People v Watson

[*1] People v Watson 2018 NY Slip Op 50177(U) Decided on February 5, 2018 Justice Court Of The Town Of Greenburgh, Westchester County Orden, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on February 5, 2018
Justice Court of the Town of Greenburgh, Westchester County

The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

against

Dane Watson, Defendant.



17100118



People were represented by ADA Annmarie Stepancic, Esq., on behalf of Anthony Scarpino, Westchester County District Attorney, and Defendant was represented by Earl Williams, Esq.
Bonnie L. Orden, J.

Defendant is charged with violating VTL §1192 (2), (driving with blood alcohol content greater than 0.08 percent); VTL §1192(3); VTL §1201(a), for stopping, standing, or parking on a highway; Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree, (PL § 195.05); and, Harassment in the Second Degree, (PL § 240.26). Defendant moves for dismissal due to a lack of geographic, subject matter, and personal jurisdiction, as well as dismissal in the Interest of Justice pursuant to CPL § 170.40.

At approximately, 3 A.M., on September 25, 2017, Dane Watson, a 21-year old male, was found slumped over the wheel of his car, asleep at a green light with the motor running, on Interstate Highway 287 ("I-287"). The location of the Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses was within the Town of Greenburgh, Westchester County, NY. A Greenburgh police officer woke up the defendant and detected alcohol on his breath. Thereafter, the New York State Police were [*2]called for assistance. After arriving at the scene, Trooper Malintha Hewage also noticed the smell of alcohol on the defendant's breath. After investigatory questions, defendant admitted that he had been drinking. Trooper Hewage ordered defendant out of his car and performed a series of field sobriety tests which the defendant failed. The defendant was arrested for two counts of driving while intoxicated ("DWI") and ticketed with a traffic infraction at that location, in the Town of Greenburgh located in Westchester County, (hereinafter "Westchester"). Defendant was transported for processing to the "Tarrytown Division" of the New York State Police Barracks, temporarily relocated to West Nyack, Rockland County, (hereinafter "Rockland"). Westchester and Rockland counties are contiguous to one another. The Tarrytown barracks, which had been located in Westchester, were demolished due to construction of the new Tappan Zee Bridge, now known as the Mario Cuomo Memorial Bridge.[FN1]

After defendant's arrest and while in custody in Rockland, defendant consensually submitted to a breath alcohol analysis test, after DWI warnings and Miranda rights were given to him. The results indicated that the defendant had a blood alcohol content of 0.11 percent. Further, while in custody in Rockland, defendant was arrested for Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree, (PL § 195.05), and Harassment in the Second Degree, (PL § 240.26) for allegedly trying to break his leg shackles and handcuffs in order to seize his cell phone so that Trooper Hewage could not call defendant's mother in order to procure for him a safe ride home. Defense counsel alleges, with no substantiation, that the police beat defendant while he was in custody in Rockland, which the People deny, (People's Affirmation in Opposition, p. 3). On October 13, 2017, defendant was arraigned on all five charges in the Greenburgh Town Court. Thereafter, defendant filed two motions. One motion argues for dismissal on the grounds stated herein. The second "dismissal" motion was, in substance, an Omnibus Motion which the Court will address in a separate decision. Thereafter, the People filed an affirmation in opposition and the defendant filed an unsigned, unsworn reply.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The critical issues to be determined are: (1) Does the Town Court in Greenburgh, (Westchester), have jurisdiction of the DWI offenses, when the breath alcohol analysis test was conducted in Rockland; (2) Does the Town Court in Greenburgh have geographic jurisdiction of Obstructing Governmental Administration and Harassment, which alleged crimes occurred in Rockland following defendant's arrest; (3) Should this matter be dismissed because the defendant's due process rights were allegedly violated because of his transport to Rockland for processing where he was allegedly beaten; and, (4) is a dismissal in the interest of Justice warranted.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

[*3]Motion to Dismiss

I. Lack of Jurisdiction

A. VTL §1192 (2), VTL §1192(3), VTL § 1201(a)

The defendant argues that the Greenburgh Town Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter because the defendant was taken to and processed at the West Nyack Police Station/Tarrytown Division of the New York State Police barracks in Rockland, after his DWI arrest in Westchester. The defendant asserts that the Greenburgh Town Court would first need to obtain jurisdiction over the "West Nyack Police Station" in order to prosecute the defendant, since without it, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction and would be a violation of defendant's 14th Amendment due process rights. Defendant also argues that this Court has no jurisdiction since the breath alcohol analysis test was conducted in Rockland.

