Schenectady Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Schenectady

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

Schenectady Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Schenectady 2020 NY Slip Op 34346(U) December 29, 2020 Supreme Court, Schenectady County Docket Number: 2020-1411 Judge: Mark L. Powers Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF SCHENECTADY PRESENT: HON. MARKL. POWERS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE DECISION AND ORDER Index No. 2020-1411 RJI No. 46-1-2020-0598 SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, On Behalf of BRIAN POMMER and On Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated Members of the SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, and BRIAN POMMER, Petitioners-Plaintiffs, -~t- CITY OF SCHENECTADY, MICHAEL C. EIDENS, in his official capacity as Public Safety Commissioner for the City of Schenectady, CITY OF SCHENECTADY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondents-Defendants. NOTICE: PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 55 OF THE CML PRACTICE LAW AND RULES, AN APPEAL FROM THIS JUDGMENT MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN 30 DAYS AITER SERVICE BY A PARTY UPON THE APPELLANT OF A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT WITH PROOF OF ENTRYEXCEPTTHATWHERESERVICEOFTHEJUDGMENTISBY MAIL PURSUANT TO RULE 2103(B)(2) or 2103(B)(6), THE ADDITIONAL FIVE DAYS PROVIDED SHALL APPLY, REGARDLESS OF WHICH PARTY SERVES THE J UDGMENT WITH NOTICE OF ENTRY. [* 2] APPE RANCES: John P. Calareso, Jr., Esq., Gleason, Dmm, Walsh & 0 'Shea, 40 Beaver Street, Albany, .Y 12207; Co11mel for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, chenectady Police Benevolent ssoc1ation, o n behalf of Brian Pommer and on behalf of all o ther similarly situated members of the Schenectady Police Benevolent Associatio n, and Brian P ommer; Andreu; B. Ko/din, Esq., Assistant Corporation Counsel, City H all, 105 Jay Street, Room 201, ~chc nec tady, ew York 12305; Counsel for Respondents-Defendants, City of Schenectady, Michael C. E idens, in his official capacity as Public .. afety Commissio ner for the City o f Schenectady, and the City o f Schenectady Police Department; 1\1.ichae/Sisitzky, Esq.,Julissa Reynoso, Esq., Sofia Arguello, Esq., La11ren E. Dux stad, Esq. , Brett Waters, Esq., Erin Baldwin, Esq., Samantha &tppenthal, Esq., WI TO & TRA \'{IN LLP, 200 Park .A venue, ew York, New York 10016; Counsel far Intervenor-Parry, cw Yo rk Civil Liberties U nion. HON . MARKL. POWERS, JSC T he issue before this Court is whether a police o fficer's personnel and disciplinary record, to the extent it contains uncharged or unsubstantiated allegations of misco nduct, or founded charges resolved witho ut professional discipline, must be disclosed in response to a Freedom of Information Lau1 (FOIL) request, in light of the repeal of Civil Rights Law (CRL) §50-a, on June 12, 2020. Certainly, the repeal, which took effect immediately, removed the blanket o f secrecy with which law enforcement records, statewide, were previously cloaked in their entirety. However, the scope of the general public's reach, through the simple submission of a FOIL reques t, as far as the content of such records is the question now 2 [* 3] put to municipalities around the state. 1 At the o utset, the Court recognizes that strong lobbying by advocacy groups, coupled with recent nationwide pro tests in the name of racial equality and demanding massive reform, were the catalysts for the statutory repeal of CRL §50-a. Indeed, our natio n's recent history is forever marked by anger and sorrow surrounding controversial arrests invo lving the use and degree of force, particularly as against black men, women and children. Although not an ex haustive rendition, police-caused fatalities o f mino rities, which garnered national media attention, peaceful public o utcry and / or violent social unrest include: the death o f E ric Garner, o n July 17, 2014, resulting from po lice cho ke hold, during arrest for selling untaxed cigarettes; the death of Tamir Rice, a child, on November 22, 2014, who was carrying a toy gun; the death o f Freddie Gray, on 1\ pril 19, 2015, caused by spinal cord injuries sustained while