People v Decoster

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[*1] People v Decoster 2018 NY Slip Op 50975(U) Decided on June 26, 2018 City Court Of Mount Vernon Armstrong, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on June 26, 2018
City Court of Mount Vernon

The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

against

Frederick Decoster, Defendant.



18-0931



Westchester County District Attorney

Mount Vernon Branch

Jeffrey Scaggs, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant

73 Main Street

Tuckahoe, New York 10707
Adrian N. Armstrong, J.

The defendant, Frederick Decoster moves to dismiss the criminal action on the ground that he has been denied his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) §§ 30.20 (1) and 30.30 (1) (c).

The defendant is charged with one count of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree in violation of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511. [1]).

Based on the parties' submission, and my review of the record, the defendant's motion to dismiss, is denied.

It is alleged that on February 25, 2014 at approximately 2:57 p.m., the defendant did operate a 1998 GMC motor vehicle bearing New York license plate number 8891IE on South 12th Avenue and West 2nd Street in the City of Mount Vernon, County of Westchester, State of New York. When the defendant was stopped it was revealed that the defendant's license to drive in the State of New York was suspended. The defendant's license was suspended for failure to pay child support as well as for failure to answer a summons. The defendant was given a Simplified Traffic Ticket and released by the Mount Vernon Police Department. The defendant was advised and the Simplified Traffic Ticket stated, that the defendant was to appear in this Court for arraignment on March 20, 2014.

On March 20, 2014 the defendant failed to appear in this court for his arraignment. On April 27, 2018, more than four years later, the defendant was present in this court, was arraigned [*2]and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. The People announced their readiness for trial and the matter was adjourned to May 28, 2018. On June 6, 2018 the defendant filed his motion papers off calendar.

The defendant claims that the entire period of time from the date the ticket was issued on March 20, 2014 until April 27, 2018, the date of the defendant's arraignment, is chargeable to the People. As that period exceeds ninety (90) days, the defendant claims the case should be dismissed.

Pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1), the applicable speedy trial time is determined based on the highest charge in the accusatory instrument. (People v Walton, 165 Misc 2d 672, 674 [Crim Ct, Richmond County 1995].) In this case, the defendant is charged with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle (VTL § 511 [1] [a]) which is an unclassified misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed 30 days. (VTL § 511 [1] [b].) Where a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of less than three months, a speedy trial motion must be granted where the People are not ready for trial within 60 days of commencement of the criminal action (see CPL 30.30[1][c]).

The defendant has the initial burden of showing, through sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted by the statute. (People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986].) Once the defendant has made that showing, the People bear the burden of demonstrating sufficient excludable time in order to withstand a motion to dismiss. (Id.)

Turning to the unclassified misdemeanor that is the subject of this speedy trial motion to dismiss, the Simplified Traffic Information was issued by a police officer and directed the defendant to appear in Mount Vernon City Court at a designated future time, in connection with his alleged commission of the respective offense. Thus, the relevant Simplified Traffic Information conformed to the definition of an appearance ticket and is to be treated as an appearance ticket pursuant to CPL § 150.10.

CPL 30.30 (5) (b) provides, for purposes of computing the time within which a trial must be commenced for a defendant who has been served with an appearance ticket, that "the criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket." (Emphasis added.) The defendant was required to appear in the Mount Vernon City Court on March 20, 2014, yet failed to appear until more than four years later. As such, the defendant's failure to appear when required, in an instance such as this, cannot work to his benefit. It is true that the defendant does not have to bring himself to trial, but he cannot claim the benefits of CPL 30.30 where he has failed to appear for arraignment and has in effect "hid out". If any delay has resulted, the defendant has been responsible for it.

Defendant also moves to dismiss for denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. In People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975), the Court of Appeals set forth five factors to be considered when deciding a constitutional speedy trial motion, They are the extent of the delay, the reason for the delay, the nature of the underlying charge, the defendant's bail status and whether there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by the delay. This Court concludes, once again, that if any delay has resulted, the defendant has been responsible for it, and the defendant has not alleged any impairment of his defense.

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is denied in its entirety.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.



Dated: June 26, 2018

Mount Vernon, New York

__________________________

HON. ADRIAN N. ARMSTRONG

City Judge of Mount Vernon

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