Once geographical jurisdiction is raised by the defense, the People bear the affirmative burden to prove appropriate jurisdiction, particularly since this is a court of limited jurisdiction. See People v. Kellerman 102 AD2d 629 (1984). The People assert that the Court has proper jurisdiction over the defendant's DWI and traffic violation charges pursuant to CPL § 20.20 (1) (a) which allows New York State to prosecute when the criminal conduct occurred within the State sufficient to establish an element of the offense. The People assert that this jurisdictional authority extends to counties, pursuant to CPL § 20.40 (1) (a) when an element of the offense was committed within such county, or, alternatively, when none of the elements of the crime were committed within that county, one of the five statutory exceptions contained within CPL § 20.40 (2) applies. The People further argue that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to CPL § 20.50, which applies the principles of CPL § 20.40 to jurisdiction between cities, towns, and villages within a particular county.

The Greenburgh Town Court has proper jurisdiction when a crime has been committed within its geographical jurisdiction. See UCJA § 2001 (1); CPL § 20.40 (1) and (2); CPL § 20.50; People v Epstein, 47 AD2d 661, 662 [2d Dept. 1975]. In the instant case, the offending conduct, as contained in the two DWI charges and the traffic infraction, were committed wholly within the borders of the Town of Greenburgh, Westchester County. The mere fact that the breath testing was conducted in Rockland does not rid this Court of jurisdiction since the testing bears an essential connection to Westchester. The toxicology test was part of the trooper's continued investigation and evidence gathering. Defendant was brought to the closest State Police barracks from the scene of the alleged crimes. Not only is defendant's processing ministerial in nature, but the alcohol breath testing was performed with the defendant's consent, after being given the requisite DWI and Miranda warnings.

Motion to Dismiss

I. Lack of Jurisdiction

B. PL § 195.05 and PL § 240.26

With regard to Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (PL § 195.05) and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26), the People argue that this Court's jurisdiction over these charges is proper, even though these crimes were wholly committed within Rockland, because those crimes (1) stemmed from defendant's arrest for DWI offenses in Westchester, (2) were committed while the defendant was in police custody for the substantive crimes of DWI, and (3) "bear a necessary nexus" to Westchester, pursuant to People v. [*4]Kellerman 102 AD2d 629 (1984).

Several courts have ruled that an arrest is complete when a defendant is taken into custody and "events that occur after the arrest are not part of the arrest itself." See People v. Cross, 51 Misc 3d 1210(A) (2016), quoting People v. Hasenflue, 169 Misc 2d 766 (1996); People v. Elliott, 41 Misc 3d 1228(A) [2013]. In People v. Muro, 223 AD2d 563 (1996), a court's charge to the jury on the issue of geographic jurisdiction was erroneous when the court instructed that finding geographic jurisdiction on one count of the indictment effectively provided that county with jurisdiction over all other counts.

In the case at bar, the defendant was placed under arrest for two counts of DWI and a related traffic violation in Westchester. All elements of those crimes were committed in Westchester. When the defendant allegedly attempted to break his handcuffs and leg shackles, in order to grab his cell phone, this activity occurred wholly within Rockland. As such, geographical jurisdiction in Rockland is met. See CPL § 20.40 (1) (a). Defendant's actions and the alleged reasons for taking those actions, which are not disputed between the parties, fail to support the view that these actions were part of a continuing course of conduct that commenced in Westchester and ended in Rockland.

