People v Boyles
Annotate this CaseDecided on June 9, 2021
Justice Court of the Town of Pleasant Valley, Dutchess County
People of the State of New York,
against
Michael P. Boyles, Defendant.
02-10150
JONATHAN D. COHN, ESQ.
Gerstenzang, Sills, Cohn & Gerstenzang
Attorneys for Plaintiff
210 Great Oaks Boulevard
Albany, NY 12203
JENNIFER L. FLUCK, ESQ.
Senior Assistant District Attorney
236 Main Street
Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
David A. Sears, J.
The Defendant has moved, by Notice of Motion dated April 2, 2021, for a Writ of Coram Nobis vacating a Judgment of Conviction entered in the Pleasant Valley Justice Court on April 17, 2003. The conviction was a result of the Defendant's plea of guilty to the charge of Driving While Ability Impaired in violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law §1192(1). The People of the State of New York, through Sr. Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Fluck, oppose the application, asserting that Defendant's sole remedy would be an application under Criminal Procedure Law Article 440 and such an application was not made in a timely fashion.
The Defendant argues that the Department of Motor Vehicles promulgated regulations on September 25, 2012 that affected the relicensure of individuals who have accumulated three or more DWI related convictions within the previous twenty-five years or five DWI related convictions in a lifetime. The Defendant argues that at the time of his Pleasant Valley Justice Court guilty plea, he was not advised by his attorney that his driver's license would be permanently denied under New York Department of Motor Vehicles regulations enacted approximately nine years after his conviction. He further argues that there was no discussion with his attorney that a conviction would result in a lifetime denial of his driver's license. Defendant's claim is that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly or intelligently because had he known this information, he may have decided to challenge the cases in the hopes of avoiding a lifetime revocation under the New York Department of Motor Vehicles regulations subsequently enacted in 2012.
The Defendant, through counsel, notes that he has six (6) alcohol related convictions and [*2]as it currently stands, he is permanently denied from obtaining a driver's license under the New York Department of Motor Vehicles regulations. The last such conviction occurred on November 24, 2008. At that time, he was convicted of Driving While Intoxicated in the Dutchess County Court.[FN1] Counsel notes that this is the first of what could be many applications. If the Defendant vacates one conviction, he may be able to reapply for relicensure with a requirement of an Ignition Interlock Device. If Defendant vacates two prior alcohol-related convictions, he may be able to be relicensed without any restrictions.
ANALYSIS
A motion for a Writ of "Coram Nobis" provides a way to attack a criminal conviction for a person who is no longer in custody. A Writ of Coram Nobis presupposes a violation of constitutional rights not appearing on the record. People v. Bachert, 69 NY2d 593 (1987). However, Coram Nobis relief is not another stop on the continuum of Defendant's efforts to seek appellate relief. Coram Nobis is extraordinary relief only provided in rare cases and presupposes a violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights not readily apparent on the record. Id.
The Writ of Coram Nobis has been expanded in scope, when necessary, to afford the Defendant a remedy in cases where there is no other avenue of judicial relief. People v. Hairston, 10 NY2d 92, 93 (1961).
An application for a Writ of Coram Nobis presumes no negligence on the part of the Defendant for his failure to bring any alleged error to the attention of the Court at the time of trial and further, that the current proceeding is not a substitute for a new trial, appeal or other statutory remedy. People v. Bachert, 69 NY2d 593, 598 (1987),
As urged by the People that Defendant's application must be measured against the structure of Criminal Procedure Law Article 440, and the standard of review under provisions of that statute. The People assert that Defendant's only remedy was an application under Criminal Procedure Law §440.10 and such an application was not timely made. Accordingly, the People argue the Defendant's motion must be denied.
It is important to note that Criminal Procedure Law Article 440 replaces all aspects of common law writs that it directly covers and thus, the resort to a Coram Nobis is not available in situations covered by the statute. However, the Legislature did not abolish the common law Writ of Coram Nobis or necessarily embrace all of its prior unanticipated functions within the statutory provision, and therefore the writ remains available.
Defendant's claim, in essence, is an ineffective assistance of trial counsel, by failing to advise the Defendant of the possibility of a lifetime revocation resulting from future changes in regulations by New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. It appears to this Court that Defendant's application for Writ of Coram Nobis vacating the 2003 conviction is not relief this Court can grant. Rather, the proper application by Defendant should have been an application under Criminal Procedure Law §440.10 addressing trial counsel's perceived "ineffective assistance". However, that application is time barred an can not be granted eighteen years after the plea of guilty to Driving While Ability Impaired.
However, even assuming this Court could entertain a Coram Nobis application based on ineffective assistance of counsel, it is difficult to comprehend how counsel in 2003 could have advised the Defendant that his license could potentially be subject to a lifetime revocation under New York State Department of Motor Vehicles regulations that would be adopted nine years later. It is well settled that the loss of a driver's license is a collateral consequence of a Judgment of Conviction. See, People v. Ford, 86 NY2d 397 (1995). To assert that trial counsel failed to advise the Defendant of a consequence not then in existence, not only defies logic, but also common sense. The adoption and enforcement of the regulation in 2012 by New York State Department of Motor Vehicles could not have been anticipated in 2003. Granting the Defendant's application to vacate this conviction, and in essence invalidating the regulation as applied to this Defendant, without the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles being given an opportunity to be heard, is not something this Court will entertain. Moreover, it appears Defendant's grievance is aimed more directly at the 2012 regulation than at the performance of his trial counsel in 2003.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the Defendant's motion is denied in all respects.
This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: June 9, 2021
________________________________
HON. DAVID A. SEARS, Town Justice Footnotes
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