already in police custody; the dea th o f E lijah McClain, on August 24, 2019, after being cuffed, ad ministered ketamine (a sedative), and then held against the ground in a choke hold fo r more than fi fteen minutes; the death o f Breonna Taylor, on March 13, 2020, after officers blindly fired multiple sho ts into her ho me while executing a search warrant; the death of Daniel Prude, o n March 23, 2020, after being held face down to the pavement in excess o f two minutes with a "spit hood" over his head; and the death of George :rloyd, on May 25, Upon in formation and belief, at the time o f this writing, on-line databases are in the process of develo pment, geared toward improved and more efficient respo nses to f.'O IL requests, as well as reduced costs for compilation, reproductio n, and consistent records retentio n policies. T he extent, if any, to which such database design has been delayed by the o n-going global health pandemic (COVID-19) is unknown to this Court. 3 [* 4] 2020, while pinned to the ground with an officer's knee against his neck for more than eight minutes, during arrest for possession o f a counterfeit $20.00 bill. Each o f these deaths (and others not specifically referenced herein) sparked large-scale demonstrations decrying police brutality and systemic racism. The circumstances from which the instant matter emanates is, gratefully, not one in which a death resulted. However, on July 6, 2020, P atrolman Brian Pommer (hereinafter, "Patrolman Pommer"), a 46 year old white police o fficer, employed by the City o f Schenectady Police D epartment since 2013, arres ted Yugeshwar Gaindarpersaud (hereinafter, "Gaindarpersaud"), a 31 year old Indian man , in the course o f ques tioning him about a neighbor dispute. G aindarpersaud, who was unarmed, ran from Patrolman Pommer and, in response, Patrolman Pommer pursued G aindarpersaud, subduing him with the use o f physical force. 2 Given that our nation was gripped in demonstrations over the death o f George Floyd merely six weeks earlier, parallels were drawn, locally, with respect to Patrolman Pommer's arres t o f Gainderpersaud, prompting public interest in Patrolman Pommer's prior disciplinary record, if any. Sp ecifically, on July 8, 2020, Michael Goodwin, a journalist with the Times Union, a newspaper in wide general circulation within New York State's Capital District, submitted a FOIL request to the City's Records Access 2 Upon informatio n and belief, Gaindarpersaud was charged with criminal mischief as to his neighbor and with resisting arrest as to Patrolman P ommer. T hese charges have since been dismissed or adjourned in contemplatio n o f dismissal. Upon fur ther information and belief, an internal investigatio n resulted in disciplinary charges brought against P atro lman Po mmer, which have since been resolved with a six day suspension, witho ut pay, and mandatory additional training. 4 [* 5] Officer, seeking Patrolman Pommer's personnel record. On July 15, 2020 and eptember 30, 2020, respectively, the New York Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter, " the NYCLU") submined FOIL requests, initially seeking Patrolman Pommer's disciplinary records and, subsequently, seeking the disciplinary record s of all officers in tlie City's employ. The instant combined Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Article 78 special proceeding and declaratory judgment action, was brought on eptember 9, 2020, by the Schenectady Police Benevolent Associatio n (hereinafter, " the PBA"), a labor orgaruzauo n and the exclusive representative for all police officers of the City o f chenectady, including Patrolman Po mmer, (collectively, "the petitioners'') seeking to prevent the City of Schenectady, its Public Safety Commissioner and its Police Department (hereinafter, collectively, "the respo ndents") from including particular documents, and those associated with them, within their response to the pending FOIL requests. The petitioners further seek to have this Court direct the respondents to redact any and all references to conduct which was uncharged, un fo unded, unsubstantiated, settled without discipline and/ or otherwise resolved or exonerated, from the records of all officers, including Patrolman Pommer, prior to