Marefat v Rivera

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Marefat v Rivera 2020 NY Slip Op 30568(U) January 16, 2020 Supreme Court, Bronx County Docket Number: 34623/2018E Judge: Mary Ann Brigantti Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [*FILED: 1] BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/28/2020 10:10 AM INDEX NO. 34623/2018E NYSCEF DOC. NO. 48 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/28/2020 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF BRONX ------------------------------------------------------------------)( TALA MAREFAT, Plaintiff, -againstHAILYN P. RIVERA and CITY BRONX LEASING TWO INC., Defendants. 'Index N o.: 34623/20 l 8E ------------------------------------------------------------------)( HON. MARY ANN BRIGANTI!: Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment in her favor on the issue of liability . This is an action to recover damages for alleged personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff, T ALA MAREFAT, in amotor vehicle accident, which occwTed on or about January 22, 2016, at 11 :25 a.m., on Webster Avenue near the intersection of 170111 Street, in the Bronx, New York. Defendant, HAILYN P. RIVERA ,was the driver of the vehicle owned by Defendant CITY BRON)( LEASING TWO INC. In suppo1i of her motion, Plaintiffs submissions include the pleadings, Police Accident R eport, and Plaintiff s Affidavit and deposition transcript. In opposition, Defendants' Counsel submits his bare Affirmation. According to Plaintiff, she was driv ing her vehicle on Webster Avenue, and stopped at a red traffic light at the intersection of 170111 Street. She was fully stopped at the red light, fo r about 15-20 seconds, when her vehicle was rear-ended 2 of 6 [*FILED: 2] BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/28/2020 10:10 AM NYSCEF DOC. NO. 48 INDEX NO. 34623/2018E RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/28/2020 by the vehicle owned and operated by Defendants, causing Plaintiff to sustain personal injuries. (Plaintiff Affidavit dated November 5, 20 19). Vehicle and Traffic Law § l 129(a) "Following too closely", provides that: "The driver of a motor vehicle shall not fo llow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway." The Court of Appeals has reiterated that: "It is well settled that a "rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle" " {Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]). "Plaint iff established her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that her vehicle was stopped at a red light w hen it was rear-ended by defendants' vehicle" (Vasquez v Chimborazo, 155 AD3d 432, 433 [1 st Dept 20 17]; see Rodriguez v Garcia, 154 AD3d 581 [1 st Dept 20 17]; see Castaneda v DO&CO NY Catering, Inc., 144 AD3d 407 [1st Dept 20 16]). " "A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehic le establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle, and imposes a duty on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate, nonnegligent explanation for the accident" (Matos v Sanchez, 147 AD3d 585, 586, 47 NYS3d 307 [1st Dept 201 7])" (Urena v GVC Ltd., 160 AD3d 467, 467 [1 st Dept 20 18]). Accordingly, P laintiff made a prima fac ie showing of her entitlement to 2 3 of 6 [*FILED: 3] BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/28/2020 10:10 AM NYSCEF DOC. NO. 48 INDEX NO. 34623/2018E RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/28/2020 partial summary judgment on the issue ofDefendants' liability by attesting that Defendants' vehicle rear-ended Plaintiffs vehicle whi le it was stopped at a red traffic light. Thus, the burden shifted to Defendants to advance a non-negligent explanation fo r the accident. Herein, however, Defendants, the persons having knowledge of the relevant facts concerning the c ircumstances sun-ounding the happening of the accident, have not submitted their own affidavit; and, in their Counsel's Affirmation, there is merely a recitation of general principals; and so Defendants have not made the requisite showing. It is well-established that where the submission on the part of the party opposing a summary judgment motion "consisted only of the bare affirm ation of [his] ... attorney who demonstrated no personal knowledge of the manner in which the accident occmTed [, s]uch an affirmation by counsel is without evidentiary value and thus unavailing" (Zuckerman v New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980]). In Zuckerman, as here, the opponent of the motion proffered no affidavit made by a party or eyewitness having knowledge of the relevant facts. There was no explanation for the failure to submit affid avits. (Zuckerman v New York, 49 NY2d at 563). A p laintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on liab ility was properly granted, where, as here, in "opposition to plaintiffs prima facie showing, 3 4 of 6 [*FILED: 4] BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/28/2020 10:10 AM NYSCEF DOC. NO. 48 INDEX NO. 34623/2018E RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/28/2020 defendants failed to submit any evidence to raise a triable issue of fact, and instead relied solely upon ... the arguments of counsel ... [, who] claimed no personal knowledge of the accident, his affirmation has no probative value" (Thompson v Pizzaro, 155 AD3d 423, 423 [I st Dept 2017]). In Thompson, the Court also held that "Plaintiffs motion was not premature. Depositions are unnecessary, since defendants have personal knowledge of the facts, yet "failed to meet their obligation of laying bare their proof and presenting evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact" " (Thompson v Pizzaro, 155 AD3d at 423). Accordingly, Defendants did not present a sufficient non-negligent explanation for the happening of the accident. In this regard, "a driver is expected to maintain enough distance between himself and cars ahead of him so as to avoid collisions w ith stopped vehicles, taking into account weather and road conditions" (Matos v Sanchez, 147 AD3d 585, 586 [1 st Dept 2017]; see Urena v GVC Ltd., 160 AD3d 467, 467 [1 st Dept 2018]). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion, for partial summary judgment in her favor on liability, is granted, to the extent that Defendants are found liable for the happening of the accident, and Defendant' s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident; and that Plaintiff was free fro m comparative fault for the happening of this rear-end collision. However, this Court makes no determination as to other issues herein, such as whether Plaintiff' s alleged injuries were 4 5 of 6 [*FILED: 5] BRONX COUNTY CLERK 01/28/2020 10:10 AM NYSCEF DOC. NO. 48 INDEX NO. 34623/2018E RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/28/2020 proximately caused by the negligence of the Defendants, and whether Plaintiff sustained a "serious injury" within the meaning of the Insurance Law. This constitutes the decision and order of this Court. Dated: l \ 1\o , 2020 HO't.a~~TTI, 5 6 of 6 J.S.C.

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