Matter of Dill (T.L.)
Annotate this CaseDecided on June 2, 2020
Supreme Court, Oneida County
In the Matter of the Application of Danielle Dill, Acting Executive Director of Central New York Psychiatric Center, Petitioner, for an Order Authorizing the Involuntary Treatment of
T.L., A Patient at Central New York Psychiatric Center, Consec. No. 690020, Respondent.
EFCA2020-000918
For Petitioner: New York State Office of the Attorney General
Letitia James, Esq., Attorney General
207 Genesee Street, Room 508
Utica, New York 13501
By: Thomas Trace, Esq., Associate Attorney
For Respondent: Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Fourth Judicial Department
Kevin D. Wilson, Esq., Acting Director
207 Genesee Street, 16th Floor
Utica, New York 13501
By: Joseph M. Betar, Esq., Attorney
Louis P. Gigliotti, J.
Pending before the Court is an application filed by the Acting Executive Director of the Central New York Psychiatric Center, seeking an order authorizing the involuntary treatment of T.L. (hereinafter "Respondent"), who is a patient at the facility. The Court conducted a hearing on May 6, 2020, at which time the Respondent's co-treating psychiatrist testified for Petitioner.
In the course of receiving the doctor's testimony, the Court learned that Respondent had voluntarily taken his prescribed antipsychotic medicine since April 19, 2020. Although Respondent's decision in this regard came nearly two weeks after the doctor signed his Evaluation for Treatment over Objection, which was submitted in support of Petitioner's [*2]application, it nevertheless preceded the filing of the petition by 10 days and preceded the hearing date by nearly 2½ weeks. Petitioner does not dispute this timeline.
At the close of Petitioner's evidence, Respondent's counsel moved for a directed verdict, citing Matter of Bosco (Awet G.), 137 AD3d 1731 [4th Dept 2016]. The Court reserved decision. Respondent did not present any evidence. After the record was closed, the Court heard oral arguments. Respondent's counsel incorporated by reference the same points raised as part of his motion. The Court again reserved decision, and asked both parties to submit letter briefs addressing not only Awet G., but also 14 NYCRR 527.8 (cited within Awet G.) and Matter of Michael L., 26 AD3d 381 [2d Dept 2006]. By letter dated May 7, 2020, Respondent's counsel withdrew the motion for directed verdict. By letter dated May 13, 2020, the Court confirmed that the requested briefing should still be submitted.
In Awet G., the Fourth Department dismissed a petition for treatment over objection based upon the fact that the patient voluntarily took the prescribed medication two months prior to the filing of the petition. (See 137 AD3d at 1732). Cited in support of this decision is a case issued from the Second Department, in which the appellate court modified an order authorizing treatment over objection, so that the order would include only those medications the patient refused to take and exclude those medications the patient opted to take. (See Jay S. v. Barber, 118 AD3d 803 [2d Dept 2014]).
The Attorney General's office argues that Awet G. is distinguishable based upon the differences in the length of time that each patient took medication prior to a court hearing. In essence, the Attorney General's office maintains that Awet G. establishes a two-month minimum before a patient can be considered to have consented to treatment. The Court questions the soundness of this argument, given the Fourth Department's reliance on 14 NYCRR 527.8(c)(6) within Awet G. This regulation provides that a "patient or inmate patient may at any time withdraw his or her objection to the proposed treatment" (emphasis added). This subsection further provides that, after the facility notifies MHLS of a patient's withdrawn objection and subsequent agreement to a course of treatment, and absent a renewed objection by the patient or attorney, said treatment may be commenced 24 hours later. (See id.).[FN1]
Respondent's counsel also reminds the Court of its unpublished decision in Matter of E.E., Oneida County Supreme Court Index No. CA2019-1798. In that case, the Court dismissed a petition for treatment over objection brought by a civil hospital upon receiving uncontroverted proof that the patient had voluntarily taken her prescribed medication two weeks prior to the hearing. Respondent's counsel argues that the similar fact pattern in this case should point to a similar outcome. The Court agrees.
What gave the Court pause at the conclusion of oral argument in this case was the Matter of Michael L. decision, which appeared among search results following a quick inquiry by the Court after closing statements were received. In Michael L., the Court considered whether the [*3]hospital had met its burden of proof as to capacity, even though the patient was voluntarily taking medications other than those that were the subject of the treatment over objection petition. While Michael L. did not expressly state that a patient's lack of capacity negated a patient's ability to decide whether to consent to treatment, the attorneys were asked to discuss this issue in their written submissions to this Court.
Having read the attorneys' papers, and with time to reflect further, the Court concurs with Respondent's counsel that Michael L. is not controlling in this particular matter. The Court of Appeals has made clear that a predicate to the question of capacity is the patient's refusal to consent to a proposed course of treatment. (See Rivers v. Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 497 [1986] [explaining that a judicial determination as to capacity is required only "where the State's police power is not implicated, and the patient refuses to consent to the administration of antipsychotic drugs"]). Since Respondent in this case is not refusing the prescribed antipsychotic medication, the Court is not presented with the question of whether he lacks capacity.
Having considered Petitioner's evidence and the legal arguments of the parties, and in light of the uncontroverted evidence that Respondent is voluntarily complying with his psychiatrist's recommended course of treatment, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Petition herein is hereby dismissed without prejudice; and it is further,
ORDERED, that this file shall be sealed by the Oneida County Clerk and shall be exhibited only to the parties to this proceeding, or to other interested parties upon the order of the Court.
Dated: June 2, 2020
Louis P. Gigliotti, AJSC Footnotes
Footnote 1:Respondent's counsel notes in his affirmation dated May 22, 2020 that MHLS received no such notice in this case. As this particular issue is not squarely before the Court, it will not be addressed within this Decision. The Attorney General's office however, is encouraged to review this regulation with counsel for the New York State Office of Mental Health to determine whether CNYPC is in compliance with the regulatory requirements of 14 NYCRR 527.8.
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