Further, without a single element of the crime being conducted in Westchester, one of the applicable exceptions under CPL § 20.40 must apply. CPL § 20.40 (2) (a) provides that when the offense committed was a result offense and the result occurred in such county, (in this case, Westchester), jurisdiction in the county where the result occurs can be accorded. Additionally, CPL § 20.40 (2) (c) provides that if the conduct had, or was likely to have, a particular effect upon such county (Westchester), and was performed with the intent that it would, or with knowledge that it was likely to have produced a particular result in the effected county, jurisdiction in the effected county would also be proper.

Here, defendant was trying to break free of his restraints to wrestle away his cell phone. The Court finds that this conduct is not a result offense, there was no effect upon Westchester, and the defendant did not act with the knowledge that it was likely to have an effect in Westchester. Accordingly, Rockland remains the proper jurisdiction for the charges of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (PL § 195.05) and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26). Further, the People's reliance on People v. Kellerman 102 AD2d 629 (1984) is misplaced. In Kellerman, a conspiracy case, the defendant shipped cocaine from another state to New York. Geographical jurisdiction was challenged in New York, but the Court ruled that appropriate jurisdiction for a conspiracy charge lies in any county where defendant either entered the conspiracy or committed an overt act in furtherance thereof. No overt act or any element of the Rockland crimes was committed in Westchester, and, as such, Kellerman is clearly distinguishable.

Defendant's mere assertions that his due process rights under the 14th Amendment were violated, or that this Court has no personal jurisdiction [FN2] over defendant, are without grounding in fact or in law. The Court concurs with the People that defendant asserts no facts in support of his allegation that he was beaten while in custody. An unsubstantiated claim of police misconduct cannot be used to support a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Further, defendant's [*5]arguments that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated due to his transport to Rockland are again, unsupported by any facts or law. Indiscriminate references to broad constitutional principles, without more, do little to bolster unsupported, unsubstantiated, or unsworn assertions (see reference to Defendant's reply, supra at 2).[FN3] Finally, defendant's argument that defendant was not served with a Desk Appearance Ticket ("DAT") or brought before the Court for an immediate arraignment, thereby ridding this Court of jurisdiction, is also misguided. Defendant was charged with two counts of DWI by the use of two simplified traffic informations, charged with violating VTL § 1201 (a) by the use of a traffic summons, and charged with violations of PL § 195.05 and PL § 240.26 by misdemeanor informations. Hence, defendant's reliance on CPL § 140.20 to suggest that there was no reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed an offense is without merit.

Motion to Dismiss

II. Interest of Justice

Defendant argues that this matter should be dismissed in the interest of justice pursuant to the factors set forth in CPL § 170.40. The purpose of such a motion is to "allow the letter of the law gracefully and charitably to succumb to the spirit of justice" People v Rickert et al, 58 NY2d 122 (1983), quoting People v Davis 55 Misc 2d 656, 659 (1967). It requires a sensitive balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the People. Id. The trial court's discretion to dismiss in the interest of justice should be exercised "sparingly and only in the rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations" People v Belge, 41 NY2d 60 (1976). Additionally, "[w]hen deciding the motion . . . it is not necessary to engage in a point-by-point 'catechistic' discussion of all ten factors . Instead, the court is required to consider the factors individually and collectively" People v Gragert, 1 Misc 3d 646 (2003) (internal citations omitted).

Under CPL § 170.40, which codified the rubric as outlined in the seminal case of People v Clayton 41 AD2d 204 (1973), the criteria to be considered are: the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; the extent of the harm caused; any evidence of guilt, whether admissible or not; the history, character and condition of the defendant; any exceptionally serious misconduct by law enforcement personnel during the investigation, arrest, or prosecution of the case; the purpose and effect of imposing a sentence on the defendant; the impact of dismissal on the safety and welfare of the community; the impact of dismissal on the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system; if appropriate, the attitude of the complainant with respect to the motion to dismiss; and, any other relevant factors that would suggest that a conviction would serve no useful purpose.