any disclosure. The particular documents at issue are: a Counseling o tice, dated April 15, 2020, which Patrolman Pommer received relative to his response to a domestic call o n November 10, 2019; and a Notice o f Potential Charges, drafted o n May 4, 2020, which was never signed, dated, no r served upo n Patrolman Pommer, but arose from his handling of a group gathering outside a local business (Bumpy's Polar Freeze), relative to COVID-19 restrictions and for which he received a Notice of Discipline o n May 21, 5 [* 6] 2020, which was, in turn, resolved via a Settlement Agreement on June 1, 2020. Based upon a good cause showing by petitioners that there was an imminent intention, on the respo ndents part, to disclose these records, in respo nse to the FOIL requests, albeit in redacted form, this Court granted, on September 9, 2020 (commensurate with the commencement of the proceeding) a temporary restraining Order prohibiting any further release of information from Patrolman Pommer's personnel record. The Court also directed the Schenectady County Clerk to seal the filings relative to this matter, pursuant to 22 New York Code of Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) §216.1. Shortly tl1ereafter, by a bench ruling on September 23, 2020, which was reduced to writing and signed as an O rder of this Court on September 30, 2020, the respondents were directed to release those portions of Patrolman Pommer's disciplinary records as pertain to actual findings o f misconduct, together with the evidence underlying such findings. T he New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) submitted a formal motion seeking intervenor-party status, via Order to Show Cause (OSC) filed on October 13, 2020. T his application was granted, without genuine opposition, and pursuant to this Co urt's discretion, under CPLR §7802(d). THE LAW AND DISCUSSION The Freedom ofInformation Law (FOIL), codified at New York S fate Public Officers Law Article 6, §§84-90, is rooted in a presumption favoring access to all agency records, 6 [* 7] without the need o f the person requesting access to provide any reason. In short, absent an exp ress statutory exception allowing an agency to withhold disclosure o f any reques ted public record, its availability is presumed . The theory is that "public record s belong to the public." 1 he implementation o f FOIL is overseen by the N ew York State Committee on O pen Government and this Committee issues advisory opinio ns, extolling the importance of transparency so as to expose agency abuses which pose threats to public health and safety. T hroughout the more than 40 year reign o f CRL 50-a, - - fro m its enactment in 1976 until its repeal in 2020 - - , police disciplinary records were shielded from the public eye (unless an o fficer consented to their disclosure or a Court O rder was obtained) . CRL§50-a'sexistence squarely secured police misco nduct records and, especially, placed them beyond the reach o f those who might o therwise use them for impeachment purposes. Impo rtantly, their no n-disclosure did no t turn o n whether misco nduct was substantiated, nor whether discipline was imposed, nor whether charges were merely under co nsideration . Rather, CRL §50-a rendered all records o f police conduct or misconduct essentially invulnerable. Moreover, despite litigation to repudiate or, at least, scale back CRL50-a's blanket safeguard against disclosure, its protections, prior to 2020, continued to receive expansive interpretation by the New York State Court o f Appeals. See, e.g., Matter of Prisoners' Legal Servs. oJNY v. New York State Dept. ofCorrectional Services, 73 NY2d 26 [Ct. 7 [* 8] ofAppeals, 1988), wherein the high Court ruled that inmate grievances against correction officers constituted the "very sort of record intended to be kept confidential under CRL §50-a. See also lvlatterofDai!J Gazette Co. v. Ciry ofSchenectady, 93 NY2d 145 [Ct. ofAppeals, 1999), wherein the high Court ruled that records of police officers, who engaged in unruly condu ct while off-duty, were protected from clisclosure in light of the risk that such records might otherwise be used to "embarrass or humiliate" them. In fact, it wa merely two years ago, in a holding viewed as "the high water