People v Walker
Annotate this CaseDecided on February 15, 2018
County Court, Monroe County
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
Yolanda Walker, Defendant.
2017-0963
APPEARANCES:
For the People:
SANDRA DOORLEY, ESQ.
Monroe County District Attorney
By: ELEANOR BIGGERS, ESQ.
Assistant District Attorney
47 S. Fitzhugh Street
Rochester, New York 14614
For the Defendant:
TEO SIGUENZA, ESQ.
1 East Main Street
10th Floor
Rochester, NY 14614
Christopher S. Ciaccio, J.
Defendant Yolanda Walker is charged with one count of Assault in the Second Degree (PL § 120.05[2]). Defendant has requested that the Court inspect the grand jury minutes and moves to dismiss or reduce the indictment on the grounds that the proceedings were defective, that the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient and the indictment is defective (CPL §§ 210.20[1], 210.25, 210.30 and 210.35).
A grand jury may indict only where there is legally sufficient evidence before it that provides reasonable cause to believe that an offense has been committed (see Criminal Procedure Law § 190.65[1]; see further People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 407 [1996]). To dismiss or reduce an indictment on the basis of insufficient evidence, a reviewing court must consider whether the evidence produced at the grand jury, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, would, if unexplained and uncontradicted, warrant conviction by a petit jury (People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 114 [1986], People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523 [1998]).
"Legally sufficient evidence" is defined by statute as "competent evidence, which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged" (CPL § 70.10 [1]). "In the context of a grand jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, [*2]not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 526 [1998], People v Mayo, 36 NY2d 1002, 1004 [1975]). The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to determining whether the evidence presented was legally sufficient; the court is not to weigh the evidence or examine its adequacy (People v Jensen, 86 NY2d 248, 252 [1995]).
A grand jury proceeding is defective when the integrity of the proceeding is impaired, and prejudice to the defendant may result (see People v Huston, 88 NY2d at 409). "The exceptional remedy of dismissal is thus warranted where a defect in the indictment created a possibility of prejudice (see People v Di Falco, 44 NY2d 482 at 487 [1978]). The defendant need not show actual prejudice, (see People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 409 [1996]), however, the "submission of inadmissible evidence will be deemed fatal only when the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain the indictment" (Huston, Id.).
The victim, one Mark Miller, did not testify before the Grand Jury.
To establish what happened, the People called several Rochester Police Department officers and allowed the grand jury to consider the written and oral statements the defendant gave to Officer Louis Mastrangelo.
Officer Louis Mastrangelo presented a written statement signed by the defendant. It was read to the Grand Jury, and in it the defendant stated that her boyfriend, Mark Miller, had come home drunk and started accusing her of "doing stuff" with his cousin's boyfriend, saying that he doesn't "like other men entertaining my women." The victim then "bum-rushed" her and began punching her in the head. The defendant hit him in the head with the coffee mug she was holding "to get him to stop hitting me." Afterward, she noticed the victim bleeding a "little bit." Defendant admitted to Officer Mastrangelo (although it is not in the statement) that she hit the victim one time.
Officer Katelyn Bracht, who responded to the scene, testified. She was asked, "Officer, through the course of this investigation, did you learn of any object that had been used during the assault?" She responded, "coffee mug." Not only was mention of the incident as an assault prejudicial, as it signified to the grand jury that an assault had occurred, but Officer Bracht's responses were inadmissible hearsay, as she could only have learned that a coffee mug used from the victim. No curative instruction was given.
RPD Officer James Castillo testified. He was asked, "Investigator, during the course of your investigation did you have occasion to develop the name of a suspect? He answered, "Yolanda Walker." He was then asked, "Did you learn the nature of the relationship between Ms. Walker and Mr. Miller?" He replied, "They were dating." He then testified that initially Mr. Miller was not cooperative but went on to say that Mr. Miller left him a voicemail "indicating that it was his girlfriend Yolanda Walker that did that to him." (GJT, pp. 16-17). This was not only inadmissible hearsay but was extremely prejudicial testimony that was offered for the truth of the matter asserted, which was, that the defendant is a "suspect" who the officer believes committed the alleged crime.
More hearsay followed. In response to an inquiry from a juror as to whether he found a knife, Castillo said that he went to the apartment for a report of a stabbing (hearsay again, and if having been offered not for the truth but to explain why the officer went there, no curative instruction was given), and there he learned that the victim wasn't stabbed with a knife, but that "he received those marks from being smashed in the face multiple times with a mug, which broke."
How the prosecutor didn't identify this as prejudicial hearsay and direct the jury to disregard the testimony is difficult to understand. No other purpose in eliciting the hearsay is conceivable, but even if there was a purpose that took it out of the definition of hearsay, no curative instruction was given. It cannot be said that the testimony was cumulative, since the victim did not testify. It did not [*3]merely add to what the defendant's statement contained, since it characterized the encounter in an entirely different manner ("Yolanda Walker did that to him,") and added new facts to what happened (the defendant "smashed him the face multiple times with the mug").
Defendant's statement that she acted in self-defense does not establish the requisite intent cause physical injury to the victim with a dangerous instrument. Although defendant's statement to Officer Mastrangelo is self-serving, it is unrebutted by any other proof, and it makes clear that defendant's "conscious objective or purpose" (PL § 15.05[1]) in striking her boyfriend was to get him to stop hitting her, not to cause him physical injury nor to necessarily wield a dangerous instrument.
Moreover, while the officers who interviewed the victim were able to testify to injuries they observed, no competent proof establishes how those injuries occurred. Defendant said she hit the victim one time and that he was bleeding "a bit." The extensive bleeding and facial injuries the officers observed may have preceded the encounter between the defendant and her boyfriend, or they may have been inflicted afterwards by some other actor. Without the testimony of the victim, any inference or suggestion as to how the injuries were caused is based on impermissible hearsay.
Even if intent and causation could be inferred from the defendant's statement to Officer Mastrangelo when the facts and the logical inferences to be drawn are viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the uncorrected hearsay testimony impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings. While it is true that "the receipt of evidence which might not be admissible at trial does not necessarily impair the integrity of a Grand Jury proceeding" (People v. Taylor, 181 AD2d 408, 409 [1st Dept 1992]), here the grand jury's conclusion that the defendant struck her boyfriend with the requisite intent to commit Assault in the Second Degree was very likely influenced by the impermissible testimony, severely prejudicing the defendant and requiring dismissal of the indictment. It is hard to imagine any rational line of thinking by which the jury would have indicted the defendant if it had only heard the competent evidence, i.e., her statement.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment is GRANTED and the indictment is DISMISSED, without prejudice to re-present.
The above constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: February 15, 2018
Rochester, New York
____________________________________
HON. CHRISTOPHER S. CIACCIO
Monroe County Court Judge
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