No doubt, and conceded by the defendant, driving while intoxicated is a serious offense. [*6]The Court does not have to wait for harm to occur in order to uphold a charge for such behavior. It is not unusual for a DWI charge to have stemmed from actions where no harm was done to any victim(s). In fact, had harm occurred as a result of defendant's actions, it is likely that far more serious charges would have been levied against the defendant. The defendant's argument that he does not pose a threat to the public is belied by the very nature of these charges. The evidence of guilt is substantial. The defendant admitted to drinking, stated that he knew what this was going to cost him, appeared physically intoxicated by both a Greenburgh police officer and a NY State trooper, failed field sobriety tests, and failed a breathalyzer test. Defendant argues that since he has no history of a prior arrest, is a college graduate who works and drinks occasionally, and is a "model citizen," there is no purpose in imposing a sentence. These factors do not warrant a dismissal in the interest of justice. If the Court dismissed all first-time DWI offenders, there would be no prosecutions in New York for DWI. While defendant alleges that he was beaten by the police, this claim is totally unsupported and uncorroborated. The purpose of sentencing has several goals: retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. Rehabilitation attempts to modify an offender's behavior and thinking, so that the individual does not continue to repeat the crimes for which he was charged. Retribution is self-evident; it serves to punish for the act. The purpose of deterrence is either to deter future criminal conduct of the defendant, or as notice to the public that criminal conduct will not, except in truly exceptional circumstances, go unpunished. Incapacitation is for those who need to be placed in a correctional facility.

The defendant has failed to articulate how in a case of driving while intoxicated, no sentencing objectives would be fulfilled. To the contrary, the Court finds that dismissing defendant's DWI charge would, in fact, have a negative impact on the welfare of the community and set a bad precedent. If the Court were to dismiss these charges, it might encourage the defendant to commit the same illegal acts and, perhaps, result in damage to property, others, or to him. Further, such a dismissal would be equivalent to sanctioning the behavior when it is undeniable that such conduct is dangerous and frowned upon by the community and lawmakers, as evidenced by drunk/drugged driving prevention campaigns and strict DWI regulations in New York. The public's confidence is undermined when a dismissal in the interest of justice is granted, absent a combination of conditions rendering it truly exceptional. Nothing about this case is exceptional or extraordinary. The facts and charges are exactly in line with what VTL § 1192 was designed to protect against — the hazardous effects of alcohol on a person's ability to drive. Defendant was found asleep in a running car at a green light on an interstate highway, which shows the powerful effects of alcohol on a person and significant potential for harm that must be regulated. Defense counsel's statements that defendant is a "model citizen," that the toxicology report was not properly performed, and that defendant did not fail the field sobriety tests are conclusory, unsubstantiated statements. Assuming a proper foundation will be been laid, these are issues of fact to be resolved at trial.

After full consideration of the arguments, the Court finds that the defendant has not presented any compelling factor which warrants dismissal based on the factors delineated in CPL § 170.40.

CONCLUSIONS

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction with respect to VTL §1192 (2), [*7]VTL §1192(3), and VTL §1201(a) is denied;

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction with respect to Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (PL § 195.05) and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26) is granted;

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice is denied.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Dated: February 5th, 2018

Town of Greenburgh

White Plains, New York Footnotes

Footnote 1:The Court takes judicial notice of the following: the new Tappan Zee Bridge construction has now been completed; the "Tarrytown Division" will return to Westchester as soon as construction of the new barracks is complete; and, the Tarrytown and West Nyack barracks are only a few miles away from one other, each one on either side of the Tappan Zee Bridge.

Footnote 2:Defendant resides within Westchester, and the DWI offenses were committed within the County.

Footnote 3:It is clear from defendant's motion papers that counsel was trained in the law in another country, as, for example, he refers to "Parliament," as opposed to the Legislature. In order to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant, this Court has gone overboard to attempt to figure out what counsel is referring to in his motion papers; however, in any future submissions, this court strongly advises counsel that all motions must be substantiated by sworn facts and, where necessary, New York law/case law.