People v Copeland
Annotate this CaseDecided on January 30, 2018
City Court of Mount Vernon
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
Allen Copeland, Defendant.
17-1081
Westchester County District Attorney
Mount Vernon Branch
April D. Bowie, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
315 Madison Avenue, Suite 901
New York, New York 10017
Adrian N. Armstrong, J.
The defendant stands charged with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree in violation of VTL § 511.1. In a pretrial omnibus motion, defendant seeks an order: 1) dismissing the information as facially insufficient pursuant to CPL 100.40; 2) dismissing the information pursuant to a speedy trial violation under CPL § 30.30; 3) dismissing the information in the interests of justice pursuant to CPL § 170.40; and 4) reserving to defendant the right to make additional motions as necessary. The People oppose this motion.
The simplified information alleges that on April 18, 2017, at approximately 6:15 p.m., the defendant was driving a motor vehicle in the City of Mount Vernon in violation of VTL § 511.1. On May 18, 2017, the defendant was arraigned on the accusatory instrument and released on his own recognizance. The defendant was arrested on May 23, 2017 on a very serious unrelated matter and has been incarcerated in that case since that date. On October 11, 2017, at the defendant's request, this Court set bail in the instant matter so that the defendant would receive credit for the time that he's incarcerated.
Defendant first moves to dismiss the charge on facial insufficiency on the ground that he has not been served with a supporting deposition more than six months after his arraignment. As defined in CPL § 100.10(2), a simplified traffic information is a streamlined instrument designed for the expeditious processing of traffic infractions; it is a short, written accusation, signed by a police officer and filed with a criminal court. Evidentiary facts are not required. To be facially [*2]sufficient, the instrument must also comply with the requirement of CPL 100.25.(1) that it be substantially in the form prescribed by the commissioner of motor vehicles."
VTL § 511(1)(a) provides that "[a] person is guilty of the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree when such person operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway while knowing or having reason to know that such person's license or privilege of operating such motor vehicle in this state is suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the commissioner."
A traffic action can be commenced by a simplified information; and that instrument is jurisdictionally sufficient to enable prosecution of the action, provided that it is issued in the form required by the statute and by an officer authorized to do so under the statute (CPL §§ 1.20(5) and 100.10(2). However, since a simplified information does not provide any evidentiary facts with respect to the charge, it does not establish reasonable cause for the charge against the defendant (see, People v Abajian , 142 Misc 2d 250, 256 [justice Court, Village of South Nyack, 1989]). Accordingly, the Legislature has given the defendant an absolute right to obtain a deposition from the arresting officer, setting forth sufficient facts to establish a reasonable cause for the charge, although not necessarily a prima facie case sufficient to go to trial (People v Hohmeyer, 70 NY2d 41, 43 [1987]).
If demanded in accordance with the statute, the defendant must be provided with the supporting deposition within 30 days of the demand, or else the charges against him must be dismissed (People v Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102 [1991]). The defendant must make a timely request for the deposition, either (1) at the arraignment or (2) within 30 days of entry of [a] his plea of not guilty or [b] written notice that he is entitled to receive a supporting deposition (CPL § 100.25(2). If the defendant does not make a timely request, his right to receive the supporting deposition is deemed waived (People v Clark, 142 Misc 2d 544 [Justice Ct., Town of Arcadia, 1988]).
Given the spare standards applicable to simplified traffic informations, and since there is no indication that the defendant demanded a supporting deposition so as to require a demonstration that reasonable cause existed to believe that he knew or had reason to know that his license of operating a motor vehicle in this state was suspended, the defendant's motion is denied. The court also observes that the People are not required to notify a defendant of the right to a supporting deposition.
Defendant also moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument premised upon a violation of speedy trial under CPL § 30.30. Pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1), the applicable speedy trial time is determined based on the highest charge in the accusatory instrument. (People v Walton, 165 Misc 2d 672, 674 [Crim Ct, Richmond County 1995].) In this case, the defendant is charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law §?511 [1] [a]) which is an unclassified misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed 30 days. (Vehicle and Traffic Law §?511 [1] [b].) Where a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of less than three months, a speedy trial motion must be granted where the People are not ready for trial within 60 days of commencement of the criminal action. (CPL 30.30 [1] [c].)
The defendant has the initial burden of showing, through sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted by the statute. (People v Santos, 68 [*3]NY2d 859, 861 [1986].) Once the defendant has made that showing, the People bear the burden of demonstrating sufficient excludable time in order to withstand a motion to dismiss. (Id.)
Defendant contends that his speedy trial rights pursuant to CPL § 30.30 was denied because the People failed to provide him with the appropriate supporting deposition. As discussed earlier, the defendant failed to timely request a supporting deposition, therefore defendant has not met his initial burden of showing, through sworn allegation that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted by the statute.
Finally, defendant seeks dismissal in the interest of justice. CPL § 170.40 provides that a Court may dismiss an accusatory instrument in the interest of justice where there exists "some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice." CPL § 170.40 lists 10 factors which the court must consider when determining whether to grant dismissal in the interest of justice. "The power to dismiss on such ground is, as provided in the statutory text, committed to the trial court's discretion; it should be exercised sparingly and only in that rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations." People v. Harmon, 181 AD2d 34, 36 (1st Dept. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court need not "engage in a point-by-point catechistic discussion of all ten statutory factors; instead, the court is required to consider the factors individually and collectively in making a value judgment that is based upon striking a sensitive balance between the interests of the individual and those of the state." People v. Gragert, 1 Misc 3d 646, 648 (Crim Ct, NY County 2003); see also, People v. Rickert, 58 NY.2d 122 (1988). Where the defendant fails to meet his burden of demonstrating by the preponderance of the evidence that a compelling factor exists to warrant dismissal in the interest of justice, the court may summarily deny the motion. People v. Schlessel, 104 AD2d 501 (2d Dept. 1984).
Defendant's principal appeal is to C.P.L. § 170.40(f), the "purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense." Defendant faces a maximum punishment of 30 days incarceration if found guilty of the sole count of VTL § 511. Defendant has been incarcerated on an unrelated action since May 23, 2017 and bail was set in this action, at the defendant's request, on October 11, 2017. Defendant therefore argues that since he has already served the maximum incarceratory sentence for the offense for which he stands before this court, the action should be dismissed in the interest of justice.
This Court finds that none of the enumerated factors provides a basis for dismissal pursuant to CPL § 170.40. The mere fact that the defendant has served his maximum level of incarceration is insufficient to justify the exercise of the court's discretion, and "does not immunize him from the normal processes of the criminal law (People v Varela, 106 AD2d 339, 340 [1st Dept. 1984]).
"Defendant is reminded that "[i]t is the District Attorney's prerogative to prosecute those who commit crimes, to bring charges or discontinue criminal proceedings" (People v. Keith R., 95 AD3d 65, 67 [1st Dept. 2012]) and absent a showing by defendant that a compelling factor exists to warrant dismissal in the interest of justice, this court will not exercise its discretion under CPL § 170.40(1). This Court finds that none of the enumerated factors provides a basis for dismissal pursuant to CPL § 170.40.
Defendant's reservation of his right to file further motions is unauthorized pursuant to CPL § 255.20(3). Any other motions shall be summarily denied absent a showing of good cause.
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is denied. Defendant's request to file additional motions is denied subject to rights under CPL 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.
Dated: January 30, 2018
Mount Vernon, New York
__________________________
ADRIAN N. ARMSTRONG
City Court Judge of Mount Vernon
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