mark" for the protection afforded police personnel records, that the high Court again reiterated the need to shield police officers from the disclosure of potentially embarrassing record s. See J\llatterofNew York Civ. L iberties Union v. New York Ciry Police Dept, 32 NY3d 556 [Ct. ofAppeals, 2018), wherein civilian complaints made to a review board, which may or may not be referred for cliscipline, were held non-disclosable based upon CRL §50-a. In a nutshell, CRL §50-a was interpreted broadly and applied so as to afford maximum confidentiality to all law enforcement disciplinary records. tate lawmakers, however, responding to public demand, dramatically changed the landscape on] une 12, 2020. On this date, a package of sweeping statutory reforms was enacted in combination with the complete repeal of CRL §50-a. The measures taken by the legislature were widely lauded as a giant leap forward in government accountability and transparency, focused on resto ring the public's trust in the integrity of our police force. As a result, access to law enforcement perso nnel records, inclucling disciplinary history, is now governed by FOIL alone, with key provisions of FOIL having been 8 [* 9] amended accordingly. Specifically, there are newly enacted provisions to POL §86, to wit: the addition o f subdivision (6) [de.fining ''law enforcement disciplinary records']; the addition of subdivision (7) [de.fining "law enforcement disczplinary proceeding'J; the addition o f subdivision (8) [de.fining "law enforcement agenry'J and the addition of subdivision (9) [de.fining "technical infraction']. There are also newly enacted provisions to POL §87 to wit: the addition o f subdivisions (4-a) and (4-b) {providing far the mandatory or discretionary redaction of certain information prior to release]. New provisions were also adopted in POL §89, to wit: the addition of subdivisions (2-b) and (2-c) [likewise each p roviding/or certain redactions prior to release). 3 At the same time, POL §87(2)(b), which provides an exemption for records which "if disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted invasion o f personal privacy," was not changed. It is, however, POL §89(2)(b) which sets forth a non-exhaustive list of the types of information which, if released, would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Thus, with the repeal o f CRL§50-a, FOIL requests for law enforcement personnel records are now to be considered in a light that makes them available unless a particular record, or p ortion thereof, falls within a recently enacted statutory exception or a preexisting one which the legislature left unaltered. It is POL §87(2)(b)'s exceptions for records that, if disclosed, would constitute an "unwarranted invasion of personal 3 Within three days of these am endments, compatible statutory revisions were made to the CRL at§§79-11(2) and 79-p; Exec11tive Law§70-b; and the Police Statistics and/lcco11nlabi/iry Act (STAT), the latter o f which itself amends p rovisio ns of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Judiciary Laiv and the Executive Law. 9 [* 10] privacy," that occupies the greatest significance to the instan t matter. H ere, albeit the petitio ners insistence that no public interest is served by the disclosure o f the Counseling Notice, the Notice of Potential Charges, the Notice o f Discipline and / o r the Settlement Agreement, this Court is hard-pressed to find that any o f these particular documents fall within the types of record s to which POL §89(2)(b)(Iviiz) ascribes a right o f " personal privacy. "Nor does it particularly strengthen petitioners position to emphasize thatPOL §89(2)(b)(I-viii), by its express language, does not provide an exhaustive list of personally private materials. While there is no argument that the Settlement Agreement contains disciplinary info rmatio n based on a founded charge(s), this Court acknowledges, and co ncurs with, the petitioners assertion that the Counseling Notice was not discipline but, merely, the no ting of a job deficiency. Likewise, the Notice of Poten tial Charges does not contain any specifications, nor was it even served upon P atrolman P ommer. The assertion by petitioners that unsubstantiated charges, if disclosed, have the po tential to