People v Tarrant
Annotate this CaseDecided on September 7, 2018
City Court of Mount Vernon
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
Joseph Tarrant III, Defendant.
18-1238
For the People:
Westchester County District Attorney, Mount Vernon Branch
For Defendant:
Joseph Goubeaud, Esq.
22 West First Street, Ste. 502
Mount Vernon, New York 10550
Adrian N. Armstrong, J.
A bench trial in this action was conducted on September 6, 2018. The People called the victim Symphani Robinson as its sole witness. The defendant who was being tried on the single count of Harassment in the Second Degree (P.L. § 240.26[1]), testified on his own behalf. The court finds both witnesses testified credibly.
The evidence adduced at this non-jury trial established that on April 20, 2018 at approximately 7:30 p.m., the victim, Symphani Robinson was riding in the defendant's vehicle, seated directly in the passenger seat behind the defendant who was driving. Also seated in the back seat was the defendant and victim's infant daughter. Both witnesses testified that they began to argue while in the vehicle. When the vehicle stopped at a red light at the intersection of Fulton Avenue and Third Street in the City of Mount Vernon, County of Westchester, Ms. Robinson testified that she attempted to exit the vehicle. Ms. Robinson testified that before she could exit the vehicle the defendant reached around from the driver's seat and closed the door on her leg, causing her pain. It is undisputed that the defendant then proceeded to make a left turn at Third Street and proceeded one block to Franklin Avenue and Third Street where he pulled the vehicle over. The victim then exited the vehicle and removed property from within before walking home with her infant child. Ms. Robinson testified that after reaching her residence she then drove her [*2]vehicle to the Mount Vernon Police Department where she filed a complaint against the defendant.
Defendant admitted that he closed the rear passenger door when the defendant was attempting to exit the vehicle, however, he claims that it was done to prevent the victim from exiting the vehicle into a lane of traffic. Defendant also feared that Ms. Robinson was trying to take their daughter out of the vehicle at this intersection and both could have been in danger if he had not closed the rear door blocking Ms. Robinson from exiting.
A person is guilty of Harassment in the Second Degree when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person: he or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same. P.L. § 240.26(1). A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or conduct "when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct." P.L. § 15.05. "Because intent cannot be the subject of a nonhearsay evidentiary allegation, it is necessary only that there be alleged evidentiary facts from which intent may be inferred." People v. Spiegel, 181 Misc 2d 48, 52 (Crim Ct, New York County 1999) quoting People v. Leiner, NYLJ, Oct. 15, 1997, at 34, col 5 (App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists) lv denied 91 NY2d 894 (1998). Intent can be inferred from the defendant's conduct and/or the surrounding circumstances. See, People v. Bracey, 41 NY2d 296 (1977); People v. Collins, 178 AD2d 789 (3d Dept. 1991); People v. Hawkins, 1 Misc 3d 905(A) (Crim Ct, NY County 2003).
The crux of Penal Law § 240.26 (1) is the element of physical contact: actual, attempted, or threatened (see People v Bakow, 96 NY2d 770 [2001]). Although not rising to the level of an assault causing physical injury (P. L. § 10.00 [9]), petty forms of offensive touching, such as striking, shoving and kicking, are prohibited when committed with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm the victim. Furthermore, as there is "[o]ften . . . no direct evidence of a defendant's mental state" (People v Smith, 79 NY2d 309, 315 [1992]), the element of intent may "be inferred from the act itself" or from the defendant's "conduct and the surrounding circumstances" (People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]).
Based upon the credible evidence presented, this Court finds that the trial evidence was inadequate as a matter of law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This legal standard requires the court to determine "whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt". (People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417 [1995]; People v Wong, 81 NY2d 600 [1993]). In this regard, the Court of Appeals has noted that "the scope of a reasonable mind is broad. It's conclusion is not always a point certain, but, upon given evidence, may be one of a number of conclusions. Both innocence and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may fairly lie within the limits of reasonable conclusion from given facts." (People v Jackson, 65 NY2d 265, 271 [1985]). The credible evidence establishes that the defendant did close the rear vehicle door on the victim's leg as alleged by the victim, however, the credible evidence presented is insufficient to infer defendant's intent to harass, annoy or alarm Ms. Robinson. The defendant testified that when he noticed that Ms. Robinson was attempting to exit the vehicle at an intersection into possible oncoming traffic, he attempted to close the rear car door blocking her exit. Given this limited proof, the physical contact does not, by itself, establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to harass, annoy or alarm Ms. [*3]Robinson during the alleged incident. While Ms. Robinson testified that she was scared for her safety and was in pain during this incident, her reaction is immaterial in establishing defendant's intent (see Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Law of NY, Book 39 , Penal Law § 240.26, at 71; see. eg. People v Jemzura, 29 NY2d 590 [1971]).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant engaged in the course of conduct complained of, but did not act with the requisite intent to harass, annoy or alarm the victim on the date and time alleged. As such, the Court finds that the defendant is not guilty of Harassment in the Second Degree.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.
Dated: September 7, 2018
Mount Vernon, New York
HON. ADRIAN N. ARMSTRONG
City Court Judge of Mount Vernon
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