People v Kurlak
Annotate this CaseDecided on February 4, 2019
Justice Court of the Town of Webster, Monroe County
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
Stefan A. Kurlak, Defendant.
18090082
Heather Manly, Esq. Assistant District Attorney
Stefan A. Kurlak, Pro Se
Thomas J. DiSalvo, J.
History of the Case
The defendant was charged on September 4, 2018 at 5:22 A.M. with Disobeying a Traffic Control Device in violation of VTL § 1110 (a). He was issued a simplified traffic information as defined by CPL §§ 1.20 (5) and 100.10 (2) (a), by Webster Police Officer Katie Hillyard. On the initial appearance date of October 17, 2018 the defendant was arraigned on the charge and advised of his rights to obtain an attorney, a right to a trial and right to obtain a supporting deposition. At that time the defendant requested a supporting deposition. The court issued an Order for Supporting Deposition on October 23, 2018 to Officer Katie Hillyard. An affidavit of service, dated October 25, 2018, was filed with the court by the Webster Police Department, attesting that a supporting deposition was forwarded to the defendant at his home address. A copy of the electronically generated supporting deposition, affirmed under penalty of perjury on October 25, 2018, was also filed with the court by the police. At the conclusion of the arraignment, the matter was set down for trial at the request of the defendant.
Facts of the Case
VTL § 1110 (a) states as follows:
"Every person shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable to him placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless otherwise directed by a traffic or police officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized [*2]emergency vehicle in this title."The supporting deposition stated under the section entitled "Additional Information" as follows: "Patrol was stationary on Holt Road facing North. Patrol observed the defendant who was driving the above listed vehicle south on Holt Road at a high rate of speed. Patrol visually estimating the speed to be 50mph and confirmed the speed with the Stalker radar at 53mph in a 35mph zone."
Also, the officer recorded on said deposition a statement made to her by the defendant, in which he allegedly stated "I was going a bit fast".
The matter came on for trial on January 23, 2018. The court explained to the defendant how the trial would proceed. Before starting the trial the court also advised the defendant that if he decided not to testify that no adverse inference would be drawn against him. The People then called its one and only witness, namely Officer Katie Hillyard. The officer testified to her length of service with the Webster Police Department, her training in general and her ability to estimate the speed of a moving vehicle. She testified to that on the date and time in question she observed the defendant's 2015 white Mercedes heading southbound on Holt Road in the Town of Webster going at a high rate of speed. She testified that the posted speed limit on that road was thirty five (35) miles per hour. Officer Hillyard visually estimated the vehicle's speed to be fifty (50) miles per hour. She then engaged her radar device, which registered a speed of fifty three (53) miles per hour. As a result, the officer proceeded to stop the defendant's vehicle just north of the intersection of Holt Road and Orchard Street. She then provided the defendant with the said simplified traffic information." In fact, in response to a question from the court as what traffic control device was allegedly violated, Officer Hillyard replied "the speed control sign". The People then rested. The court advised the defendant that he then had a right to cross-examine the police officer. However, the defendant stated he had no questions for the officer.
Upon completion of the People's case, the defendant indicated that he did not have any witnesses. The court reminded the defendant that he had no burden to testify and that if he testified he would be subject to cross-examination by the assistant district attorney. Nevertheless the defendant stated he wished to testify in his own behalf. Upon being sworn in the defendant was permitted to give his testimony by way of making a statement under oath setting out his defense, since there was no one to ask him questions. He did not deny exceeding the speed limit. Nor did he contest the speed as attested to by the officer. Instead the defendant raised the defense of justification. He testified that while driving south on Holt Road, prior to being stopped by the officer, a deer jumped over the hood of his car without touching same. At that time he noticed a group of four more deer to his left. He stated that it was at that time that he sped up to get past those deer before one or more of them ran across the road in the vicinity of his vehicle. On cross-examination the defendant indicated he did not advise the officer of the reason why he was speeding. The defendant then rested his case. At which time, both the defendant and the assistant district attorney were given the opportunity to give a summation.[FN1]
Issue Presented
Was the defendant justified in speeding up in order to avoid a possible collision?
Legal Analysis
This issue was dealt with in People v. Hariton, 61 Misc. 2d 209, 305 N.Y.S.2d 247 [1969]. The defendant in that case was charged with violating VTL § 1180 (d), to wit: speeding. The court summed up the situation as follows:
"The defendant contends that a motorist is permitted to temporarily exceed the speed limit to avoid an accident. Here, defendant maintains that in order to avoid being struck in the rear by a swiftly approaching vehicle (later learned to be that of pursuing police officer) it was necessary for defendant to increase his speed to permit the vehicle to pass when he could not move safely into the right-hand lane."[FN2]In the instant case the defendant maintains that he needed to speed up to avoid the possibility of deer running across the street in front of or presumably into his car. There was no indication why he could not slow down or move over to the side of the road until the possible danger passed. "The courts have held that, in a true emergency, speed limits may be exceeded, but they have been quite conservative in defining those emergencies." (Rose, New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 34:19 at 455 [2nd ed]). In addition, the court in Hariton set out two issues which it suggested a court must consider in determining whether a person was justified in exceeding the speed limit. First," The law does not favor sudden bursts of speed."[FN3] Second, "... that where reliance is placed upon an emergency as the justification for exceeding the speed limit, careful scrutiny of the situation should [be] made.[FN4] In this case considering these two principles it is difficult for the court to conclude that the defendant herein had no other choice but to speed up beyond the thirty five mile an hour speed limit. Thus, as was stated in the Hariton case , "This Court finds that the defendant was not sufficiently prescient so as to be able to conclude that an accident was the only alternative to exceeding the speed limit."[FN5]
Conclusion
The People presented credible evidence at the trial which was legally sufficient and established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof.[FN6] The defense put forth by the defendant, that speeding up in excess of the posted speed limit was justified to avoid the possibility of a collision with the group of deer he observed on the left side of the road, is without merit. Therefore, the defendant is found guilty as charged of the traffic infraction of failure to avoid a traffic control device in violation of VTL § 1110 (a).
Dated: February 4, 2019
Webster, New York
Hon. Thomas J. DiSalvo
Webster Town Justice Footnotes
Footnote 1:The assistant district attorney made a motion at the end of the people's case to amend the ticket to charge the defendant with a violation of 1180 (d)1, to wit: speed in zone. The court reserved on that motion at that time, but now in the discretion of the court that motion is hereby denied as untimely.
Footnote 2:Id. at 210,248.
Footnote 3:Id.
Footnote 4:Id.
Footnote 5:Id.
Footnote 6:CPL § 70.20.
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