cause embarrassment and / or give rise to officer safety issues is, indeed, made even more concerning by the possibility that veracity may be completely lacking. T hese points advanced by the petitio ners are well-taken and credited by the Court. H owever, there is simply no ambiguity, in this Court's view, as to the legislature's instructio ns when responding to FOIL reques ts. In terms of public access, it is of little consequence that records contain unsubstantiated charges or mere allegations of misconduct. Where counseling pertains to job per formance, or allegatio ns relate to public duty, such reco rds 10 [* 11] are publicly accessible, via FOIL request, regardless of reputational injury or validity. It is not the veracity o f the allegations but, instead, whether they relate to the discharge of public duties which guides the analysis. (See Matter ofNew York Times Co. v. City of N .Y Fire Dept., 4 NY3d 477 [Ct. ofA ppeals, 2005)). " Privacy" is, o f course, a subjective iss ue for individuals but it is not as to public employee records. Public employees have less entitlement to privacy than do non-public employees, at least where job performance is concerned. This is due to the high priority placed on accountability. Stated otherwise, where records relate to performance o f public duties, no privacy right exists. It may well be true that a public employee (including a police officer) and/ or his collective bargaining unit or labor union, views a particular record as private or embarrassing or its disclosure as a personal safety risk but, it is nonetheless now within the ambit of disclosure. The current statutory scheme, while recognizing a privacy invasion, clearly does not deem it to be "unwarranted." Indeed, pursuant to POL§89(2-c), the public's right of access may even extend to "technical infractions" (minor rule violations related solely to administrative departmental rules and not of public concern), as included within the meaning of "law enforcement disciplinary records," albeit with the agency having some discretion for redactions. Similarly, the documents sought by the pending FOIL requests do not fall within the exception to disclosure for materials that are "inter-agency or intra-agency," under POL §87(2)(g)(iii), In the balance between the public's right of access and the impact of disclosure 11 [* 12] upon the officer, the legislature has now made clear that the latter (the impact upo n the officer) must bow to the former (the public's right of access). It is unavailing as a basis to deny disclosure that an officer may not have had a full and fair opportunity to contest any misconduct charge. Therefore, while the petitioners posit that the items sought herein arc, at least in part, not disclosable due to the lack of a hearing, the new statutory scheme does not deem an officer's lack of opportunity to contest allegations, at a fair hearing, to serve as a basis to deny public disclosure. In other words, such lack of opportunity to the officer does not, standing alone, establish an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus, although this Court concurs with the petitioners that a fair determination as to the veracity of a misconduct complaint would seem to be appropriate, such course is not compatible with the legislature's clear directives. This Court also declines to adopt the petitioners reliance upon the T qylor Liw. It is axiomatic that the public right of access to records under FOIL cannot be bargained away in collective bargaining between management and labor. Next, the Petitioners allege a denial of due process (New York Constitution, Article 1, §6) since the S econd Class Cities Liw (SCCL) §137 and the Schenectady Police Department Manual, Policy 1038, were not followed. However, the disclosure of police personnel records, albeit possessing the potential fo r reputational damage, does not amount to a cognizable protected interest under the fed eral or state constitutions, without more, such as, for example, the loss of employment. (See, Patterson v. Ciry of Utica, 12 [* 13] 370 F.3d 322 {2d Circuit 2004],· and DiBlasio, M.D. v. N ovello, 344 .F.3d 292 [2d Circuit 2003)).4 Here, the petitio ners cannot develop a valid claim upon constitutional arguments because Pommer has