial's claim is barred by §11 of the Workers' Compensation Law. Centennial contends that prior to the June 12, 2015 agreement, in a prior agreement dated May 12, 2015, SP Plus agreed to indemnify Centennial. As such, Centennial argues that there is an issue of fact as to which contract governed the relationship between Centennial and SP Plus at the time of the plaintiff's incident. Additionally, Centennial argues that it should be permitted to depose SP Plus, regarding the contracts provided by the parties so a proper determination can be made as to which contract was in effect at the time of plaintiff's incident.
Centennial relies on the affidavit of Joseph Sena, its VP of Service Operations, to support entennial's contention that a written agreement, albeit not signed, and predating the June 12, 2015 agreement between the parties existed. This document, dated May 12, 2015, provided that Centennial was to perform maintenance of the elevator equipment at the subject location, and SP Plus was to hold harmless Centennial for injury related to the performance of said agreement. Centennial submits that the lack of signature on the May 12, 2015 agreement does not negate its existence or that Centennial was working pursuant to the terms of that agreement, and that SP Plus was paying Centennial in conjunction with that agreement.
In reply, SP Plus argues that Centennial's opposition was based solely on an unsigned document that was not executed by any entity. SP Plus contends that the unsigned document established the perimeters of when and how it could become a valid agreement, relying on language therein which states "[t]his proposal shall become a valid contract only when accepted by the owner, the owner's agent or lessee and when subsequently approved by Centennial Elevator Industries Inc." Therefore, SP Plus argues that the May 12, 2015 "agreement" should not be considered, and the parties are bound by the June 12, 2015 signed agreement that does not indicate that Centennial is entitled to contribution and/or indemnification.
A motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) may be granted only where the documentary evidence "utterly refutes" the plaintiff's factual allegations, resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of the claims at issue (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY, 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]).
Centennial submitted opposition based solely on an unsigned document that was not executed by any entity including Centennial. This Court finds no basis in law to enforce the May 12, 2015 unsigned document. The document was merely a proposal to contract. As such, the parties are bound by the signed June 12, 2015 agreement.
The opposition does not dispute that SP Plus was the plaintiff's employer, and thus without an exception to the Workers' Compensation rule, third-party actions that attempt to bring the employer into the litigation are barred. In the absence of a "grave injury", Workers' Compensation Law §11, as amended in 1996, bars a third-party action for contribution or indemnification against an employer when its employee is injured in a work-related accident, unless the employer entered into a written contract "prior to the accident or occurrence by which the employer had expressly agreed to contribution to or indemnification of the claimant or person asserting the cause of action for the type of loss suffered" (Workers' Compensation Law §11; see Potter v M.A. Bongiovanni, Inc., 271 AD2d 918 [2000]). Here, Centennial did not [*3]allege that the plaintiff suffered a grave injury and the record reveals that the employer, SP Plus did not enter into a written contract prior to the plaintiff's accident expressly agreeing to contribution or indemnification.
Consequently, the documented evidence submitted in support of this motion establishes conclusively that plaintiff was an employee of SP Plus on the date of the incident, and as a result of his accident on July 20. 2015, that he filed a workers' compensation claim and obtained benefits. As a result, those workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy. Because the fully executed agreement between the parties required that Centennial indemnify Central Parking, not the other way, Centennial has failed to state a cause of action in the second third-party action.
Furthermore, contrary to Centennial's argument that the motion to dismiss is premature, it failed to make a showing that "facts essential to justify opposition to the motion to dismiss would be uncovered through discovery" (Gabrielli Truck Sales v Reali, 258 AD2d 437, 438 [2nd Dept 1999]). The contention that further discovery may yield some evidence of fault on the movant's part is speculative. The mere hope that a party might be able to uncover some evidence during the discovery process is insufficient to deny this motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is granted. The second third-party causes of action against second third party defendant, SP Plus Corporation claiming common law indemnification and/or contribution is dismissed.
This is the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: June 14, 2021
_____________________________
Adrian Armstrong, A.J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