no t suffered a tangible loss. Moreover, it is beyond cavil that legislative acts enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. This Court finds that the petitioners have not advanced a persuasive argu ment as to the governing statutes being in conflict with due process, equal pro tection o r any o ther provision o f the federal or state constitutions. s with their arguments sounding in the unwarranted invasion o f privacy, the petitioners claims th at the respondents intended compliance with the FOIL requests would be arbitrary and capricious, or an error of law, also fail. "It is fundamental that a co urt, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent o f the Legislature" (Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist, 9 1 NY2d 577, 583 (Ct. ofAppeals, 1998) quoting Tompkins v. Hunter, 149 NY11 7 (Ct. ofAppeals, 1896). The repeal o f CRL§50-a reflects the legislature's intention to alter the processing of FOIL requests seeking law enforcement disciplinary records from disclosure of the least possible material to the greatest permissible disclosure. J\ s fo r retroactivity, it is generally true that new statutes arc presumed to apply prospectively. General Construction Law (GCL) §§93 and 94; see also Matter of Regina Metro. 4 uch claims are o ften referred to as "stigma-plus claims," because they involve an injury to reputation (the "stigma") coupled with loss of a property interest (the " plus"). ~ tigma-plus claims require a showing of bo th a derogatory statement, false in nature, which injures reputation and the taking or alteration o f a pro perty interest, status o r right. (See Pa11/ v. Davis, -124 U. S. 693 [S11preme Court efthe United Stales, 1976)). 13 [* 14] Co., LLC v. New York Stale Div. of Rous. & Community Reneival, 35 NY3d 332 (Ct. of Appeals, 2020) quoti.ngMajewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist, 91NY2d577, 584 (Ct. ofAppeals, 1998), thereby affordi ng individuals an opportunity to know what the law is and to co nform accordingly. [Landgrafv. USI Film Products, et al, 5 11 U.S. 244, 265 (United States Supreme Court, 1994}). Nevertheless, it is also true that statutory retroactivity to matters preceding enactment is often sanctioned, particularly where, as here, strong public policy considerations serve as the foundation for the new statutory scheme. In this Court's view, even despite a risk of "over-transparency," our state legislature has spoken loudly toward its stated goal of imp roving racial discourse, particularly with regard to policing and especially as to policing of minorities and those suffering with mental health disorders. Here, there is strong evidence that retroactive effect was intended by the legislature. Therefore, regardless whether unsubstantiated or unfounded or exonerated or dismissed , or regardless of whether not yet fully determined, or regardless of whether founded but without discipline imposed, the respondents herein cannot determine to deny the sought disclosure. finding that Patrolman Pommer's personnel record, or any portion thereof, be withheld or redacted on the basis that its relea e would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, cannot be realized by petitioners, as to do so would render the legislature's repeal of C~§50-a utterly meaningless simply by the respondents theorizing that the record (or any portion thereoQ is, in their opinio n, "private." Given that an easy ability to render the new statutory scheme meaningless 14 [* 15] could not possibly have been the intended by the legislature, this Court is constrained to deny the petition and complaint in their entirety. In conclusion, the last thing intended by this Court's decision herein is that it be viewed as a vilification of law enforcement officers, who, bravely dedicated to public service, arc also all too often losing their lives in the line of duty. This Court appreciates petitioners position that the reputational harm which can result fro m the disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations, can be irreparable. It is, however, the Court's role to apply the current statutory scheme to the facts before it and, on these specific facts, to credit petitioners' interpretation would be to sub-vert CRL§50-a's repeal. In our current times, our state lawmakers have seen fit to require disclosure of police personnel reco rd s, upon FOIL request, even when such records reflect no more than allegations. They, presumably, did so in the name of opening the door to transparency, and having done so, it would be palpably improper for this Court to close it. It strikes the Court that the legislature intended not just a change in law but, rather, a change in culture. It is the Court's functio n to enforce the current laws in a manner that reflects that intention. finally, notwithstanding any greater societal significance which any actual or interested party, or the media, may seek to ascribe to the instant ruling, it is, in actuality, narrowly confined to the particular FOILrequests outstanding as to Patrolman Pommer and the members of the Schenectady Police Department. Any broader applicability as to other locales o r other FOIL requests will necessarily have to be determined on their own specific merits. 15 [* 16] THE COURT'S RULING OW, therefore, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that thr p<'titio11k omplai11t is DENIED 1111<1 DISMISSED with pn'j nd iC'('; a 11<1 it is f11 rt hr1· ORDERED tlmt, eff<'d.ivr with the entry or thi. Decision h.Y thr f ntPrv<'nor- Part~· (thr NYC LlJ), with t lw Sc·IH'll('Cta.dy C'o1111t~· Cl<'rk, and sc• rvic·c• of an <'llt<'r<'cl <'Op~· 11 po11 co11 ns<' I ror t I w nanwd PP t i ti one rs and Hrsponden ts, t hP '1'<'111 pora r~· Hrst ra i11 i ng OnlPr sha 11 be' automatica 11.Y ,·;u•at<'d and lw of 110 furthrr forc·c• or rffrct, wlH'rc'upon Hc'spo11dc'11fs shal I proc·c'C'd swi flil_y in complyi 11g with thr pc•11d i ng POlL n'cp1c•sts t.o i ndndr Pat.rol rna,n Po111111c'r's c·ou nseli ng 11otic·r, (draft) 11ot.ic·p or pot.cntia,I <'ha.rg<'s, NotieP of' Discipline and SPttlrm<'nt Agrrrm<'nt, aJl of' whi<'h shall he• without 1whtct.io11 r xcC'pt insofar a.s Patrolman Po111111c'r's, a nd an.r oth<'r officrr(s), homr addrrss, prrsonal contad information (c<'ll piton<' and <'lllitil) and Social SC'c·urit_,. N11 mbr rs; a ncl it i. fn rt h<' r ORDERED t hat, aH th<' Court is a.war<' that discipliuary <'hargc'(s) prrtai11i11g to Pa.trol 11111.11 Po111111<'r's <LtT<'st, of' Yug<.c•shw;t.r Oai 11cla.qJPJ'Si1Wl, which pro111pt,c'<1 tlw rxisting FOIL rrqnests, hav<' b('('n rC'solvC'd during tlw pc 1Hlrnc.Y of this sp<•<' ial procC'ed i ng, tlw Court's clc•tision lwrein . ha 11 hr dr<'med to i llC'l ud <' thr n•corcls a.<.; to snch di:tiplinr, without the• rn•rcl for a111u11<'1Hlrd or supplP111r11ta l FOIL r<'(] ll<'st to those alrrady t><'nding; it is furt hrr 1 ORDERED that, t.hr1·c• l><•i 11g no f11rtltr1· rc•I ic>f so ught, th is 11111J,t<•1· is elos<'d with t.his Drcision c·o11st.it.11ting tl1r fin;tl Order oft.his Court. HOJ.MARKLI>{)WERS' SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Signed: D ecember 29, 2020 at chenectady, ew York 16 [* 17] PAPERS CONSIDERED Petitioners-Plaintiffs' Verified Petition and Complaint, dated September 3, 2020, with annexed Exhibits A - E; Petitioners-Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law, dated September 9, 2020; Interveno r-Party Order to Show Cause, dated October 13, 2020, Attorney Affirmation of Michael Sisitzky, Esq., dated October 7, 2020, in Support of NYCLU's 1otion to Intervene, with annexed exhibits 1 - 8; and Attorney Affirmation of Brett Waters, Esq., dated October 7, 2020, in Support of NYCLU's Motion to Intervene, with annexed exhibits A - C; Petitioners-Plaintiffs' Reply, dated October 27, 2020, to Respo ndents-Defendants' Supplemental Brief in Support of Verified Answer, with annexed Exhibit A; Intervenor-Parry Memorandum of Law, dated November 10, 2020, in Opposition to Petitioners-Plaintiffs' Verified Petition and Complaint, with annexed Exhibits A and B; Attorney Affirmation of Brett Waters, Esq., dated November 10, 2020, in Support of Interveno r-Party's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner-Plaintiffs' Verified Petition and Complaint, with annexed Exhibits A and B; Petitioners-Plaintiffs' Reply, dated November 18, 2020, to Intervenor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioners-Plaintiffs' Verified Petition and Complaint. 17

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.